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The collective action problem in political science examines the circumstances 
under which groups can be successfully formed and maintained.  While earlier 
generations of political scientists believed that groups developed in democracies 
because of the nature of democratic culture and procedures, Mancur Olson (The Logic 
of Collective Action, 1965) demonstrated that free-riding doomed many attempts at 
collective action unless selective benefits were granted to members—hence 
automobile association members receive free travel services, for example.  
Subsequent theories posited other reasons for successful collective action, such as 
communication, leadership and anticipated returns from joining.
Tests of these hypotheses have taken place primarily in laboratory 
experiments.  This study conducts a real-world natural experiment, examining 
interjurisdictional competition (IJC)—a government’s offer of incentives for 
businesses to locate within its environs as opposed to the territories of others—in the 
setting of urbanized areas of various degrees of fragmentation (political organization 
as one, several or many local governments).  If the free-rider hypothesis is true, IJC 
would increase with higher fragmentation.
As the “free-rider” title suggests, IJC has been portrayed in game theory as a 
prisoners’ dilemma.  However, more detailed analysis in this study reveals several 
possible games, each posing a related collective action problem.
Methodologically, additive indices from a nationwide survey of economic 
development practices measure the intensity of IJC effort.  Urban area fragmentation 
is represented by indices using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index method.  The major 
hypothesis—IJC is a function of fragmentation—is analyzed using OLS regression.
The regressions refute the free-rider hypothesis.  The statistical analysis then 
examines the subsequent explanations of collective action.  Anticipated returns 
cannot be substantiated; however, civil society-based indicators show communication 
and leadership to be causes of successful collective action.
Finally, a case study of Hampton Roads (the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport 
News, Virginia metropolitan area) provides a historical narrative of the efficacy of 
communication and leadership in successful collective action as well as a possible 
example of game transition from the prisoners’ dilemma to an assurance game.
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Having been raised in the canon of New England home rule, I quickly became 
fascinated by the range of options for governmental organization of an urban region 
as I was stationed around the country during my twenty-year Army career.  Probably 
early immersion in county-based Southern regions during my first tour of duty in 
South Carolina proved too big a shock to ignore.  If the South can rely on counties, 
which are so unimportant in New England that they were abolished in Connecticut, 
and Oregon can generate a regional government based upon a city named after my 
hometown in Maine, then what other possibilities might exist?  I was hooked.
My post-Service graduate school courses included analysis of the problem of 
collective action.  Mancur Olson had written that free riding would doom collective 
action attempts by all but the smallest groups (absent selective benefits); alternative 
theories upheld the efficacy of anticipated returns, leadership and communication.  
Fragmented versus less-fragmented forms of urban regional governance seemed an 
appropriate setting for a natural experiment in collective action theory.  The 
controversy over jurisdictions competing with each other for new firms by offering 
tax rebates, public works and other incentives was an obvious phenomenon for such 
testing.  My initial speculation was that the free-rider theory would win out—that 
more fragmented regions devoid of an overarching county or regional government 
would naturally spend more on such interjurisdictional competition because their 
myriad component jurisdictions would have to compete with each other for new firms 
as well as with other urban areas, and would be drawn into raiding each other’s firms.  
iii
As outlined below and elaborated in the study, that proved false.  The free-rider 
explanation does not bear up.  Fragmentation proves to be inversely correlated with 
interjurisdictional competition, and leadship and communication are key to gaining 
cooperation in collective action.
P.2 Overview of the Study
Chapter One—Interjurisdictional Competition—provides a description of  
interjurisdictional competition, or IJC.  Anecdotal evidence shows that magnitudes of 
incentives can be quite high—over $62,000 per new job in one case recounted; up to 
$250,000 in other reports.  Such evidence also shows that IJC can indeed be intra-
regional, solely among jurisdictions within a single urban region.  However, along 
with internecine conflict there can also be cooperation on limiting IJC within the 
region and cooperating on attracting new firms.  After introducing interjurisdictional 
competition and the various forms of local governance, the chapter traces collective 
action theory from early political science, which held collective action to be an 
inherent function of democracy, through Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action
(1965) as described above.  The basic hypothesis to be examined is:
IJC = f(urban area fragmentation)
While the collective action problem is the theoretical focus of the study, IJC 
and urban area fragmentation are of interest to other major debates in theory and 
policy.  The Appendix to Chapter One sketches two IJC paradigms in the public 
finance branch of economics.  The first sees intergovernmental competition for 
business as ensuring that all taxes are benefit taxes, a normative value in welfare 
economics.  The second portrays IJC as destructive competition, a race to the bottom.  
iv
The concluding chapter revisits these debates and discusses the implications of the 
study for them.
Olson’s free-rider theory is often presented in game theory as a prisoners’ 
dilemma, and critics of IJC frequently employ the prisoners’ dilemma image.  
However, invoking a metaphor or even proposing numbers for a matrix does not 
constitute sufficient analysis of this political phenomenon.  Chapter Two—Theory—
examines rewards and costs in a game theoretic context.  The chapter appendix 
provides strict logical proofs of assertions in the chapter proper.  Given different 
circumstances—such as raiding other cities within the metropolis or dealing with 
firms which have other location options outside one’s own urban region—the game 
can actually be a prisoners’ dilemma, an assurance game, or a situation of total 
defection.  However, in the spirit of Bendor and Swistak’s 1997 critique of Axelrod, 
the assertion of IJC-as-prisoners’-dilemma is false, but the insight is correct.  A 
strong incentive to defection exists in all circumstances.
Chapter Three—Methodology—lays out the options for analysis.  
Interjurisdictional competition is notoriously difficult to quantify.  The negotiating 
positions of winning and losing jurisdictions generally remain secret, often cloaked in 
claims of proprietary information.  However, the International City/County Managers 
Association (ICMA) conducts a survey of economic development among local 
governments approximately every seven years.  The 1994 survey provides questions 
from which a researcher can derive additive indices assessing the intensity of 
competitive effort of respondent—hence, a proxy for IJC.  Measuring fragmentation 
of urban areas can be accomplished in various ways.  The best available uses 1990
vCensus data for Census-designated urbanized areas to compute fragmentation indices, 
which are essentially Hirschman-Herfindahl Indices subtracted from 1.  (The HHI 
measures concentration, hence the subtraction produces an index of fragmentation).  
The chapter also presents a list of control variables—other financial, social, or 
political phenomena which could have an impact on IJC levels, such as jurisdiction 
income per capita or form of government (elected mayor versus city manager).
Chapter Four—The Free-Rider Hypothesis—uses the ICMA and Census 
datasets to evaluate the main hypothesis.  If the free-rider hypothesis is to be 
substantiated, then increased fragmentation should lead to increased IJC.  However, 
not only is there no statistically significant positive correlation, the relationship is an 
inverse correlation.  Greater fragmentation is associated with less IJC.  Chapter 
Five—Alternative Theories—explores what might explain this counterintuitive result.  
Three major alternatives to the free-rider explanation of collective action exist.  First, 
the results of attempted collective action might be a function of the size of anticipated 
returns—large enough anticipated returns should call forth sufficient persons to make 
collective action successful.  A statistical test with national data fails to substantiate 
the hypothesis that cooperation on IJC is a function of anticipated returns.  However, 
similar national- level tests do substantiate leadership and communication as affecting 
such cooperation.  The more leadership and communication within an urban region, 
the less the IJC.  
National-level data analysis provides an important window on a phenomenon 
usually observed and tracked anecdotally in specific high-profile cases across the 
county.  Chapter Six—Case Study: Hampton Roads, Virginia—analyzes IJC as part 
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of the overall phenomenon of regional economic development cooperation within the 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA.  This is an interesting example of what 
had been two urban areas and MSAs divided by the two-mile-wide James River until 
1983.  An underlying competitive relationship between the two sides of the River 
exacerbates the typical urban-suburban strains, as does the rapid growth of Virginia 
Beach to overtake historic urban center Norfolk as most populous city during the 
1990s.  Nonetheless, a constellation of economic shocks around 1990 led to greatly 
increased efforts for regional cooperation on economic development among business 
and government elites.  An anti-raiding agreement prohibited poaching other 
jurisdictions’ firms.  Existing economic development alliances were upgraded, new 
regional partnerships were formed, and at the end of the study period the subregional 
economic development alliances from the two sides of the James were merged.  The 
chapter argues that Hampton Roads shows how game transition can change the 
underlying dynamics of a situation from the prisoners’ dilemma to an assurance 
game, producing a stable cooperative equilibrium to which leadership elites can move 
the polity.
Chapter Seven—Conclusions—summarizes the study, ties up loose ends such 
as implications for theories other than collective action (as presented in the appendix 
to Chapter One), and proposes an agenda for future research.
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1Chapter 1: Interjurisdictional Competition
1.0 Overview
This chapter serves as an introduction to the topic of interjurisdictional 
competition; its setting in practice among governments—especially at local level—
and in theory.  Section 1.1 will define interjurisdictional competition and provide 
several examples to illustrate various aspects of the phenomenon.  Section 1.2 will 
explore the governance of urban regions in the United States.  American metropolitan 
heritage has produced a rich typology of governments at local and urban regional 
level.  Because this study will offer insights relevant to the foregoing debates in 
various literatures, Appendix 1 to the chapter will present theories associated with 
regional governance as well as with interjurisdictional competition.  However, the 
main theoretical concern of this work is interjurisdictional competition among local 
governments as an example of the collective action problem, which is the topic of 
Section 1.3.
1.1   The Issue Setting—Interjurisdictional Competition
Interjurisdictional competition (IJC) is the use by a government of tax, 
spending, zoning and/or other regulatory provisions as incentives to induce a specific 
firm—or firms in general—to locate (or remain) in its own jurisdiction as opposed to 
another city, county, state or nation.  Incentives can include property, sales and/or use 
tax abatements and exemptions; tax credits for job creation or plant size; grants and 
loans; employee training programs; accelerated depreciation; assistance with site, 
supplier and market information; easing of environmental regulations; zoning 
reclassifications or variations; and numerous other services and considerations 
2(Browning, 1980, p 38; Brunori, p36;  Deloitte & Touche, 1998;  Kenyon, 1988, as 
cited in Netzer, 1991, p 224; Aylward, 2002).  Local governments— the focus of this 
study—generally grant such incentives on the basis of jobs or size of investment.  
Some incentives are standing offers to any firm promising increased employment or 
capital spending.   Other offers are firm-specific or ‘discretionary’ (Klender, 1995), 
wielded on a case-by-case basis to compete with other jurisdictions for specific 
businesses.
IJC has a long history in American political economy: New Jersey offered tax 
abatements to lure Alexander Hamilton’s factory in 1791 (Levine, cited in Brunori, 
2001, p 45).  IJC is widely practiced throughout the United States and abroad: The 
Tour de France bicycle race course varies from year to year as towns vie for 
inclusion on the route by offering different packages to support the event 
(Marketplace, 2002).  IJC varies in its dollar-per-job cost: Standing economic offers 
open to any qualifying new business or expanding current business average $2500 per 
job in a recent Georgia study (Faulk, 2002), while nationally, one-off packages 
negotiated for specific firms range from $25,000 to over $250,000 per job, averaging 
$95,000 per job and defraying up to 45% of new wage costs (Deloitte & Touche, 
1998).  And, as is the case for many economic development programs, IJC is 
controversial: “The real friend to minorities,” claims the antagonist in Richard North 
Patterson’s 1999 political mystery Dark Lady, “is Steelton 2000”— a reference to his 
incentive-driven downtown redevelopment project.
“This project benefits all races, all neighborhoods.
“It changes the image of Steelton from a burning river to a 
city with a glowing future.
3“It keeps Steelton’s money in the hands of Steelton’s 
workers, through a state-of-the-art ballpark built by local 
contractors, supplied by local vendors, and played in by a team 
with local ownership…
“The two hundred seventy-five million dollars [of 
incentives] is as good as paid for—in new tax revenues from 
jobs created and more baseball tickets sold, and from more new 
events like rock concerts [and] All-Star games.”  (Patterson, pp 
34, 41)
Proponents of local government use of business incentives tend to view IJC in 
the context of public-private partnership.  An already prosperous community can 
employ incentives to maintain a brisk pace of economic development and prepare the 
local economy for the next source of business expansion, be it biotech or next-
generation videogame software.  A community struggling to get back on its feet after 
the closing of a major employer can tighten its fiscal belt to afford incentive offerings 
to attract new sources of prosperity (Fairfax County Revitalization Groups, 2001; 
Fischel, 2001;  Freiden & Sagalyn, 1989).  Overall, IJC facilitates “bottom-up 
competition aimed at reinforcing success” in an environment of different urban 
regions with varying strengths upon which to capitalize (McRae, 5/16/01).
But the belt-tightening worries critics of business incentives.  Again, Dark 
Lady’s debate scene:
“So,” [the protagonist objects], “what are we talking about 
here?”
“Two hundred seventy-five million dollars of your money to 
build a new ballpark for [the developer].
“Two hundred seventy-five million dollars for a stadium 
you can’t afford to take your kids to, crammed with luxury boxes 
that go for a hundred thousand dollars a year.
“Two hundred seventy-five million dollars to keep the 
wealthy downtown interests—folks who have no interest in your
neighborhood, or your  lives, but a very generous interest in 
Tom’s [the opponent’s]  campaign—happier with their own 
lives…
4“What else could we do, Tom wonders, with two hundred 
seventy-five million dollars?
“Tom says he’s worried about crime.
“With two hundred seventy-five million dollars we could do 
for Steelton what Mayor Giuliani’s done for New York—put cops 
back on the beat keeping you safe, rather than stuck back at the 
station filling out police reports.
“Tom says he’s worried about schools.
“For two hundred seventy-five million dollars we could 
rebuild our public schools, start some new charter schools with 
rules that make sense to you, not some o verpaid bureaucrat.
“Tom says he’s worried about jobs.
“With two hundred seventy-five million dollars we could 
fund job-training programs for displaced workers, to help give 
back [to] our families the security they deserve.” (Patterson, p 
38)
Critics urge a strict separation of government programs and private 
development.  They object to what they see as inordinate business influence based 
upon the whipsaw tactic (“…town X has offered incentive Y… will you match that 
package?”) and assert that incentives are an inappropriate use of taxpayer money, in 
effect financing what should be a private market function and putting public money 
into private coffers.  Incentives tilt the competitive balance in favor of the big 
businesses which can pressure governments for tax abatements and fiscal and 
regulatory boons, away from the small entrepreneurs who can’t (Nader, 4/15/99).   On 
a larger scale—regionally, nationally, and even globally—IJC may constitute a race 
to the bottom as governments relax environmental regulations as incentives to 
business location, or trade off enlightened (but costly) social policies for money to 
fund incentives (Falk, 1996).  Indeed—as above in Patterson’s fictitious debate and as 
we will see in examples below—harmful income redistribution effects are alleged as 
funding for programs benefiting the poor and middle classes is reduced and in effect 
5funneled to those already wealthy.  And all the while, the privileged patrons reward 
their incentive-granting politicians with campaign donations (Babington, 10/21/98).  
Let’s look at a few recent examples of IJC in order to examine the breadth of 
the phenomenon, beginning with a bidding war near the nation’s capital:
1.1(a)   1999 Marriott Corporate Headquarters Relocation: An Introductory 
Example
December 1998 promised to be a holiday season beset with dark storm clouds 
for Montgomery County and the state of Maryland.   On December 10th the Marriott 
Corporation confirmed reports that it had outgrown its twenty-year-old southern 
Maryland headquarters and planned to build a new $144 million,  3,000-employee 
facility—but not necessarily in southern Maryland’s Montgomery County, host to the 
current headquarters.  Sites were also under consideration in adjacent Frederick 
County, in Virginia’s rapidly developing Loudoun County, and in famed Tyson’s 
Corner in Fairfax County, Virginia—one of the nation’s original edge cities (Garreau, 
1991).  Local and state planners and politicians immediately geared up their 
negotiating options.  (Shear and Evans, 12/11/98; McQuaid, 12/12/98).
Marriott had already signaled displeasure with Maryland’s business climate.  
While Chairman J. Willard Marriott had supported Maryland Democratic  governor 
Parris Glendening’s successful first gubernatorial bid in 1994, by 1998 Mr. Marriott 
was highly critical of Glendening’s economic policies, calling for further tax cuts and 
highway construction to counter congestion.  Marriott and fellow executives 
campaigned for Glendening’s opponent, donating large sums to the Republican war 
chest.  The drama heightened as Montgomery County’s elected County Executive 
Douglas Duncan attempted to coordinate an incentives package with the Glendening 
6Administration, whose newly appointed business and economic development 
secretary publicly commented, “[This deal] has to be fair for all Marylanders and all 
businesses in Maryland.  We can’t set a precedent for one company (Wilson, 
12/15/98).”  A week later, a Marriott spokesperson ominously commented that 
“Virginia has economic advantages” over a Maryland location (Pyatt, 12/15/98).
By mid-January, 1999, Washington-area newspapers were reporting 
preliminary offers:  Montgomery County and Maryland were offering $35 million in 
incentives. Fairfax County and Virginia had put together a package valued at $6 
million as well as millions of additional dollars in new roads and services such as 
employee shuttles, and a lower general tax rate (McQuaid, 1/14/99).  Marriott’s 
opening demand to stay in Montgomery County was variously reported as $51 
million (Staff, Baltimore Sun, 1/22/99) or $75 million (Wilson, 2/2/99).
Reports of incentive offers, meetings and telephone conversations up to the 
gubernatorial level continued throughout Montgomery County’s long winter of 
1999—as did commentary pro and con from editorialists, elected officials and 
everyday citizens.  Even the District of Columbia—snubbed as a potential location by 
Marriott management—made a brief attempt to snare the new corporate headquarters 
(Pyatt, 3/8/99).  Finally, on March 11, 1999, Marriott International’s decision was 
announced: The headquarters would remain in Montgomery County, Maryland.  The 
combined county/state incentives package would total $44 million—over $14,650 per 
job (Brunori, 2001, p 43; Wilson 3/12/99).   The figure is lowered to $11,890 when 
Marriott’s agreement to add 700 new workers is considered (Staff, Baltimore Sun, 
73/12/99).  Fairfax County and Virginia’s combined offer still stood at $6 million plus 
additional services noted above.  
Or was the per-job figure really so relatively low?  In late March, 1999, 
Baltimore Sun reporters used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain telephone log 
notes of calls between Marriott executives and Virginia officials.   A summary of a 
February 10th conversation revealed that Marriott’s treasurer had told a Virginia 
official that Virginia had lost the bidding war.  The treasurer asked that the 
information be kept quiet to avoid damage to Marriott’s ongoing negotiations with 
Maryland (Hancock, 3/27/99; Brunori, 2001, p 43).   The Marriott financial officer 
later stated that he had merely informed the Virginia official the basics of Maryland’s 
final offer had been presented on February 1st, and that all other things being equal, 
the Maryland offer would suffice to keep Marriott in the state (Murphy, 3/30/99).  If, 
however, the more conspiratorial interpretation of events is to be believed, then 
Marriott’s 3000 Maryland jobs were never in jeopardy, and the state and county 
gained only 700 new jobs in return for the incentives package—$62,850 per job.  
Moreover, some have argued that Marriott headquarters was certain to expand 
anyway to accommodate extensive recent and planned acquisitions, so the IJC price 
per job was infinitely higher1 (Pyatt 3/15/99).  As if anticipating this deduction, CFO2
Magazine had earlier published a set of guidelines for companies desiring both to stay 
in their present locations yet receive state and local incentive funding entitled 
1
 Properly, of course, the price per job became ‘undefined’: $44,000,000 divided by zero is undefined 
because division by zero is always ‘undefined’ in mathematics.  However, given everyday parlance, 
“infinitely higher” makes better intuitive sense.
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 Chief Financial Officer
8“There’s No Place Like Home—How Companies Are Cashing In by Staying Put”
(Behr, 3/12/99).
Commentary on the pending 3M Deal (Montgomery, Maryland and Marriott) 
reflected much of novelist Patterson’s dramatic confrontation above.  Greater 
Baltimore [development] Alliance president Ioanna T. Morfessis worried, “It raises 
the issue, ‘What about all of the other companies that have been doing business and 
paying their taxes?’  At some point they could get in line and say, ‘What are you 
going to do to keep me here?’  Inevitably, more will follow (Behr and Evans, 
3/8/99).”  Maryland legislature Delegate Leon G. Billings (D-Montgomery County) 
worried about income redistributive effects:  “One particular taxpayer is going to 
receive significant tax breaks to stay in our county, which increases the burden on 
other taxpayers and rewards economic blackmail.  If they want to leave, that’s their 
business decision, but it should not be tied to the amount of socialism it can get out of 
the government…  If you asked the people of Montgomery County if they want to use 
$50 million to bribe a company to stay, the answer would be, ‘No, let’s build schools 
instead’ (Wilson, 2/24/99).”
Other comment was guarded or even filled with praise.  “My only worry is 
that [the deal] could undercut other efforts on our part to meet real needs in the 
county—but we are in the fortunate position of having substantial resources available 
to us,” commented Blair G. Ewing, Montgomery County Council member (D- At 
Large) (Wilson, 2/2/99).  The Baltimore Sun editorialized that “Losing a Fortune 500 
company headquarters of Marriott’s esteem would be a crushing blow for 
Maryland’s economic development efforts (Staff, Baltimore Sun, 2/7/99).”  And an 
9internal Montgomery County financial analysis obtained by the press asserted that 
Montgomery County would recover its $18 million share of the incentives offer in 
three years—Marriott costs the County $6.6 million in traffic, schools and public 
services but pays $12.6 million in taxes.  A similar Maryland document projected a 
State break-even date two years later  (Wilson, 2/15/99).
Key Analytical Points:  The Marriott headquarters relocation bidding war 
highlights the extremely competitive IJC world with both state and local incentive 
offerings.  Greater Baltimore Alliance president Morfessis’ comments demonstrate 
that the major concern is about IJC as a process.  The amount paid for keeping 
Marriott in state can be more readily justified than a process in which “all of the other 
companies…say, ‘What are you going to do to keep me here?’.”  Later in the 
appendix to this chapter we will see that the theoretical literature on IJC is also 
concerned with IJC as a process rather than as single, unique phenomena.  Relatedly, 
the Marriott example underscores the usefulness of the prisoners’ dilemma paradigm, 
in which two or more individuals or governments have individual motivations to 
continue to compete for firms even though they conceivably would do better to 
cooperate on business attraction and retention to avoid IJC costs.  The next chapter, 
Theory, will explore the prisoners’ dilemma and other game theoretic concepts in 
detail.
Not all IJC involves an interstate component, however.  Our next case will 
recount an entirely intra-urban region example of IJC.
10
1.1(b)   Portland-Westbrook, Maine Warehouse & Television Facility 
Relocation: A Local IJC Example
The Portland, Maine area—comprising 120,000 residents in seven cities and 
towns—has become a locus of intense IJC over the past decade.  The central city, 
Portland, employed tax-increment financing (TIF) nine times between 1994 and 2001, 
ploughing corporate property taxes into roads and other improvements which enhance 
the corporation’s site instead of into city coffers.  The value of these TIFs ranges from 
$711,570 to $10.3 million (Downtown Portland Corporation, 1997; Shanahan, 
6/30/01).  The city has granted benefits up to $50,826 per job created or retained 
(Downtown Portland Corporation, 1997).  
The most recent TIF sought to cement the move of a 120-employee 
telecommunications firm from elsewhere in the State with $4.8 million in benefits, or 
$40,000 per new job (Staff, Portland Press Herald, 9/28/01).  However, IJC within the 
Portland area can also include raiding firms from other jurisdictions within the urban 
region itself.  In 1998, Bindley Western Industries’ pharmaceutical warehouse was 
moved from Portland to neighboring Westbrook in response to a tax abatement offer 
(Staff, Mainebiz, 1/7/02).  In October, 1999 the local Fox and Paramount network 
affiliates announced that they had outgrown their jointly-owned Portland facility.  A 
new facility would enable the stations’ news programming to be “equal to or better 
than” that of competitors.  Their search for a new site focused on a Westbrook 
location.  The Westbrook City Council approved a 25% property tax reduction for the 
site over ten years, saving the firms $166,000 (Bell; Staff, Press Herald, 10/20/99).  
The affiliates accepted the offer and relocated, even as the stations’ project manager 
remonstrated that the companies would have moved without the tax break.  No money 
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from a higher echelon of government was involved in this transaction, although 
Westbrook’s cost is actually somewhat less than $166,000 because of state and 
county tax accounting procedures.  
Key Analytical Points:  Interstate IJC is not the only game in town.  IJC can 
and does occur between neighboring towns and cities.  Such intra-urban IJC raises the 
same concerns as interstate IJC, and once again, the prisoners’ dilemma descripton 
fits the ongoing process.
As a near-poetic footnote to Westbrook’s victory, in 2001 the Ohio-based new 
owner of Bindley Western closed the TIF-won warehouse, eliminating 111 jobs 
(Staff, Mainebiz, 1/7/02).  
1.1(c)   Boeing Headquarters Relocation-- Chicago vs Denver: An Example 
of  Intra-Urban Area IJC vs Cooperation
Maryland’s Marriott Corporation is not the only mega-firm capable of 
surprising its host community.  On March 21, 2001, aircraft maker Boeing 
Corporation announced plans to move its 1,000-member world headquarters out of 
Seattle, the city of its founding in 1916.  Boeing startled not only Seattle officialdom 
but movers and shakers in the Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth and Denver urban areas by 
announcing that one of the latter three metropolises would be the manufacturing 
giant’s next home (Staff, AP, 3/21/01; Draper, 3/22/01).
The eventual winner of this IJC tug-of-war, Chicago, immediately swung into 
action.  Democratic mayor Richard Daley quickly enlisted the support of beleaguered 
Republican Governor George Ryan.  The two had long been the odd couple of Illinois 
politics, mutually financing a new football stadium for the Chicago Bears and 
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pushing a $12 billion state construction bill.  Illinois pundits were not surprised by 
Daley’s public support for Ryan’s re-election several months after the Boeing 
announcement: With the gubernatorial re-election, Daley would remain the most 
influential Illinois Democrat, and Ryan would continue to enjoy Daley’s impetus in a 
number of legislative battles in the divided Illinois state government (Dizon, 7/21/01).  
The combined state and city incentives offer to Boeing eventually came to 
$75.5 million: $52.5 million in state tax credits and other benefits, and $23 million in 
Chicago tax breaks.  The battle for legislative approval was not easy.  South Illinois 
interests demanded similar help for their regional coal industry.  Many lawmakers 
were dubious about providing benefits to firms while proposals to cut the state 
gasoline tax were being shelved as too expensive.  In the end, the $52.5 million 
approved was $11 million less than the amount originally offered to Boeing by the 
Governor—a shortfall which did not reverse Chicago’s victory (O’Connor, 5/31/01; J. 
Patterson, 4/21/01 & 5/15/01).
Legislative conflict was not the only homegrown threat to Chicago’s Boeing 
bid, however.  Intra-metropolitan IJC took seed and sprouted throughout the region 
during the spring of 2001.  No less than seventeen urban and suburban Chicago 
jurisdictions ranging from Elgin to tiny Bannockburn (population: 1,400) developed 
their own packages of incentives to lure Boeing.  About a dozen could not meet real 
estate requirements for Boeing’s headquarters  (Spielman, 4/11/01; Susnjara, 
4/12/01).  Five remained strong enough as competitors that Boeing executives toured 
them as part of their official April on-site inspection of the Chicago urban region 
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(Toomey, 4/11/01).  The internecine conflict was sufficiently disturbing for a writer 
in Crain’s Chicago Business to mourn (Merrion, 4/2/01): 
On paper, the Chicago region’s effort is being coordinated 
by the DCCA [state Department of Commerce and Community 
Affairs]…   [However,] so far, Denver has not seen any 
localities pitching Boeing independently, and in Texas, only two 
or three outside of Dallas and Fort Worth has expressed 
interest…   While Chicago [regionally] lacks an organizing 
force…Denver has a regional economic development group 
called the Metro Denver Network, which covers the six-county 
region.
The editorialist was soon partially in error: Within a fortnight, two Denver 
area counties had announced bid packages, and three component communities were 
offering additional incentives should Boeing bless their turf with its presence 
(Arellano, 4/13/01; Griffin and Leib, 5/4/01).  However, the general description of 
regional cooperation in the Denver region was correct.  Central to the mechanisms for 
cooperation is the Metro Denver Network (MDN).   The MDN is the successor 
organiation to the Greater Denver Corporation (GDC), formed in 1987 after some 
particularly difficult years for the Denver region economy.  Founders from six 
counties and almost five dozen cities agreed in their charter to “combine the 
resources of all metropolitan area economic development agencies for the purpose of 
attracting more new business and industry.”  MDN also came to include almost one
hundred corporate members.
According to founders, the GDC and MDN doubled the number of cases in 
which Denver had become a finalist in the site selection process.  The organizations 
were also responsible for coordination of the region’s new international airport and a 
light rail system.  MDN leadership and regional business leaders believe that 
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prospective firms prefer well-coordinated regional proposals rather than a cacophony 
of varying bids (Hornby, 1995; Merrion, 4/2/01).
What then explains the eventual emergence of competing Denver-area offers 
for Boeing?  The MDN charter authorizes only MDN to make the initial contact with 
firms proposing a Denver-area location.  Any signatory receiving an overture from 
such a firm is required to refer the company to the MDN.   Only after its own initial 
talks with the firm will MDN open the site selection process up to component 
communities.  And on a similar note germane to the previous section of this chapter, 
jurisdictions are not allowed to raid other MDN members.  If a firm in Aurora offers 
to move to Denver if Denver’s price is right, Denver officials are compelled to first 
contact Aurora to ensure that Aurora officialdom knows what is transpiring (Metro 
Denver Network, Code of Ethics, undated).  
Despite site inspection tour highlights such as breakfast in the governor’s 
mansion with Denver Broncos star quarterback John Elway, Boeing officials passed 
over Denver and its almost $30 million in combined state and local incentives (Tsai, 
5/1/01; Leib, 5/11/01).  But Denver officials did not register dismay.  The benefit of 
lessons learned and the publicity of making Boeing’s short list were the theme of 
official comments and most editorials.  And no one doubted the continued 
applicability of the lesson in regional cooperation learned over a decade earlier.
Key Analytical Points:  Urban regions can foster cooperation as well as IJC.  
In greater Denver’s case, the genesis of cooperation was severe economic distress: 
The crisis of the mid-1980s—a boom time for most of the rest of the nation—saw the 
loss of 14,000 petroleum jobs (half of the local energy sector), a high rate of business 
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failures and plummeting land prices.  The area’s office vacancy rate became the 
highest in the nation (Hornby, 1995, pp 12-13).  Such economic distress would 
among other things raise the real cost of IJC.  The theoretical chapter will 
demonstrate how heightened costs can transform IJC from a prisoners’ dilemma to an 
assurance game, which more readily results in group cooperation.  
1.1(d)   IJC—The Developer’s Point of View
While this study will be from the perspective of local governments and the 
economic development problems they face, it is instructive to understand IJC from 
the perspective of the business executive making a location decision.  
The literature on the practice of commercial and retail location follows fairly 
logically from the economic and geographic theories of industrial location.  Miller 
(1977), for example, sketches theories of agglomeration, locational interdependence, 
and spatial general equilibrium, then tests each against the experiences of eight major 
industrial groups.  Hack (1999) emphasizes the derivative lessons for practitioners.  
The executive should primarily consider proximity to markets and materiel, 
transportation costs, utility cost and availability, and labor costs.  The average firm 
will need to consider approximately one hundred jurisdictions in about six states 
(Hack, 1999, pp 38-39).  Cutting edge computer software programs also employ these 
methods graphically.  Map-based computer geographic information systems (GIS) 
allow users to optimize location vis a vis  factors such as target income, ethnic and 
sociological groups, desired transportation facilities, and sources of industrial inputs.  
A typical iterative search—conducted on an on-screen map—might essentially 
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request, “Show me the areas which are (a) within 10 miles of a concentration of at 
least 20,000 people with per capita income exceeding $65,000 per year and who are 
of ethnic backgrounds ‘X’ and ‘Y’, (b) within one mile of an interstate highway off-
ramp, (c) within ten miles of a major airport, and (d) within 25 miles of a research 
university.  I want to locate our new branch office/sales site in one of those areas.”
The output of this Boolean logic process is a map highlighting suitable locations 
(ESRI, 1996).
Hack covers the differences in state and local tax structures—as well as local 
zoning ordinances and restrictions—to illustrate the need to evaluate each in detail 
before making a location decision.  His work contains only a brief IJC-esque 
reference to considering local “availability of financial aid” (Hack, 1999, pp 109-
116, 119).  On the other hand, a Rouse Company guide to industrial site selection 
(Browning, 1980) incorporates a full chapter on incentives and IJC.  Browning details 
all the incentive types outlined in the first section of this chapter.  He notes the 
existence of geographically specific Federal programs (and regional Congressional 
coalitions supporting them)  as well as state incentives.  Critically for our study, 
Browning acknowledges the crucial role of local incentives—it’s not just a state-level 
game.
After listing these considerations, the Rouse reader treats the budding site 
selector to a walk through the incentives negotiation process—an enlightening transit 
indeed (pp 31-33, 40):
Almost every political jurisdiction in the United States waits 
eagerly to aid you in your location search…Most counties and 
cities of any size have some kind of staffed economic 
development organization… A successful relationship with 
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representatives of economic development organizations 
(especially at local level) will often speed up all the permitting 
processes which must go on after a final location decision has 
been made… In all cases, discussions are confidential…  The 
basic rule of thumb when dealing with the public agencies is 
“Ask and you may receive.”… The competition among states for 
your business is fierce; the same is true county to county and 
city to city… 
If you elect to conduct your business incognito, don’t feel 
you’ll be poorly treated…  it is not uncommon for companies to 
go to elaborate means to disguise who they are.  Some even go 
as far as to cut the labels out of their suits lest the people they 
are talking to discover their city of origin…
As should be clear by this time, industrial development is a 
highly competitive sales situation.  [Government 
representatives] will… work nights and weekends should your 
needs dictate…[and] consider their role as that of a catalyst to 
bring the company and the community together…
A somewhat less effusive (while nonetheless maturely pragmatic) treatment in 
the professional literature is presented in Klender (1995).  The author notes the 
smorgasbord of benefits available but cautions executives to base their short lists of 
sites for final consideration on the conventional economic analysis described at the 
outset of this section (p 2):  
While incentives are often one of the first things our clients 
discuss when we begin site selection projects, we caution that 
incentives should play a secondary role in evaluating the 
desirability of potential locations.  Most incentives are of a 
short-term nature; after they run their course, the company is 
left with the basic attributes of the community… For most 
projects, incentives’ main role should come in the later stages of 
selecting a location, when the company is narrowing the choice 
among a small group of top locations…  It is at this point that 
the location offering the most attractive package of incentives 
will generally get the facility.
Klender alerts businesspersons to the possible requirement of formal “clawback” 
agreements guaranteeing investment or hiring targets.  If the firm fails to meet the 
target(s), the incentive deal is off.  He also cautions executives that the cost in 
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goodwill of belligerently extracting the last few thousand dollars of incentives may 
outweigh the value of those benefits over the long run.
Key Analytical Points:  While significant, incentives do not appear to have 
the same overriding criticality to private executives that they do to their government 
counterparts, for whom incentives are a major tool of economic development—and 
the only one they possess with which to compete for specific firms.  Also important 
for our study is the repeated observation that business executives consider the local 
level incentives to be as important as state IJC.
1.2 The Issue Setting—Governance Structures and Fragmentation 
As might be inferred from the examples in sections 1.1(a)-(c), IJC is often 
linked in debate to fragmentation of urban regions into multiple local governments.  
If destructive competition is a problem, why not simply pare the number of players 
(jurisdictions) down to one government for the whole urban region and eliminate the 
problem?  The debate tends to produce two polar positions.  A number of descriptors 
exist for these two schools, often with rhetorical baggage attached: Those favoring 
unified metropolitan area-wide government often refer to the opposite opinion as 
Balkanization.  Those seeing greater virtue in local home rule strike back with 
Gargantua to describe unified governance.  This study will use the terms 
poloycentricity and monocentricity—originally derived from Michael Polanyi’s 1951 
The Logic of Liberty and adopted by the Indiana University Workshop in Political 
Theory and Policy Analysis (McGinnis 1999a, 1999b, 2000)—as well as neutral 
synonyms such as fragmented or multiple jurisdiction governance, and unified, 
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metropolitan, or regional government, respectively.  The appendix to this chapter will 
sketch these arguments and the concluding chapter will comment on the implications 
of this study for these theories.  For now, we should take a brief look at American 
local government and the structure of urban regions.
There is considerable variety in the mechanisms of local government in the 
United States.  State governments have designated counties and townships as 
subdivisions of the state vested with certain governmental functions.  Particularly in 
southern states, the county is the predominant form of local government.  Locations 
within the county may carry place names but have no independent government (a 
well-known example: Reston, in Virginia’s Fairfax County), although some truly 
independent self-governing cities may exist within the county’s boundaries.  The 
functions of townships vary nationwide, from the renowned town meetings of New 
England to mere collection of poor taxes in many states of the old Northwest 
Territories.
Unlike other forms of local government, the incorporated city is deliberately 
formed by local citizens who desire local self-determination and government.  As 
such, it is historically a unique bottom-up institution (David Miller, 2002, p 27).  The 
twentieth century, however, spawned other forms of bottom-up (in some cases, 
arguably middle-across) institutions to handle the demands of urban regions which 
had outgrown central city urban boundaries.  Annexation of adjacent incorporated or 
unincorporated communities—already an option in some areas—was used frequently 
in the Progressive Era.  City-county consolidation has been the result of nineteen 
mergers approved by voters since World War Two (Rusk, 1996, p 36).  Regional 
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government has been instituted in several U.S. metropolitan areas.  Portland, 
Oregon’s Metro Government is the only directly elected regional government—other 
governing bodies are appointed by component jurisdictions.
Finally, special districts manage distinct functions across areas which may or 
may not be contiguous with the boundaries of local general purpose governments 
such as cities and counties.  School systems are frequently governed as special 
districts.  Water and waste management functions also are often administered on a 
special district basis.
To further complicate the picture, the latitude granted local governments 
varies from state to state.  Most restrictive are the Dillon’s Rule states, which follow 
Iowa Supreme Court Justice John F. Dillon’s dictum in his 1881 Commentaries on 
the Law of Municipal Corporations (p 75):
Public corporations [municipal governments] are called 
into being at the pleasure of the state, and while the state may, it 
need not, obtain the consent of the people of the locality to be 
affected. …[T]he power of the legislature over such 
corporations is supreme and transcendent: it may erect, change, 
divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public 
good to require.
In a more modern phrasing: “Municipal corporations have and can exercise only 
those powers expressly granted [by the state legislature], those necessarily or fairly 
implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable (McCarthy, p 14).”
In practice this doctrine has been applied with varying degrees of liberality.  
Nonetheless, the application of Dillon’s Rule remains far distant from the home rule
spirit expressed in the 1868 work of Michigan Justice Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise 
on the Constitutional Limitations (pp 189, 191):
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In contradistinction to those governments where power is 
concentrated in one man, or in one or more bodies of men, 
whose supervision and active control extends to all the objects of 
government within the territorial limits of the State, the 
American system is one of complete decentralization, the 
primary and vital idea of which is that local affairs shall be 
managed by local authorities and general affairs only by the 
central authority…  [A] dense population renders different rules 
important from those which are needful for the rural districts… 
[The] regulation of such local affairs…is not understood to 
properly belong to the State; and when [the State legislature] 
interferes, as sometimes it must, to restrain and control the local 
action, there must be reasons of State policy or dangers of local 
abuse to warrant the imposition.
The argument over the proper degree of local autonomy is both old and 
ongoing.  Recent commentary on urban region issues such as sprawl and IJC 
spending have frequently distinguished such controversies as properly falling into 
Justice Cooley’s “reasons of State policy” to justify the intervention of state 
legislatures.  This debate can rapidly become complex; for our purposes, it serves to 
underscore the intriguing variety of local government arrangements across the nation.
Statistically, then, what is the urban region setting in which various types of 
municipalities must solve problems facing their inhabitants?  Using Census-defined 
urbanized areas (we will examine definitions and measures of urban regions in 
Chapter Four), we find a heterogeneity similar to that of government types.  
Urbanized areas range from a single jurisdiction covering the entire urban 
population—Davis, California—to dozens or even hundreds of local (including 
county), general-purpose (as opposed to special district) governments.  The following 
table lists several well-known examples from the spectrum:
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Urban areas thus can contain vast numbers of cities, towns, and counties.  
1.3 The Theoretical Setting—The Collective Action Problem
A vast policy literature has been devoted to whether IJC and urban area 
governmental fragmentation are socially beneficial or bad.  The results of this study 
will have implications for this debate; therefore, the appendix to this chapter will 
describe these arguments and the concluding chapter, the implications of the 
statistical and case analysis to be presented.  However, the major thrust of the inquiry 
will be what the American urban area IJC phenomenon teaches us about one of the 
key elements of democratic life—collective action by citizens and groups.  This 
section will outline the history of collective action theory in political science.
1.3(a) Introduction
The [retreating] Athenians hurried on to the 
Assinarus River… As soon as they were there, they rushed in 
without any order, each man wanting to be the first to cross 
while the enemy laid into them… [T]hey fell upon one another 
and got trampled under foot… In the end, …the army was utterly 
defeated… (Thucydides, p 150).
Personal security and individual benefits can be powerful disincentives to 




Boston, Massachusetts 2,774,717 99
Chicago, IL-- Northeast IN 6,793,132 379
Davis, California 52,711 1
Denver, Colorado 1,517,803 30
Las Vegas, Nevada 679,078 4
Los Angeles, California 11,402,955 141
New York, NY-- Northeast NJ 16,044,493 459
Portland, OR-- Vancouver WA 1,171,834 6
Washington, DC-- MD-- VA 3,363,047 57
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looked upon democratic collective action as an inherent function of individuals raised 
in a tradition of freedom.  Groups may have different ‘intensities’ of activity and 
utilize different ‘techniques’ to influence others and pressure government officials 
(Bentley, 1908, pp 215-216), but groups occur simply because that is what citizens in 
a democracy do:
I am inclined to think that if a complete analysis of the 
whole process could be made we could attain a point of view at 
which we could see the activity of all these discussion and 
organization groups so completely absorbed into the represented 
interests, that we should no longer feel ourselves under the 
necessity of attributing any independent activity to them.  
…[I]nterest is merely a manner of stating the value of the group 
activity… (Bentley, 1908, pp 445, 215.)
1.3(b)   The Logic of Collective Action 
Mancur Olson challenged the prevailing view in his 1965 The Logic of 
Collective Action.  Olson argued that while small-size groups have the ability to 
enforce agreements through social pressure, larger ones are doomed to failure in the 
manner of Thucydides’ account of the Athenian defeat in Sicily.  The group 
members’ common goal is not enough to attract and keep members.  In fact, 
ironically, the existence of an organized group—political pressure group, labor union, 
and the like—works against goal attainment: The average individual who shares the 
goal, noting the organized group, will be tempted to free ride on the efforts of those 
who have already joined the group.  If I, a senior citizen, see that the American 
Association of Retired Persons is pushing for legislation helpful to seniors, why 
should I spend money on AARP membership for lobbying benefits I already receive?  
The same problem is publicized yearly during public television membership drives: 
Many individuals enjoy public television programming at the expense of others’ 
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financial support.  They are able to view their favorite shows without helping to pay 
for them.  They are free riders.
What, then, is Olson’s solution?  Olson saw that successful organizations 
offered potential participants more than attainment of the common goal.  In addition 
to the collective benefit upon which so much free-riding is possible, successful 
organizers ensured that those who joined the organization received selective benefits
from which non-members were excluded (Olson, 1965, pp 133-4).  
A thoughtful look around successful contemporary organizations furnishes a 
number of examples of selective benefits.  The American Automobile Association 
(AAA) lobbies state and national governments for highway construction and 
measures to aid the motoring public.  Non-members certainly receive the benefits of 
AAA-backed legislation.  However, in addition to these lobbying results, those who 
choose to become AAA members also receive AAA roadside assistance, low AAA 
hotel and car rental prices, free trip maps and other such selective benefits.  Similarly, 
to continue an example from above, American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP) members receive not only the benefits of AARP lobbying successes but also 
low-cost prescription drugs, vacation packages, and other selective benefits.  Even an 
outfit with as pristine an image as the Sierra Club relies upon selective benefits in the 
forms such as wildlife vacation packages to attract members.
Olson compares organizations with virtually identical lobbying goals, some of 
which succeeded and others of which failed.  Representative is the case of farmers’ 
lobbies.  Nineteenth century lobbies did not offer selective incentives.  Only one—the 
Grange—ever became successful, and that success lasted barely over a decade before 
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it collapsed, survived by a meager following as a nostalgic echo of the past.  The 
twentieth century saw the rise of several farmers’ organizations, the most successful 
of which were organized as ‘Kirkpatrick cooperatives’.  Under this scheme, 
management is in the hands of the lobbying organization, not the members.  
Kirkpatrick-type Farm Bureau cooperatives conduct business with any farmer, but 
only members receive dividends—a selective benefit.  Members also receive low-cost 
insurance.  This prompted a newly-formed no-frills competitor lobby to advertise “we 
insure your income, not your car” in an attack on the allegedly frivolous side-
programs of the  Farm Bureau, but the challenger failed to draw membership numbers 
close to those of the Farm Bureaus  (Olson, p 153-9).  Through this and other mini-
case study narratives, Olson substantiates his thesis.  Numbers are the key to the 
collective action problem: Small groups can overcome the collective action problem 
but as ‘n’—the number of individuals sharing the common interest—increases, 
successful collective action is imperiled.   The only solution Olson sees is selective 
benefits.
1.3(c) Critiques of Olsonian Collective Action
Olson’s n-based collective action analysis receives support not only from his 
mini-case studies, expanded in his later The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982).  
Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) list more contemporary examples (pp 242-244).  Terry 
Moe found that most individuals who joined trade and other economic unions did so 
for the selective benefits, not for promotion of the group cause.  (Moe, 1980, in 
Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997, p 249).  In summarizing the empirical evidence (1989, p 
310), Dennis Mueller includes the following observations: “Some but not all 
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individuals will free ride in a prisoners’ dilemma situation… Free riding increases as 
the number of players expands, at least if the return to a player declines as group size 
increases.”   Yet less than ten years later, John Ledyard (1995) would characterize 
number of participants as having no effect on collective action in his survey of 
experimental research on public goods (p 143, table 2.10; pp 151-5).  Thus, while 
certain case studies are mustered to substantiate Olson’s theory, rigorous experiments 
have not to date supported it.  
Moreover, subsequent theoretical analysis has revealed that Olsonian free-
rider collective action theory does not apply to pure public goods—goods or services 
which are joint (one entity’s consumption does not reduce the amount available for 
others) and non-excludable (no person or entity can feasibly be excluded from 
consumption of the public good).  An example of a pure public good is national 
defense: Once provided, this protection is available to all, and the birth/immigration 
of a new citizen does not diminish the amount available for others.  On the other 
hand, a public swimming pool can be a non-pure public good.  A fence and 
gatekeeper can bar residents of another community, and too many swimmers at one 
time can crowd the pool, decreasing its benefits to the average user.  
Olson’s characterization of the importance of ‘n’ remains valid for non-pure 
public goods, as will be detailed in Chapter Two and its appendix, Sections 2.7 and 
2*.7.  The public good of concern in IJC is economic development and fiscal benefits 
from the lowest-cost attraction (and retention) of business firms.
We can deal with the nature of the public good in more detail.  First, observe 
that IJC really has two components—the amount needed to attract a firm to one’s UA 
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(call this “Level #1 IJC”) and the amount necessary to attract development destined to 
the region to one’s own jurisdiction within the UA (“Level #2 IJC).   If cities and 
towns cooperate by agreeing not to provide Level #2 incentives, they in effect obtain 
an amount of money equivalent to the savings of Level #2 IJC.  The benefits of the 
public good (with commentary on jointness) are:
• Taxes from the new firm:  Not joint.  These accrue only to the gaining 
jurisdiction.
• Jobs, shopping and business supply opportunities:  Partially joint.  A 
new firm brings jobs, new opportunities to shop and for existing firms 
to obtain wholesale supplies.  These benefits spill over into other 
jurisdictions in that their citizens may shop or work at the new firm.  
However, the net benefits decline as a function of distance.  For 
example, the benefits of a job are partially eroded by a long commute, 
which imposes time costs as well as gasoline or transit costs.
• Saving Level #2 IJC costs: Joint.  Any jurisdiction can opt to 
cooperate and forswear intra-UA IJC, sharing in the public good.
The non-pure IJC public good is also not excludable.  A non-cooperating 
jurisdiction can offer incentives to lure firms away from its neighbors and still enjoy 
some of the spillover benefits noted above.  However, this should not imply that one 
or two defectors will obtain all the firms attracted to the urban area because, just as 
the region has limits to its absorptive capacity, so too do individual jurisdictions.
Thus, IJC is a non-pure public good.  (Section 2.7 of Chapter Two and its 
appendix present a more formal argument.)  Attempts at cooperation through 
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collective action should consequently exhibit Olson’s prediction that cooperation fails 
as a function of increased numbers.  Therefore, the major hypothesis examined in this 
study is:
IJC = f(urban area fragmentation)
More broadly, this study seeks to answer the question: Is IJC effort a function of 
increased numbers of players, or is competition/cooperation among jurisdictions 
determined by any of the three major alternative explanations—anticipated returns, 
communication and leadership?  These will be elaborated and explored statistically in 
Chapter Five.
1.3(d) Non-competitive Behavior as Cooperation
An objection encountered in early presentations of this thesis and data 
concerns the nature of interjurisdiction cooperation in an IJC world:  Can we really 
claim that by not offering incentives, jurisdictions are actually cooperating?  If we 
cannot, then knowledge claims concerning collective action become untenable.
The opposite of a competition-cooperation dichotomy would be an array of 
behavior characterized by competition—no interaction—cooperation.  We frequently 
find phenomena of this sort:  A business firm may compete with some firms, 
cooperate on joint business ventures with others, and simply have no intercourse with 
firms in completely different industries.  However, we can also find a number of 
phenomena in which the middle ground of “no interaction” is ruled out.  An 
important economic example is tacit collusion in oligopolistic industries.  Price-fixing 
does not necessary entail explicit agreements in restraint of trade.  Firms may also 
cooperate by following the lead of a major trendsetter company.  In international 
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affairs, nations may (again tacitly) cooperate on reducing or eliminating an arms race 
by foregoing purchase of a new weapons system or eschewing upgrades to current 
military hardware.  Relatedly, military history contains a number of instances in 
which military units of both sides stationed in quiet sectors refrain from firing on one 
another.  Not firing at even an exposed enemy becomes a norm, creating a more 
tolerable life in the trenches—effectively a small pocket of truce in the midst of the 
most harrowing competition of all.  
The key is that in all such situations, the societal environment precludes the 
no-interaction option.  Firms in an industry group either compete or cooperate.  Once 
an arms race starts, nations in the region either exacerbate or ameliorate it by their 
decisions and actions.  Soldiers on a battlefield either fight or find some way to 
cooperate with the enemy to avoid fighting.  
Interjurisdictional competition—like competition among businesses—is 
similarly a fact of the environment.  Public officials who employ IJC sometimes 
publicly bemoan the practice while asserting that they are forced into it because 
“that’s the way economic development is done these days”.  Jurisdictions can either 
compete for firms or not, but they cannot opt out of the game.  The interaction of the 
free market with local governments’ economic development desires drives the system 
to IJC—or to cooperation to overcome it.  Such cooperation can either be by explicit 
agreement, as in the case of greater Denver, or tacit in accordance with local political 
culture.  Richard Feiock (2003) has documented a social capital foundation for 
interjurisdictional cooperation on economic development, for example.
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1.4 Conclusion.
Demand-side motivations and supply-side forces thus 
generate fragmented local government structures in the suburbs 
of most metropolitan areas… Some more broad-minded people 
form civic organizations to promote a regional perspective 
concerning land use policies, but they are always a minority.  
Local officials are particularly susceptible to parochialism, 
because only citizens who live within their locality’s boundaries 
can directly influence their political survival.  So nearly every 
citizen, official, agency and community tries both to capture as 
many benefits of growth as possible for its locality, and to shift 
as many costs of growth as possible onto other localities.  This 
results in beggar-thy-neighbor policies of most localities and no 
attempt to maximize the welfare of the region as a whole.
(Downs, 1994, p 20.)
In this noncooperative solution, the competing jurisdictions 
are all worse off than if they could somehow cooperate and 
agree not to compete (an example of the prisoners’ dilemma).
(McGuire, 1991, p 155.)
This chapter has demonstrated interjurisdictional competition and the related 
phenomenon, urban area fragmentation, to be important topics in public debate and 
policy studies.  It has also shown that IJC in the urban area setting is an example of 
the collective action problem in political science.  As Therese McGuire notes above, a  
common analytical paradigm for the prisoners’ dilemma is game theory, and to a 
detailed game theoretic approach the next chapter will turn. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 (Interjurisdictional Competition): 
The Policy Setting
1.A.1 Introduction
As noted at the beginning of section 1.3, an extensive policy-oriented 
literature has grown around IJC and urban area fragmentation.  The chapter Appendix 
describes these rich literatures, which are important to this study because research 
results impact upon them as well as collective action theory.  The following 
paragraphs are intended to provide brief thumbnail sketches.  The concluding chapter 
will comment on these theories in light of the study findings.
1.A.2 Interjurisdictional Competition
The analysis of interjurisdictional competition is centered in public finance, a 
major field of economics.  Many economists regard IJC as having beneficial qualities 
in a properly functioning market economy:  Firms are steered to jurisdictions in
which they are most productive.  The taxes they pay are benefit taxes geared to the 
public goods provided for them.  A summary of this position is provided in Oates 
(2001a, p 136):
‘Small’ [local or state] governments …compete for mobile 
capital [industries] using marginal-cost pricing policies.  Firms 
face ‘tax-prices’ in each jurisdiction for publicly provided 
services… Likewise if households are mobile, they too face tax 
prices…that mirror the marginal cost of providing public 
services to residents.  In such a world, taxes guide location 
decisions of economic agents, both residents and firms, in an 
efficient manner.  And jurisdictions are led to select efficient 
levels of public activities [i.e., levels which citizens and firms 
would select if they paid individually in a market for 
government-provided services], encompassing public outputs for 
both residents and firms. 
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The opposite IJC paradigm is the destructive competition model (McGuire, 
1991), or race to the bottom.  The model encompasses two classes of citizen, mobile 
(business firms) and immobile (residents).  Jurisdictions have a preference for income 
redistribution and hence compete for the mobile class to attract its riches.  In the short 
run, taxes on immobile residents are reduced.  However, as mobile firms find they 
can move in response to offers of lower taxes from other communities, 
interjurisdictional competition lowers taxes on the wealthy firms and raises them for 
immobile residents—a bitterly ironic outcome.
Econometric studies of IJC are unfortunately rare.   Those which have been 
conducted tend to find little evidence of destructive competition.  For example, 
several studies find no degradation in environmental protection expenditures after 
Reagan-era devolution of anti-pollution efforts to the states (Fredriksson & Millimet, 
forthcoming, cited in Oates 2001b; List & Gerking, 2000, cited in Oates 2001b; 
Millimet, 2000, cited in Oates 2001b), and German local government programs are 
only partially constrained by tax competition (Buettner, 2001, cited in Oates, 2001b).  
1.A.3 Urban Area Fragmentation
As noted in the main chapter, the debate over urban area fragmentation tends 
to produce two polar positions—colloquially, Balkanization versus Gargantua; more 
civilly, fragmentation versus unified or regional governance; most formally, 
polycentricity versus monocentricity.
1.A.3.1  Polycentricity Theory
Interestingly, polycentricity traces its origins to Charles Tiebout’s 1956 
solution to the problem of putting a value on public goods, given that individuals 
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have an incentive to understate their valuation for collective goods in order to 
minimize their contributions thereto (Musgrave, 1939; Samuelson, 1954).  “If 
consumer-voters are fully mobile,” states Tiebout, “the appropriate local 
governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by the 
consumer-voters… The solution, like a general equilibrium for a private spatial 
economy, is the best that can be obtained given preferences and resource 
endowments.”
Tiebout was joined by Vincent Ostrom and Robert Warren in 1961 to refocus 
his original article into a descriptive and normative argument for multi-jurisdiction 
governance of urban regions.  Polycentric regimes not only allow citizens to vote with 
their feet.  Government in less populous towns and cities is often more responsive to 
residents.  It can provide many services with greater agility and technical efficiency 
than a bureaucracy-laden unified metro government.  Indeed, local governments will 
compete to offer the best services at the lowest tax rate in order to retain citizens.  
And local governments can engage in equipment-sharing agreements to attain 
economies of scale on big-ticket items such as specialized fire-fighting equipment.  
The latest flowering of polycentric theory is William Fischel’s 2001 The Homevoter 
Hypothesis, which employs the median voter theorem to conclude that 
“…homeowners, who are the most numerous and politically influential group within 
most localities, are guided by their concern for the value of their homes to make 
political decisions that are more efficient than those that would be made at a higher 
level of government (p 4).”
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1.A.3.2    Monocentricity Theory
Monocentricity reflects the views of writers dating back to Woodrow Wilson 
(1885, p 30-1, 186) that centers of power always exist in any body politic; thus, 
effective government must identify an individual (or legislative body) responsible for 
the entity.  Norton Long, writing in the American Journal of Sociology in 1956, 
decried the lack of any formally constituted bodies with responsibility for entire urban 
regions (p 476):
[There exists an] attempt to organize the influentials of 
metropolitan areas into self-conscious governing groups… This 
is in many ways… general groping after a territorial government 
capable of dealing with a range of problems that the existing 
feudal disintegration of power cannot.
Interest in monocentricity continued through subsequent decades, adopting 
new themes such as the citistates movement (Pierce, Johnson & Hall, 1993) along the 
way: “We are now organized to respond to challenges at municipal-county, state and 
national level, but the major ones are emerging at neighborhood, regional and 
international levels… The mismatch of governance structures and regional 
challenges fosters interest in experimenting with new regional decision-making 
mechanisms (Dodge, p 19, 27).”
1.A.3.3    Empirical Substantiation--Polycentricity
As might be expected, both sides marshal studies buttressing their claims.   
Empirical research joined the growing body of polycentricity theory in the 1970s.  
The study of police services is an interesting example.  Ostrom and Whitaker (1973) 
studied police effectiveness in a regional government versus smaller home-rule 
governments.  The setting was the the Indianapolis metropolitan region. Most 
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Indianapolis-area jurisdictions had formed the city-county consolidation known as 
Unigov.  Several had opted to remain separate cities.  Ostrom and Whitaker surveyed 
722 households in the Indianapolis metropolitan region on satisfaction with police 
services.  Among their findings:  Unigov residents were more likely to be victims of 
crime.  Independent city citizens were about 50% more likely to receive ‘special 
assistance’ such as resolving family disputes or finding lost children than Unigov 
citizens.  Independent city police forces received a better score on prompt response, 
police-citizen relations, and overall performance.  The authors conclude that “…in the 
area studied, small police forces under local community control are more effective 
than a large, citywide-controlled police department in meeting citizen demands for 
police protection (p 196).”
Ostrom and Whitaker (1974) replicated the study in the Chicago area, 
comparing Chicago city with poverty-stricken neighboring villages Phoenix and East 
Chicago Heights.  The results mirrored the Indianapolis study: The smaller 
jurisdictions maintained far better performance ratings than the city.  In response to 
more general questions, citizens of the smaller jurisdictions also displayed greater 
faith in the ability of their governments to respond to resident needs.  
In 1976, Elinor Ostrom expanded the methodology further, employing 
secondary sources to wrap the Grand Rapids and Nashville metro areas into the study 
with Indianapolis and Chicago.  The results were again similar to the original 
Indianapolis findings.  In addition, the author reported on a study of 109 jurisdictions.  
The smallest or middle-ranked communities consistently out-performed the largest 
jurisdictions on measures of performance effectiveness and dollars-and-cents 
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efficiency.  For example, per capita expenditure in small police forces ranged from 
$7.20 to $20.56, while those of the largest forces ranged from $19.29 to $52.77.  
The 1980s and 90s saw the inclusion of polycentricity in institutionalism (the 
study of the effects of formal and informal organizations and rules) as well as its 
extension into formal rational choice theory.  Scholars tested new institutionalist 
concepts in settings such as principal-agent game theoretic analysis of South Asian 
shepherds (Agrawal, 1997) and groundwater commons law in the western United 
States (Gardner, Moore & Walker, 1997).  Others used game theory to discover the 
effects of polycentric organization on phenomena ranging from institutionally 
induced equilibrium (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995) to policy outcomes in two-stage 
games (McGinnis & Williams, 1993).  
Most recently, scholars have evaluated polycentric governance in terms of 
collective action and civic society (Oakerson & Parks, 1988; Oakerson, 1999; Feiock, 
2004).  They find competition coexisting with cooperation.  Polycentric urban regions 
are found to foster regional agreements which provide the benefits claimed for 
monocentricity while stimulating greater responsiveness to local concerns and a more 
vibrant, involved civic society.
1.A.3.4    Empirical Substantiation—Monocentricity 
Two popular policy analysts have developed causal mechanisms 
advocating monocentricity.  Myron Orfield (1997, 2002)—state legislator and creator 
of the neologism metropolitics—asserts that only 7% of communities in the 25 largest 
American urban areas have reliable resource bases which cover municipal 
governmental and social needs.  This creates self-perpetuating imbalances among 
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communities: The success of affluent job centers begets more success; the problems 
of central cities foster middle-class flight and business abandonment, further 
burdening remaining citizens and government resources.  The strengths of one part of 
the metropolis are not brought to bear upon problems elsewhere.  Complementarity, 
let alone synergy, are not developed among components of the region.
David Rusk, former Albuquerque mayor, advances an elasticity-based
explanation of urban region success (1993).  This is not the elasticity of economics 
but rather a reference to the ability of a central city government to grow spatially to 
encompass the urban area as it expands.  Rusk compares pairs of cities similar in most 
respects except elasticity and finds (p 47) that: 
An inelastic area has a central city frozen within its 
city limits and surrounded by growing suburbs…[C]ity 
neighborhoods are increasingly catch basins for poor Blacks 
and Hispanics.  With the flight of middle-class families, the 
city’s population has dropped steadily…City government is 
squeezed between rising service needs and eroding 
incomes…Rivalry among jurisdictions often inhibits the whole 
area’s ability to respond to economic challenges.
In an elastic area…the central city is able to expand and 
capture much of suburban growth… [M]inorities are more 
evenly spread throughout the area…Tapping a broader tax base, 
an elastic city is better financed…[L]ocal political 
institutions…tend to be more unified and promote more united 
and effective responses to economic challenges.
Most recently, Drier, Mollenkoph and Swanstrom (2001) present evidence to 
argue that polycentric arrangements have failed to successfully address problems such 
as poverty, poor housing, education and health care.  They call for institution of 
stronger regional governments, popularly elected for true representation of all 
citizens.
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1.A.3.5    A Middle Ground
In point of fact, there is a middle ground in this debate, populated by those 
who advocate regionalism—cooperation among local governments to achieve 
progress in areas affecting entire urban regions.  Support for regionalism comes both 
from monocentrists discouraged by slow progress toward regional government (Katz, 
2000) and polycentrists who see certain problems such as urban sprawl as unfortunate 




As we saw in the first chapter, newspapers and weekly magazines decry losses 
to internecine competition among localities and a new “war between the States”
(Time, 1996; Business Week, 1988).  Anthony Downs refers to urban area 
fragmentation phenomena such as IJC as beggar thy neighbor policies (1994, p 20) 
and Therese McGuire explicitly terms some forms of IJC prisoners’ dilemmas (1991, 
p 155).  But how exactly can such theorists support the claim of IJC as a prisoners’ 
dilemma?
In their numerical textbook example of IJC, Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath 
(1999, pp 274-6) set a prisoners’ dilemma in the contest for firms between two states, 
“Ours” and “Theirs”, which face the question of “bidding for business” (Anderson & 
Wassmer, 2000)—of offering or not offering business incentives:
THEIRS:
No Bid Bid
OURS:     No Bid  3,  3 1,  4
   Bid 4,  1 2,  2
If no incentives [bid] offer is made by either state, the status 
quo is maintained.  Neither state incurs the cost of incentives, 
but it does not get new firms to move in either…  If Ours offers 
incentives while Theirs offers none, then Ours will  encourage 
firms to move in  while Theirs loses firms; Ours gains at the 
expense of Theirs…  The opposite will be true for the situation in 
which Theirs offers incentives while Ours offers none…  If both 
states offer incentives, firms are likely to switch states to take 
advantage of incentives packages, but the final number of firms 
in each state will remain the same as in the absence of 
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incentives.  Each state has incurred a high cost to obtain an 
outcome equivalent to the original situation.
The example is clear, exciting and useful as a textbook illustration of the wide 
applicability of game theory.  Its language emphasizes that the true social problem is 
not a single act of piracy but rather the ongoing process of IJC, as we noted in 
Chapter One.  However, at a deeper level, simply assigning numbers to a social 
phenomenon is not sufficient proof of the validity of its characterization as a 
prisoners’ dilemma or any other game.  In the sections below, we will confirm that 
many situations indeed are prisoners’ dilemmas.  In particular, in a scenario in which 
states, urban regions or cities raid each others’ industries—essentially the IJC 
scenario underlying the Dixit and Skeath exposition—the outcome is always a 
prisoners’ dilemma.  However, raiding is not the only conceivable IJC scenario.  
Local jurisdictions may compete for new firms which have already decided for 
economic reasons to come into the urban area, or they may compete for firms which 
are considering other metropolitan areas and for whom incentives may be influential 
or decisive in the inter-metropolitan location selection.  Finally, each of these 
scenarios can exist with spillover externalities or without such externalities.  
Externalities typically are found in intra-urban area IJC (Level #2 IJC) as opposed to 
Level #1 inter-urban area IJC.  
To provide a capsule preview of the results of the analysis in this chapter, 
there are three possible IJC scenarios, each with its own gaming result: 
1. Raiding each others’ industries—offering incentive bids to induce firms to 
relocate from their present jurisdictions to one’s own jurisdiction—always 
produces a prisoners’ dilemma.  
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2. The opposite scenario, that of new firms willing to come to an urban region 
even if no incentives are offered, engenders a prisoners’ dilemma if bids are 
lower than a ceiling (the ceiling being a percentage of the direct benefits to a 
city or town of firm location within its environs) and an assurance game if 
bids exceed that ceiling.  
3. Finally, if the scenario involves new firms which can locate outside the region 
(and thus are in a position to demand IJC bids), the game becomes not a 
prisoners’ dilemma but rather one of complete defection.  The payoff for 
cooperation is never sufficient to motivate jurisdictions to forego bidding.  
However, easing assumptions a bit can yield a prisoners’ dilemma even in this 
scenario.
Unfortunately, there is no overarching meta-scenario in which game type is a 
function of underlying factors such as, say, the ratio of direct benefits to externalities.  
All three scenarios are at work simultaneously in the typical metropolitan area.  One 
town successfully pirates a firm from a neighboring city, promising property tax 
rebates.  A nationwide chain decides it must establish a new distribution center 
somewhere in the urban area even if no incentives are available (although if local 
governments compete for the firm, the incentives offered would be a welcome part of 
the final location selection).  And another nationally ranked enterprise is seeking a 
location for a new research campus.  It will consider locating within this urban area… 
if incentives are offered.
The good news for analyzing IJC, then, is that despite some variety, collective 
action games pervade this social phenomenon.  Most of them are prisoners’ 
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dilemmas, so the claims of prisoners’ dilemmas—hitherto largely metaphorical—are 
valid.  Further, the addition of externalities to the model does not change outcomes.
2.2 Basic Game Setup and Assumptions








(cooperate) R, R S, T
Bid (defect) T, S P, P
…where ‘R’ is the Reward for mutual cooperation, ‘T’ represents the Temptation to 
defect rather than cooperate, ‘S’ is the Sucker’s payoff for innocently cooperating 
while the other player defects, and ‘P’ is the Penalty (or Punishment) for mutual 
defection.  Each IJC scenario has different specific values for T, R, P, and S—for 
example, Dixit and Skeath characterize R in the raids scenario as maintenance of the 
status quo.  No matter what the application, the basic dilemma is that players are 
motivated toward mutual defection—but the greater social reward is in mutual 
cooperation.  Also no matter what the scenario, the proof of a prisoners’ dilemma 
remains the same.  The single equilibrium in the game must be suboptimal while the 
social optimum in ‘R, R’ is not an equilibrium.  In the prisoners’ dilemma, that means 
that T>R  and P>S  (overall, that T > R > P > S), and that 2R>T+S.  (The latter 
condition has been shown to be overly restrictive: an asymmetrically optimal 
prisoners’ dilemma can exist in which T+S>2R and players’ greatest benefit comes 
from alternating between T,S and S,T cells by agreeing upon a varied pattern of 
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cooperation and defection.  See Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1996; which deals mainly 
with n-person games).
Other games have been used to characterize the collective action problem.  
The assurance game is of particular relevance as it plays a role in one of the IJC 
scenarios.  As in the prisoners’ dilemma, assurance game players can be motivated to 
mutual defection even though mutual cooperation carries a higher social reward.  (In 
the n-player version, to be illustrated shortly, players are induced to defect unless a 
large enough number cooperate—a ‘tipping point’ phenomenon.)  Unlike the case in 
the prisoners’ dilemma, however, mutual cooperation in the assurance game 
constitutes a second equilibrium.  If players can get to mutual cooperation, there is no 
inducement to defect.  Technically, this means that  R>T>P>S—the ‘R’ and ‘T’ have 
changed positions.  To provide a comparison with Dixit and Skeath’s numerical 
example, here is the standard numerical matrix of an assurance game:
THEIRS:
No Bid Bid
OURS:     No Bid  4,  4 1,  3
          Bid 3,  1 2,  2
…and again for comparison, Dixit and Skeath’s IJC prisoners’ dilemma:
THEIRS:
No Bid Bid
OURS:     No Bid  3,  3 1,  4
          Bid 4,  1 2,  2


























A time-honored example of an assurance game is a wildcat strike in a 
company town.  In the early stages of the walkout, with only a few strikers, the costs 
of joining the protest outweigh the benefits.  Unless more workers can be persuaded 
to walk, strikers will be fired and the company will easily find new workers locally.  
If, however, enough join the strike, the company knows it cannot find replacements 
for them all and must accede to worker demands.  Now the payoff for cooperating in 
the strike is greater than the costs—a worker can become part of those who brought 
management to its knees and avoid being seen as a spineless pariah who remained 
subservient to supervisors.  A more modern example of the assurance game is the 
twentieth century civil rights movement as elucidated by Dennis Chong (1991).
As can be seen in the Dixit and Skeath example, IJC game analysis typically 
measures benefits and costs using welfare/policy criteria, such as jobs and income.  
The present chapter will proceed in this vein.  It should be noted that the model might 
also be specified in political space, looking, for example, at rewards and punishments 
for political actors based upon which groups are helped or hurt and what their relative 
power is.  Indeed, Section 2.7 will examine a related objection to the approach in this 
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chapter—the contention that pressure groups or entrenched bureaucracies are the true 
underlying determinants of local government behavior.
The models in this chapter use the following abbreviations:
• B:  …the Bid for firms.  This is the financial cost of incentives to lure firms.  
It is paid only to firms which accept IJC offers—losing jurisdictions do not 
pay B. 
• D:  …the Direct benefits of a firm locating in one’s jurisdiction.  These 
include jobs, income, shopping opportunities for consumers and new sources 
of supply for existing businesses.
• E:  …the spillover Externality to a non-gaining jurisdiction from a firm 
locating in another locality.   These are the job, income, shopping and supply 
opportunities open to residents of the non-gaining jurisdiction because of a 
firm newly located in a nearby city or town.  Note that these are spillover 
externalities in the regional development sense, not traditional multiplier 
effects.
The first of several assumptions comes from Dixit and Skeath:  “…assume 
that the states have done enough prior investigation to be able to construct an 
incentive package whose costs are offset by the benefits of the arrival of new firms.”
Thus:
• D > B   and
• D – B > 0  (net benefits are positive) Rationality Assumption
We will encounter an important objection to this characterization later in this chapter.
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The second assumption comes from regional development theory.  The 
maximum impact of new development is felt in the immediate vicinity of the new 
plant or firm, with effects diminishing with distance The gaining jurisdiction gets 
more in ‘D’ than nearby jurisdictions receive in ‘E’.  Thus:
• D > E Nature of Externalities
The concept of such distance decay is common in regional economic analysis and not 
to be confused with macroeconomic multiplier effects.  In the postwar era, the non-
spatial growth center theories of Francois Perroux were applied to geography by 
development economists such as Albert Hirshman (1958) and J.R. Boudeville (1966).  
Briefly, the product was a theory (and a policy prescription) of regional growth 
emanating from a central pole.  The theory has been successfully tested and applied in 
institutions and industries such as high-tech research parks (Luger & Goldstein, 1991; 
Debackere, Clarysse & Van Dierdonck, 1995; Keeble et al, 1999), medical centers 
(van der Berg & van Klink, 1996; Lawson & Lorenz, 1999), and research universities 
(Luger & Goldstein, 1991; Anselin, Acs & Varga, 1997; Meyer & Hecht, 1996).
Finally, for IJC to exist, net benefits must be greater than externalities.  Were 
the case reversed, jurisdictions would not compete for net benefits.  They would 
simply wait for other cities or towns to attract such firms.  In such cases, the 
collective action problem in regional economic development is not intra-urban area 
IJC but the more traditional problem of raising any funds necessary to induce the firm 
into the metropolitan region.  Remember that by our original definition of IJC (page 
1), bids (‘B’) include not only financial but zoning and environmental concessions, so 
the term ‘net benefits’ is inclusive of all effects, positive and negative.  Thus, 
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• D – B > E IJC Game Parameter
2.3 ALWAYS a PRISONERS’ DILEMMA:  Raids Scenario
Raiding—using incentives to lure firms from their current jurisdictions—is  
probably the most dramatic and politically controversial scenario in the IJC realm.  
Examples include the Portland, Maine area television studio and instances which 
helped prompt the anti-piracy provision in the code of ethics for the Metro Denver 
Network.  Certainly the raids scenario was the basis for the Dixit and Skeath IJC 
model.  We will first analyze raids without externalities, as we would expect to be the 
case among different urban areas or perhaps distant cities within a large conurbation.
2.3(A)  Raids Scenario without Externalities.   We can begin  defining T, R, 
P and S by recasting Dixit and Skeath’s numbers.  The mutual cooperation ‘R,R’ cell 
(“no bid/no bid”) follows the standard ‘3,3’ in their text.  However, the authors 
clearly describe the product of mutual cooperation as the status quo, which is more 
precisely a ‘0,0’ outcome.  Thus, ‘R’ in this model shall be 0.
The temptation to defect, ‘T’, is the net benefit of wresting firms away from a 
cooperative second player.  A jurisdiction bidding while the other jurisdiction refrains 
from bidding gets the direct benefits of pirated firms for the price of the bids.  ‘T’ 
therefore is ‘D – B’ in this scenario.
And what of the cooperator jurisdiction?  In the process of pursuing its no-bid 
policy, the community loses many of its firms.   The sucker’s payoff ‘S’ can be 
conveniently symbolized with ‘– D’.
Finally, the penalty ‘P’ for mutual defection—both localities bidding—is that 
each gains and loses an equal number of firms.  Equivalently, each has an equal 
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chance to gain or lose a firm as individual firms consider relocating.  Both gaining 
and losing firms have been symbolized above; the equal chance of either is ‘½ (D –
B) + ½ (– D)’. To summarize all the foregoing:
• T: D – B 
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B) + ½ (-D)  = – ½ B
• S: – D 
…and the game matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0 -D,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  -D 
1/2(D-B)+1/2(-D)  
1/2(D-B)+1/2(-D)
Algebraic proof of the prisoners’ dilemma in this scenario is in the Appendix to this 
chapter, Section 2.3(A)*.  Intuitively, a jurisdiction finds bidding to always be in its 
best interest.  If the other jurisdiction does not bid, it is better to bid and receive the 
net benefits of ‘T’ as opposed to the status quo ‘0’ of ‘R’.  If the other jurisdiction 
does bid,  bidding oneself attains roughly equal amounts of gains and losses of 
businesses, whereas not bidding means only the loss of one’s firms.  (Another way to 
see this uses the simplified definition of P as – ½ B.  Thus, if the other jurisdiction 
bids, bidding oneself entails the loss of half the cost of the bids, while refraining from 
IJC means the loss of whole firms, a much greater cost because D > B by the
rationality assumption.)  Both jurisdictions face the same alternatives and pressures 
from the situation, so the equilibrium outcome is ‘bid/bid’, or the ‘P,P’ cell.  
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This equilibrium is inferior to the status quo of mutual cooperation in the 
‘R,R’ cell: All the gains and losses of firms even out for the jurisdictions.  They only 
constitute churn, resulting in basically the same number of firms per jurisdiction as in 
the mutual cooperation cell.  However, mutual defection also entails the reality of 
incentives bids costs, a major loss to the public fisc in the IJC process, a point 
reinforced by the simplified definition of P = – ½ B.   By similar reasoning, the social 
value of mutual cooperation—2R—is greater than that of the ‘bid/no bid’ cell.  Status 
quo is better than the loss of bid costs.
2.3(B)  Raids Scenario With Externalities.  The symbology of this variant of 
the Raids Scenario follows from that above, adding externalities to all outcomes 
except of course the ‘0,0’ status quo.  Thus, the sucker’s payoff ‘S’ becomes the loss 
of firms but gaining of their externalities, now that the firms are in the competing 
jurisdiction.  Note that because the direct benefits of firms—‘D’—are greater than 
their externalities, the sucker’s payoff is negative. On the other hand, the competitor 
winning the temptation outcome ‘T’ still obtains net benefits of new firms but loses 
the lesser quantity of their externalities—the gaining jurisdiction now has direct 
benefits ‘D’ instead of externalities ‘E’ .  Because net benefits are greater than 
externalities by the parameters of the IJC game, ‘T’ is positive.  The penalty ‘P’ 
includes these shifts in externalities.  This makes the algebra at 2.3(B)* more 
cumbersome but is necessary to avoid doublecounting. 
The new symbology and 2-player game matrix is:
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• T: (D – B) – E
• R: 0
• P: ½ {(D – B) – E}  +   ½ ( – D + E)
• S: (– D + E)
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0 (-D+E), (D-B)-E 
Bid (D-B)- E,  (-D+E)
1/2{(D-B)- E}+1/2(-D+E)  
1/2{(D-B)- E}+1/2(-D+E)
The intuitive explanation of the prisoners’ dilemma is also similar to that of the 
‘raids-without-externalities’ variant of the Raids Scenario.  It is better to bid than not.  
If the other jurisdiction does not bid, then net benefits (D – B) minus the lost 
externalities of firms induced to come to the jurisdiction are greater than zero, per the 
IJC game parameter that net benefits are always greater than externalities.  If the 
other jurisdiction does bid, not bidding entails the negative sucker’s payoff involving 
loss of firms, while bidding in the face of defection carries the positive ‘net-benefits-
minus-externalities’ outcome half the time.  (As in 2.3(A) above, the simplified 
definition of P = – ½ B can be employed here.  If the other jurisdiction bids and ours 
does not, then the loss of half the bids amount is better than the loss of complete 
industries, even with our jurisdiction receiving externalities from the new location.)  
However, mutual cooperation remains greater than mutual defection because, again, 
after all the churn of net benefits of gained firms and losses of departed firms—
including the churn of externalities—the only difference between mutual cooperation 
and mutual defection is the depletion of bids from local governmental coffers, as can 
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be seen in the simplified definition of P as “– ½ B”. Finally, mutual cooperation 
(‘2R’) remains greater than either of the ‘bid/no bid’ cells for a similar reason: The 
business movements in the latter cell balance each other out, with the loss of IJC 
funding as the real difference between the mutual cooperation and cooperation mixed 
with defection.
2.3(C) Generalization to n-Players
Game Setup:  In each round, jurisdictions choose either to 
cooperate by not bidding for firms in other jurisdictions or to 
defect by offering IJC bids.  Additionally in each round, each 
jurisdiction has a firm which is open to being induced to move if 
incentives are offered by another jurisdiction.  
The existence of an n-player prisoners’ dilemma can best be demonstrated by 
showing that a matrix of the options available to an undecided player essentially 
corresponds to the prisoners’ dilemma graph previously discussed.  Here, then, is the 















And here is the game matrix:
number of other jurisdictions which bid (or defect, "d")
N -  1 … 2 1 0
(1 - [(N-1)/N])(D - B)  + … (1 - (d/N))(D - B)  + (1 - (d/N))(D - B)  +
      Bid: (D - B) 
[(N-1)/N](-D) (d/N)(-D)     (d/N)(-D)
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
 No Bid: [(N-1)/N](-D) … (d/N)(-D) (d/N)(-D) 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
The matrix views the gaming situation from the perspective of the last undecided 
player.  This player—in this case, a jurisdiction—has the option of bidding or not 
bidding.  Payoffs are a function of that choice plus the number of other jurisdictions 
which have decided to defect, as shown across the top of the matrix.  Each cell shows 
the reward for a particular choice.  The endpoints of the functions on the graph are 
noted as Cell i, cell ii, and so forth in the matrix.
Columns for d = 1 and d = 2 show that the chance of being raided is the 
number of defectors divided by the number of jurisdictions, or ‘d/N’.  The undecided 
jurisdiction’s chance of successfully raiding another jurisdiction is 1 minus the 
probability that another jurisdiction successfully raids the target firm.  In order to 
underscore the relative magnitudes of these fractions in the “N – 1” column, we 
substitute in “N – 1” for ‘d’.  The use of ‘d/N’ accords with basic probability theory 
(the probability of mutually exclusive events is the sum of the probabilities—c.f. 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, pp 81-82).  Mutual exclusivity should not be a 
controversial assertion:  Many jurisdictions may attempt to raid a firm in another city, 
but only one jurisdiction can successfully do so.  While this steers the model away 
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from the mechanics of bidding wars among multiple jurisdictions, it keeps the 
probability mathematics tractable and clear.
Using ‘d/N’ permits a separate realistic element to enter the model: A 
jurisdiction will probably believe that inertia will keep firms within its own 
boundaries and hence raid another jurisdiction, but it may in some rounds prefer to 
defensively bid on one of its own firms instead.  Mathematically, the alternative of 
using ‘d/N – 1’ to preclude defectors from “raiding themselves” would cause an 
unacceptably unrealistic zero coefficient for ‘D – B’ in the ‘N – 1’ column.  The 
appendix to this chapter further details the mathematics and logic of the matrix.
An inspection of the graph reveals the similarities to the two-player game 
above.  If every other player has determined a course of cooperation—not bidding, 
depicted in the “0” column—and the undecided jurisdiction also opts to cooperate, 
then the outcome is the status quo in Cell iv.   If on the other hand all other 
jurisdictions cooperate and the (previously) undecided jurisdiction defects—“bids”—
then that jurisdiction can raid with impunity, gaining a firm at the cost of the 
incentives bid in Cell iii.  And what if every other community defects (the “N – 1” 
column)?  If the undecided jurisdiction then cooperates, it has the maximum chance 
of losing a firm and gaining nothing, as depicted in Cell ii.  If, however, it also 
defects, then it has a chance of offsetting this highly probable loss with the gain of a 
firm (Cell i).  The matrix thus explicitly and implicitly covers all the possible 
outcomes for a jurisdiction: explicitly, gaining or losing a firm; implicitly, both 
gaining and losing or neither gaining nor losing a firm.
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We now need to demonstrate that the numbered cells in the matrix describe 
the same phenomenon as do the functions on the graph.  Cell iii is certainly of greater 
value than Cell iv:  Defecting when all others cooperate produces a new firm for the 
defector whereas also cooperating would yield only the status quo.  Cell i is also 
above Cell ii because it adds a the chance—however small—of gaining a firm to the 
near-certainty of losing a firm.  And Cell iv is greater than Cell i because the negative 
component of Cell i —the strong possibility of losing a firm— clearly outweighs the 
chance of gaining a firm at the cost of the IJC bid.  For example, with N = 5, the 
absolute value of  4/5(– D) exceeds that of 1/5(D – B).  Thus, in summary, the matrix 
indeed reflects the graph.  Formal proofs are in the appendix.
The case of externalities modifies the matrix as shown:
number of other jurisdictions which bid (or defect, "d"):
N - 1 … 1 0
[1 - {(N-1)/N}][(D - B) - E]  + … (1 - (d/N))[(D - B) - E]  +
      Bid: (D - B) - E
[(N-1)/N](-D + E) (d/N)(-D + E)
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
 No Bid: [(N-1)/N](-D + E) … (d/N)(-D + E) 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
Payoffs in each cell remain essentially the same.  However, a jurisdiction which gains 
the direct benefits “D” of a new firm loses the externality benefits which had accrued 
when the firm was in a nearby jurisdiction.  Similarly, a raided jurisdiction loses 
direct benefits of a lost firm but gains the externality benefits. 
The comparison of graph endpoints and numbered matrix cells also proceeds 
in similar fashion.  Cells i and ii share the near-certainty of the loss of a firm (albeit 
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ameliorated by the lesser amount of externality benefits), but Cell i entails the small 
chance of gaining a firm as well, making it of greater value than Cell ii.  Cell iii is, by 
the game parameter, is greater than zero.  Thus, the undecided jurisdiction receives a 
higher payoff from bidding (defecting) than refraining from bidding and receiving 
only the status quo in Cell iv.  Finally, Cell iv is of greater magnitude than Cell i
because in Cell i, the positive component is less than the negative component—both 
share the difference between direct benefits “D” and externalities “E”, but the 
positive component also subtracts the bid “B”.  Again, formal proofs are in the 
appendix.
In overall summary then, the Raids Scenario always results in a prisoners’ 
dilemma, whether it entails externalities or not, and whether two-  or n-player.  We 
will next use similar methods to explore other scenarios… and find a rich game-
theoretic world involving not only prisoners’ dilemmas but other game types as well.
2.4 PRISONERS’ DILEMMA & ASSURANCE GAMES:  New Firms—
which will move in without IJC bids—Scenario 
The Raids Scenario dealt with a closed system in which one jurisdiction’s gain 
of a firm was always at the expense of another jurisdiction.  Of course, not every IJC 
bid is made to raid a jurisdiction within one’s own metropolitan area.  Sometimes a 
firm may decide that only a single, particular urban region has the necessary mix of 
labor force, resources and market proximity for the needs of the enterprise.  For 
example, in a later chapter, we will later touch on the case of motion picture studios 
locating in the Hollywood area.  Finally, note that there is a ‘local capital’ argument 
for some new facilities siting within a given urban area: A television station’s new 
studio or transmitter almost necessarily needs to locate within the urban area, as does 
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a new newspaper print plant or a taxicab office or maintenance shop.  Thus, the New-
Firms/will-move-without-bids scenario is quite realistic.
A major difference, then, between the Raids and the New-Firms/will-move-
without-bids scenarios is that in the latter, jurisdictions realize that even without 
bidding, they have a possibility of obtaining new firms.  Thus, bid size becomes 
important.  If bids seem too large, why not simply refrain from bidding and take a 
chance on the firm picking your jurisdiction?  
As we will see below, the prisoners’ dilemma model fits the circumstance in 
which bids do not rise above a certain percentage of direct benefits and—in the 
variant of the scenario—externalities.  If competitive pressure raises bid levels above 
this, the situation generates an assurance game.
2.4(A)  New Firms—which will move in without IJC bids—Scenario 
Without Externalities.   There are three major changes to the definitions presented 
for the Raids Scenario.  First, instead of the reward ‘R’ for mutual cooperation being 
the status quo, there is now an even possibility of getting firms.  Even if neither 
jurisdiction offers incentives, this class of firms comes to the urban region—and some 
jurisdiction will get the industrial location.  Second, instead of losing firms, the 
sucker’s payoff ‘S’ is now simply the status quo, 0.  These firms are generated 
elsewhere, so no local jurisdiction is deprived of an existing business entity.  Finally, 
reflecting the second point, the penalty ‘P’ for mutual defection is modified to drop 
the even chance of losing a firm.  It is now simply the even chance of getting the net 
benefits of having firms respond to one’s incentives bids.  The algebraic definitions 
are thus:
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• T: D – B
• R: ½ D
• P: ½ (D – B)
• S: 0
…and the game matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid 1/2D,  1/2D  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
Because the bid conditions vary for prisoners’ dilemma and assurance, we will 
analyze both separately here and in the corresponding chapter appendix sections 
2.4(A)1* and 2.4(A)2*.  
2.4(A)1:  Prisoners’ Dilemma
The prisoners’ dilemma still holds in this scenario… if bids are held to less 
than ½ of direct benefits.  If the other jurisdiction does not bid, then it is better to 
bid—as long as the bid does not lower net benefits below ½ D, or half of direct 
benefits.  This of course implies that bids must be less than ½ D.  If bids are higher 
than this level, then it would make sense not to bid in the face of the other 
jurisdiction’s restraint.
If on the other hand the other jurisdiction does defect by bidding, then clearly 
half of net benefits is greater than the status quo, 0, and the greater payoff is in 
bidding.  Further, the social returns to mutual cooperation exceed society’s returns in 
the ‘Bid/No Bid’ cell:  the sum of mutual cooperation is direct returns, while the sum 
of defection/cooperation is net returns.  Similarly, the reward ‘R’ for being part of 
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mutual cooperation is greater than the penalty ‘P’ for being part of mutual 
defection—half of direct benefits is greater than half of net benefits.
2.4(A)2:  Assurance Game
Assurance games contain not just the one ‘defect/defect’ equilibrium of the 
prisoners’ dilemma but also a second equilibrium in the ‘cooperate/cooperate’ cell.  
As can be seen, if some factor such as competitive pressures in a financially well-off 
set of jurisdictions raise bids to the point that net benefits (D – B) are less than half of 
direct benefits ‘D’, then the best response to the other jurisdiction not bidding is to 
not bid.  This gives rise to ‘no bid/no bid’ –‘cooperate/cooperate’—as an equilibrium.  
On the other hand, if the other jurisdiction does bid, then the greater payoff is to also 
bid—half of net benefits is better than nothing.  Thus, ‘defect/defect’ remains a valid 
equilibrium.
2.4(B):  New Firms—which will move in without IJC bids—Scenario 
With Externalities.   Modeling externalities modifies most game payoffs.  The 
temptation to defect if the other cooperates, ‘T’, remains the same but the sucker’s 
payoff ‘S’ changes from the status quo to receipt of externalities from new firms 
moving in the nearby community.  The penalty for mutual defection, ‘P’, reflects this, 
becoming an even chance of receiving net benefits by attracting the firm and, on the 
other hand, receiving only externalities.  In similar fashion, the reward for mutual 
cooperation, ‘R’, now contains an even chance of receiving externalities or direct 
benefits.  Algebraic definitions following from this discussion are:
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• T: D – B 
• R: ½ D + ½ E
• P: ½ (D – B) + ½ E
• S: E
The game matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid
1/2D + 1/2E,  
1/2D + 1/2E  E,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  E
1/2(D-B) + 1/2 E, 
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E
Mathematical analysis is reserved for Appendix sections 2.4(B)1* and 2.4(B)2*,
while intuitive explanations are below:
2.4(B)1:  Prisoners’ Dilemma
The reasoning here is similar to that of 2.4(A)1, the prisoners’ dilemma in this 
scenario without externalities.  In the earlier case, the bid ceiling was  ‘B < ½ D’.  
With externalities modeled, the ceiling becomes  ‘B < ½ (D – E).  First, we can 
examine the best payoff if the other jurisdiction does not bid.  If the bid is less than 
half the difference between direct benefits and externalities, then net benefits will be 
greater than half a chance at direct benefits and half a chance at externalities.  Thus, 
the best outcome attaches to bidding.  If the other jurisdiction does bid, then half a 
chance of receiving net benefits combined with half a chance of winding up with only 
externalities is clearly better than a 100% chance of externalities, because by game 
parameters net benefits are greater than externalities.
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To complete the intuitive proof of the prisoners’ dilemma, the sum in the 
mutual cooperation cell, direct benefits plus externalities, clearly exceeds that of 
either ‘bid/no bid’ cell, which is net benefits plus externalities (direct being greater 
than net).  And the reward for mutual cooperation ‘R’ similarly exceeds the penalty 
for mutual defection ‘P’:  half a chance at direct benefits plus half a chance at 
externalities is greater than half a chance at net benefits plus half a chance at 
externalities.
2.4(B)2:  Assurance Game
If bids are above the prisoners’ dilemma ceiling,  B > ½ (D – E), then net 
benefits are of less value than a 50% opportunity to obtain direct benefits combined 
with a 50% chance of receiving externalities.  The bid amount subtracted from direct 
benefits simply lowers net benefits too drastically.  The higher payoff in the face of a 
jurisdiction which cooperates and offers no bid is to also refrain from bidding.  
Mutual cooperation thus becomes an equilibrium.  The other, mutual defection 
equilibrium described in section 2.4(B)1 above remains, for the same reasons as 
related in that section.
2.4(C)  Generalization to n-Players.
Game Setup:  In each round, a new firm announces its intention 
to locate in the urban area, even if no incentives are offered.  If 
incentives are offered by any jurisdictions, the firm will locate in 
one of the jurisdictions making IJC bids.  Thus, a jurisdiction 
either gets a firm or does not in the basic, non-externality 
scenario, which will be examined first.  
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number of other jurisdictions which bid (defect, "d" ):
N -  1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]0 … [1 - (1/d+1)]0 [1 - (1/d+1)]0
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
(1/N)D +
 No Bid: 0 … 0 0
[1 - (1/N)]0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
A quick tour of the matrix: Beginning in Cell iii, if no other jurisdiction bids and the 
final, undecided jurisdiction opts to bid, then it gains the new firm with complete 
certainty.  On the other hand, if the final jurisdiction joins all the others in not bidding 
(Cell iv), then each jurisdiction has an equal chance (represented by ‘1/N’) of being 
selected by the new firm.  Note that if the final jurisdiction bids, it receives the direct 
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benefits ‘D’ of the firm but pays the amount of the bid, ‘B’, while if it does not bid 
and gains the firm, it receives full direct benefits.  Moving to the left-hand side, if all 
other jurisdictions have defected and the undecided jurisdiction determines it will also 
defect (Cell i), then it has an equal chance (again, ‘1/N’) of receiving net benefits ‘D 
– B’.  Should it decide not to bid, then it settles for the status quo, 0, because the new 
firm will choose one of the bidding jurisdictions.  Between the left- and right-most 
cells, non-bidders (‘cooperators’) have no chance of receiving the new firm.  On the 
other hand, defectors have a diminishing probability of gaining the firm and net 
benefits from right to left.  Specifically, the probability is ‘1/(d+1)’, where ‘d’ is the 
number of other jurisdictions which bid.  Thus, in the case in which the final 
jurisdiction and one other town bid, the probability the final jurisdiction will get the 
firm is ‘1/(1+1)’ or ½.  ‘1/d+1’ clearly steadily becomes smaller to the right.  Cell i
contains a special case: at ‘N – 1’, ‘1/d+1’ equals ‘1/N’, as demonstrated in the 
appendix.  This notation makes for an easier comparison with Cell iv.
We can compare critical cells to see that the matrix describes the prisoners’ 
dilemma and assurance game graphs above.  Beginning with the leftmost cells (i and 
ii), bidding carries a higher payoff than not bidding—some chance of net benefits is 
greater than a certainty of receiving nothing.  This argument continues until the 
rightmost cells (iii and iv).  Here, if ‘B’ is not too large, net benefits are of greater 
value than a small chance of receiving full direct benefits.  The defection line remains 
above the cooperation function and the game is the prisoners’ dilemma.  On the other 
hand, if bids are higher than this ceiling, then net benefits are less than a chance of 
direct benefits.  The cooperation line has crossed above defection in a step function 
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(for more on this and alternative configurations, see the appendix) and the game is the 
assurance game.  The latter may occur in a well-heeled community with large public 
coffers capable of supporting large bids.
The generalization to n-players with externalities is similar.  The new game 
matrix is directly below.  Instead of receiving nothing, non-gaining jurisdictions now 
receive externality ‘E’.  In that all probabilities in a cell sum to 1, some chance of net 
benefits plus the remaining chance of receiving externalities is greater than the 
certainty of externalities alone.  Thus, the argument for the situation without 
externalities applies to that with externalities.
number of other jurisdictions which bid (defect, "d" ):
N -  1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]E … [1 - (1/d+1)]E [1 - (1/d+1)]E
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
(1/N)D +
 No Bid: E … E E
[1 - (1/N)]E
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
2.5 (Almost always) a DEFECTION GAME:
New Firms—with out-of-region opportunities—Scenario
Between the polar scenarios of raiding and new firms which would move in 
without IJC bids stands a third scenario, new firms which have location options 
outside of the urban region. The standard economic draws for locating a plant, 
distribution center or office complex are important to these firms, but they find more 
than one urban region which provides these assets in sufficient abundance. These 
businesses can demand incentives bids and can be expected to move in only if 
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incentives are provided.  A well-tailored incentives package can prove decisive in 
management’s location determination.  The example of the Boeing headquarters 
move illustrates this scenario.  This scenario is important both because it relates the 
urban area to the overall context of a nation (and world) of urban areas, and because 
when we modify assumptions a bit, it reflects the planner’s reality that incentives are 
not the only factor determining industrial location.  Other, more traditionally 
economic factors influence entrepreneurial decisionmaking, and even the biggest 
incentive package may prove less important than general amenities, schools, or 
proximity to resources. 
2.5(A)  New Firms— with out-of-region opportunities —Scenario 
Without Externalities.   To again begin with definitions:  If both jurisdictions decide 
to cooperate on reducing IJC and thus offer no bids, the outcome is the status quo, 0.  
Firms in this scenario will go elsewhere.  The sucker’s payoff for not bidding when 
the other jurisdiction offers incentives is also 0, while the temptation payoff is the net 
benefit of offering incentives and getting firms.  Finally, the penalty for mutual 
defection is an even chance of getting firms via bids and thus receiving net benefits.  
The algebraic definitions are:
• T: D – B
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B)
• S: 0
The game matrix is:
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No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
A comparison of options shows that these specifications lead to something 
resembling but different from the prisoners’ dilemma.  If one jurisdiction does not 
bid, then bidding gets the other jurisdiction net benefits, which are greater than the 
status quo outcome of following suit and also not bidding.  If the first jurisdiction 
bids, then the second again finds bidding to achieve the higher outcome: Better to get 
net benefits half the time than play sucker to the other’s garnering of firms.  Mutual 
cooperation is of less value to society than the value of one jurisdiction cooperating 
and the other defecting, and yet this ‘cooperate/defect’ cell value is only equal to that 
of mutual defection.  Jurisdictions are indifferent between on the one hand taking 
turns bidding and not bidding, and on the other hand, mutual defection.  Thus, an 
alternating ‘bid/no bid’ cooperative outcome is not in sight—an asymmetrically 
optimal prisoners’ dilemma does not fit this scenario.  It remains a depiction of 
complete defection—a “defection game” instead of a prisoners’ dilemma..  (We will 
modify assumptions later, briefly, in section 2.5(D) to speculate about other 
outcomes.)  Algebraic analysis is at appendix section 2.5(A)*.
2.5(B)  New Firms— with out-of-region opportunities—Scenario With 
Externalities.   Modeling externalities in this scenario leads to the now-familiar 
result of the sucker’s payoff ‘S’ changing from 0 to E, and the penalty ‘P’ for mutual 
defection picking up an additional term, ½ E.  If both jurisdictions refrain from 
bidding, then the outcome remains 0—firms simply stay away.  The algebraic 
definitions become:
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• T: (D – B)
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B) + ½ E  
• S: E
…and the game matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0  E,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  E
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E, 
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E
Algebraic proof of defection is at appendix section 2.5(B)*.  More intuitively, once 
again, if one jurisdiction does not bid, then the other jurisdiction’s better outcome is 
to bid and receive net benefits rather than refrain from bidding and retain the status 
quo, 0.  If the one jurisdiction does bid, then clearly again it is better for the other
jurisdiction to also bid and have half a chance of externalities and half a chance of net 
benefits, than to refrain from bidding and receive only externalities.  This is because 
net benefits are greater than externalities, per the game parameter, so the combined 
value of half externalities and half net benefits must be greater than externalities 
alone.  This cannot be a prisoners’ dilemma because the 0 reward for mutual 
cooperation is not greater than the penalty ‘P’ for mutual defection (a 50% chance of 
net benefits combined with a 50% chance of externalities), and the social value of the 
mutual cooperation cell, 2(0) = 0, is clearly less than the social value of the ‘bid/no 
bid’ cell, net benefits plus externalities.  And the regional polis is again given no 
inducement to cooperate on alternating the ‘bid/no bid’ cells:  the value of ‘bid/no 
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bid’ is still the same as the total value of mutual defection.  Once again, this is the 
defection game.
2.5(C) Generalization to n-Players.
Game Setup:  In each round, a new firm announces its interest 
in several metropolitan regions.  However, it will not consider a 
region without receiving incentives bids.  Thus, if in a particular 
urban area under consideration, no jurisdiction offers a bid, the 
firm does not come to that region and the payoff to all 
jurisdictions in the area is the status quo, 0.  If any jurisdictions 
within an urban area do submit bids, the firm will choose one of 
them in which to locate.
The matrix for the scenario with externalities is:
number of other jurisdictions which bid (defect, "d" ):
N -  1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]E … [1 - (1/d+1)]E [1 - (1/d+1)]E
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
No Bid: E … E E 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
The matrix is the same as in New-Firms/will-move-without-bids/with-externalities, 
with one critical exception: If no other jurisdiction bids and the undecided jurisdiction 
also submits no bid, then the new firm does not move into this metropolitan area.  All 
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jurisdictions receive the status quo.  Other than this point, the tour of the critical cells 
is the same as this New-Firms/will-move variant.
The analysis of this matrix follows that of previous n-player prisoners’ 
dilemmas:  The payoff for bidding always exceeds the return to not bidding.  At the 
very left hand (Cells i and ii), it is better to bid and have a chance at net benefits as 
well as externalities than not to bid and receive externalities with certainty, given the 
IJC game parameter {(D – B) > E}.  This analysis holds as the net benefits 
component of bidding expands moving rightward.  Finally, at the very right, if no 
other jurisdiction bids, the greater payoff is net benefits from bidding rather than the 
status quo from entering no bid.  
However, there is one critical difference from previous analyses: Cell i is 
greater than Cell iv (as well as all ‘no bid’ cells between Cells ii and iv).  All terms in 
Cell i are positive (and net benefits are greater than externalities), so the payoff for 
defection is always greater than the payoff for cooperation, even if all jurisdictions 
cooperate.  The situation is illustrated below.  Just as in the 2-player games, this is a 
scenario for complete defection.  Clearly, from inspection of the matrix, the same 















2.5(D) “Almost always” a Defection Game:  Varying Assumptions 
Produce Different Games… at the margin.   Calls for regional cooperation—the 
development of vibrant “citistates” in the evolving world economy—persist in the 
policy literature and public commentary.  The cooperation prescription involves 
pooling urban area public resources to revitalize central cities, create effective 
transportation networks and first class education systems.  The approach banks on 
industries responding to these features more often than to high IJC bids which drain 
funds from these other development options.  Yet, our analysis to this point has 
demonstrated that bidding by all jurisdictions is optimal in the face of firms with out-
of-region location opportunities.  Can assumptions be reasonably modified to support 
this “if you build it, they will come” approach to attracting new industry?
Another look at the matrix for this scenario without externalities gives rise to 
some interesting speculation about the nature of the game if underlying scenario 
assumptions are varied.  Here again is the matrix:
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
First, what happens if for reasons of risk aversion, jurisdictions within this two-city 
urban area decide that they would prefer the certainty of alternating ‘bid/no bid’ as 
new firms look at the area?  Perhaps very few firms actually ever show an interest in 
this metropolitan region, so jurisdictions fear that with so few cases, the odds over 
any reasonable length of time will not become 50/50.  These jurisdictions fear that in 
actual fact, the penalty ‘P’ will not be ½ (D – B) and ½ (D – B)  but rather something 
like, say, ¼ (D – B)  and ¾ (D – B).  Thus, each fears being the  ¼ (D – B)  recipient 
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and would therefore prefer an agreement to alternate the ‘bid/no bid’ pattern, turning 
the game from defection to an asymmetrically optimal prisoners’ dilemma.
Another interesting possibility is that jurisdictions may actually perceive that 
despite what corporate location officers may say, some firms will actually locate in 
the region without incentives.  The call for incentives is simply an attempt to extort 
more public funds, services or tax breaks in a deal which will be made regardless of 
incentives offers.  This perception may or may not be accurate, but in any event, it is 
the perception which motivates game parameters and player actions.  We can model 
this variant by replacing the status quo outcome in the matrix above with  ‘(x/y)(D)’ , 
where ‘x/y < ½’   reflects the jurisdictions’ perceptions that some firms will locate 
despite their calls for incentives.  (If jurisdictions’ perceptions and experiences were 
that  x/y = ½, the situation would be mathematically equivalent to new firms which 
would move in without incentives offers.)  The adjusted matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid (x/y)D,  (x/y)D  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
This portrait picks up elements of other scenario variants previously examined.  If one 
jurisdiction decides not to bid, the other should bid only if net benefits  ‘D – B’ are 
greater than  (x/y)D.  This necessitates an upper limit on ‘B’.  If on the other hand the 
jurisdiction decides to offer incentives, then the other jurisdiction finds its payoff 
greater if it bids—better half a chance of net benefits than status quo 0.  Finally, the 
sum of outcomes in the mutual cooperation cell can be greater than the total benefits 
of the ‘bid/no bid’ cell only if a lower limit is placed upon ‘B’.  
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Thus, when ‘B’ is contained within certain boundaries of  (x/y)D, a prisoners’ 
dilemma is the result.  A more formal analysis is in chapter appendix section 1.5(D)*.  
In overall summary of this section, a prisoners’ dilemma (standard or asymmetric) 
can occur in the out-of-region opportunities scenario, given simple and realistic 
modifications of basic assumptions.
2.6 Nested Games
To summarize the foregoing, we have seen that different scenarios beget 
different games.  Raiding always generates a prisoners’ dilemma, while new firms 
entering without demanding incentives will generate either a prisoners’ dilemma or 
an assurance game, depending on the size of the bid relative to direct benefits and 
externalities.  New firms with out-of-region opportunities demanding bids to enter 
produce either a defection game or—if assumptions are modified—some chance of a 
prisoners’ dilemma or an asymmetrically optimal prisoners’ dilemma.  In short, all 
IJC scenarios carry with them some game form of the collective action problem.
George Tsebelis (1990) has modeled comparative political phenomena using 
nested games.  In this concept, social phenomena are modeled not in one massive, 
overall model but as one game within another game, both with different pressures on 
and inducements for players.  For example, a game of assurance at local and state 
level might take place within the context of a prisoners’ dilemma at national 
Congressional level.  Tsebelis uses this modeling context to explain interesting 
counter-intuitive outcomes, such as local British Labour Party nominating committees 
selecting individuals who have no chance of being elected rather than less doctrinaire 
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potential winners.  (They want to keep candidates and the party in general hewing to 
Labour ideals.)  
IJC games do not appear to generate such intrigue.  However, a nested games 
approach does help substantiate the idea of different games being played 
simultaneously.  For example, Denver area movers and shakers evidently recognized 
two levels of game—and two different games—in the Denver area, prompting them 
to promulgate the “no raiding” provision in the Metro Denver Network Code of 
Ethics, but not to outlaw other types of potential bidding wars.  Mutual defection in 
the regional IJC raiding scenario would drain public coffers without adding to the 
regional economic base*, motivating the mutual cooperation agreement, while 
incentives bidding remains allowed for the desirable purpose of bringing to the region 
new firms which are considering not only greater Denver but other urban areas as 
well.  
2.7 Objections (And Responses) To This Approach for IJC Modeling
The objective of this chapter was to develop games of collective action to 
flesh out the frequent claim that urban area governmental fragmentation inter alia 
causes higher incidence of IJC.  Two major criticisms of this portrayal should be 
considered at this point.
The first objection, already mentioned in Section 2.2, criticizes the rationality 
assumption.  Do incentives really attract more than their value in benefits, or are net 
benefits often negative because residents and elected officials unquestioningly follow 
pro-growth dictates—new industry at any price?  An extension of this argument 
*
 note, of course, the Chapter One argument that competition also leads to better city services—a 
position not necessarily completely at odds with asserting other, more deleterious effects.
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attacks the game parameter: Perhaps business complexes really most benefit the 
“suburbanites who take the relatively high-paying jobs created by office economy 
growth. (Reed, 1986, p 161)”
Certainly such phenomena can occur in urban political economy.  Rather than 
confront this by radically adapting the model in this chapter, it is more to the point 
(and less unwieldy) to make explicit the underlying reliance of the model on the 
median voter theorem, which argues that democratic outcomes reflect the central 
tendency of the range of voters as opposed to the preferences of special interest 
groups or entrenched bureaucracies.  Thus, the cost of bids and the direct and 
externality benefits of business location are appropriate as the key variables.  While 
certainly theoretically contentious, the median voter theorem has been found to have 
stronger explanatory power than other paradigms in state and local tests.  For 
example, Congleton and Bennett (1995) show that state highway expenditures are 
better explained by median voter than special interest group models.  Ahmed and 
Greene (2000) find that while institutional and interest group explanations test almost 
as well, the median voter theorem best explains county expenditures in New York. 
And of course Fischel (2001) bases his Homevoter Hypothesis on the median voter 
model. 
In contrast, Reed and others argue more in political space—support or 
opposition of voting blocs and key controllers of other political inputs such as 
campaign funds—than in the tradition of the median voter model.  “Politicians are of 
course concerned with the size of the pie,” Todd Swanstrom (1988) summarizes, “but 
they are concerned first and foremost with slicing up the pie in order to feed their 
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political coalition.”  Basically, these scholars would be among those arguing against 
the descriptive validity of the median voter theory.  Politicians’ decisions in the cases 
they have studied have been more influenced by concerns over whether core 
constituency groups are positively or adversely affected, and what effects decisions 
will have on campaign contributors.  The median voter advocate would respond by 
acknowledging the potential for such outcomes, which certainly are of serious 
concern because of their impacts on the less affluent, but would point to the many 
studies—including those cited at local level—which tend to substantiate the median 
voter model’s predictive fidelity (Mueller, 189-93), which is of course not meant to 
preclude the possibility of important outliers.    
Furthermore, injecting the political into only one portion of the game model 
itself is in essence mixing apples and oranges.  If one part of the collective action 
game model is to be in political space—in this case, the benefits counted in terms of 
votes and partisan inputs such as campaign funds—then the other parts should also be 
measured in political costs such as loss of votes and contributions, not in welfare-
policy space using loss of revenues because of incentive bids.  In other words, all 
parts of the model must be focused on the objective function of the political 
decisionmaker.  If the median voter model is used to motivate the decision, then 
benefits and costs can be measured in terms of the welfare of the median voter.  If a 
political space model such as interest groups is to be used, then the decisionmaker’s 
benefits and costs must be measured in terms of electoral support.  The different 
paradigms should not be mixed.
75
A second criticism of the model in this chapter is that it does not really 
address urban area fragmentation—greater numbers of jurisdictions rather than a 
unified (or near-unified) metropolitan government.  The models employed speak of 
‘n’ cooperators and ‘N’ number of players, but the differences in payoffs and 
motivations are a function of ‘n’, not ‘N’.
This also is an important objection.  It can be countered by reiterating the 
contention in Chapter One that the IJC phenomenon is not a pure public good.  
Typically, pure public goods include examples such as national defense, air quality 
and non-toll bridges, highways and parks.   Once provided, their benefits cannot 
denied to those who did not help fund them.  (The benefits per person also do not 
decrease as more individuals use the public good.)  A yearly example of such a pure 
public good is the week-long campaign for public radio membership, which 
plaintively reminds listeners that many of them are free-riding on others’ donations… 
so won’t they all please do their part and become members?  
The IJC phenomenon is not a pure public good.  Some of its benefits are 
limited to gaining communities.  Even when neighboring jurisdictions receive benefit, 
it is in the form of lesser externalities.  And there is a limit to the absorptive capacity 
of a local economy—urban areas and component jurisdictions cannot take in an 
infinite number of new firms because of labor and resource limitations.  Thus, the 
potential benefits from saving on IJC bids are also limited.  Faced with a public good 
with limits, the average benefit per player diminishes as the number of players 
expands (in our terms, as an urban area becomes more fragmented, has more local 
governments).  Thus, the incentive to cooperate in provision of the public good 
76
decreases as ‘N’ increases.  This is in marked contrast to the value of a pure public 
good, which increases with ‘N’ (e.g., the value of national defense per person does 
not diminish—and the total value increases—as the population increases).  A 
mathematical analysis is presented in chapter appendix section 2.7.  The key point is 
that in addition to game influences described already in this chapter, the effect of 
increased numbers works counter to inducements for cooperative behavior.  
2.8 Summary
The theoretical world of IJC games thus does not resolve itself into a single 
game type.  Various games of collective action are being played simultaneously and 
in different proportions in different urban areas.  However, the prisoners’ dilemma 
certainly plays a conspicuous part in all scenarios.  The prisoners’ dilemma is 
inherent in raiding as well as often present when new firms will move into the urban 
area without demanding incentives.  The assurance game is only indicated when new 
firms will enter the metropolis without incentives but bid levels in that urban area are 
high.  When new firms also possess an out-of-region location alternative and can 
demand an incentive to locate within an urban area, the result can be a defection 
game, or—by amending assumptions—a prisoners’ dilemma, either standard or 
asymmetrically optimal.
An interesting phenomenon uncovered in this chapter is the possibility of a 
game transition from prisoners’ dilemma to an assurance game (Section 2.4).  The 
game transition takes place if bid costs, ‘B’, rise to be more than half of direct 
benefits, or “B > ½ D”.  Chapter Six, the case study, will present an argument that the 
77
recent economic development history of the Hampton Roads, Virginia urban area is 
an example of such a game transition.
Thus, the pervasiveness of the prisoners’ dilemma in the IJC world.  The next 
chapter will describe the plan for statistically assessing the prisoners’ dilemma in 
metropolitan interjurisdictional competition.  How can we test the assertion that 
interjurisdictional competition is a function of urban area fragmentation?
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Appendix to Chapter 2 (Theory): Mathematical Proofs
2.1* Introduction
No appended arguments.
2.2* Basic Game Setup and Assumptions








(cooperate) R, R S, T
Bid (defect) T, S P, P
• B:  …the Bid for firms.  This is the financial cost of incentives to lure firms.  
It is paid only when firms accept IJC offers—losing jurisdictions do not pay 
B. 
• D:  …the Direct benefits of a firm locating in one’s jurisdiction.  These 
include jobs, income, shopping opportunities for consumers and new sources 
of supply for existing businesses.
• E:  …the spillover Externality to a non-gaining jurisdiction from a firm 
locating in another locality.   These are the job, income, shopping and supply 
opportunities open to residents of the non-gaining jurisdiction because of a 
firm newly located in a nearby city or town.  Note again that these are 
spillover externalities in the regional development sense, not traditional 
multiplier effects.
Rationality assumption:
• D > B   and
• D – B > 0  (net benefits are positive)
Nature of spillover externalities:
• D > E
IJC Game parameter:
• D – B > E
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2.3(A)* Raids Scenario without Externalities
Definitions and game matrix:
• T: D – B 
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B) + ½ (-D)
• S: – D 
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0 -D,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  -D 
1/2(D-B)+1/2(-D)  
1/2(D-B)+1/2(-D)
Proof of prisoners’ dilemma:
• T > R: D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• P > S: ½ (D – B) + ½ (– D)  >  – D 
D – B – D  >  –2D 
2D – B > 0 follows from rationality assumption
• R > P: 0 >  ½ (D – B) + ½ (– D)
0 > D – B – D
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
• 2R > T+S 2(0) >  (D – B) – D
0  >  – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
2.3(B)* Raids Scenario With Externalities
Definitions and game matrix are:
• T: (D – B) – E
• R: 0
• P: ½ {(D – B) – E}  +   ½ ( – D + E)
• S: (– D + E)
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No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0 (-D+E), (D-B)-E 
Bid (D-B)- E,  (-D+E)
1/2{(D-B)- E}+1/2(-D+E)  
1/2{(D-B)- E}+1/2(-D+E)
Proof of prisoners’ dilemma:
• T > R: (D – B) – E  >  0 per game parameter
• P > S: ½ {(D – B) – E} + ½ ( – D + E) > (– D + E)
D – B – E – D + E  > – 2D + 2E
– B  >  – 2D + 2E
B < 2D – 2E follows from game parameter:
D – B > E
– B > E – D 
B < D – E ; thus  B < 2D – 2E 
• R > P: 0 > ½ {(D – B) – E} + ½ ( – D + E)
0 > D – B – E – D + E
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
• 2R > T+S 0 > (D – B) – E + ( – D + E)
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
In summary of the 2-player IJC game discussion to this point, the Raids 
Scenario always generates a prisoners’ dilemma, whether externalities are present or 
not.
2.3(C)* Generalization to n-Players
In this game, jurisdictions in each round choose either to cooperate by not bidding for 
firms in other jurisdictions or to defect by offering IJC bids.  Additionally in each 
round, each jurisdiction has a firm which is open to being induced to move if 
incentives are offered by another jurisdiction.  
The game matrix is:
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number of other jurisdictions which bid (or defect, "d")
N -  1 … 2 1 0
(1 - [(N-1)/N])(D - B)  + … (1 - (d/N))(D - B)  + (1 - (d/N))(D - B)  +
      Bid: (D - B) 
[(N-1)/N](-D) (d/N)(-D)     (d/N)(-D)
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
 No Bid: [(N-1)/N](-D) … (d/N)(-D) (d/N)(-D) 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
As noted in the main text, the “N – 1” column substitutes “N – 1” for “d” to illustrate 














The following proofs are offered to equate the matrix with the graph:
• Cell i > Cell ii: First, consider the situation without coefficients:
D – B + (– D)  > – D 
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
With coefficients, note that (– D) is multiplied by the 
same coefficient on the left and right sides and thus still drops out.  Now note that any 
positive coefficient on “D – B” still yields the inequality above, and “1 – [(N – 1)/N]” 
is certainly positive.
• Cell iii > Cell iv: D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
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• Positive Slopes: For the “no bid” row, note that from left to right cells 
progress from a heavily weighted fraction of ‘– D’ to zero; hence, a positive
slope.  For the “bid” row, note first the progression from the smallest possible 
fraction of “D – B” to the full value of “D – B”.  This alone would constitute a 
positive slope.  Additionally, the positive nature of the slope is reinforced by 
the diminishing “– D” term, which vanishes completely in the d  = 0 cell.
• Cell iv > Cell i: First, for clarity, replace “(N – 1)/N” by ‘a’.  Thus:
0 > (1 – a)(D – B) +  a(– D)
0 > (1 – a)D – aD – (1 – a)B
If there are only two jurisdictions, the ‘D’ terms drop 
out because both coefficients are ½ .  If there are more 
than two jurisdictions, then the “D” terms are negative; 
e.g., with N = 4, ‘a’ becomes ¾, and ¼ D –   ¾ D is a 
negative quantity.  Thus, the ‘D’ terms are either zero 
or negative.  The ‘B’ term is always negative—as noted 
above, its coefficient is positive.  Hence, the inequality 
always holds.
*******
The generalization from two to n-players is similar.  Here is the matrix:
number of other jurisdictions which bid (or defect, "d"):
N - 1 … 1 0
[1 - {(N-1)/N}][(D - B) - E]  + … (1 - (d/N))[(D - B) - E]  +
      Bid: (D - B) - E
[(N – 1)/N](-D + E) (d/N)(-D + E)
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
 No Bid: [(N – 1)/N](-D + E) … (d/N)(-D + E) 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
• Cell i > Cell ii: Without coefficients:
(D – B) – E + ( – D + E) > (– D + E)
D – B – E > 0 per the game parameter
This inequality would remain with the coefficients, as 
demonstrated in the without-externalities case above.
• Cell iii > Cell iv: D – B – E > 0 per the game parameter
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• Positive Slopes: In that (– D + E) is negative because of the nature of 
externalities, the argument parallels that of the without-externalities case.  
• Cell iv > Cell i: Without coefficients:
0 > (D – B) – E + ( – D + E)
0 > – B zero is greater than a 
negative magnitude
This inequality would remain with the coefficients, as 
demonstrated in the without-externalities case above.  
In this case, the D and E coefficents work out to be 
equal, but because D > E by the nature of externalities
and D remains negative, the overall term is negative.  
For example, using N = 4; hence, a = ¾ :
0 > (1 – ¾ )(D – B – E) + ¾ (– D + E)
0 > [(1 – ¾ )D – ¾ D] + [– (1 – ¾ )E + ¾ E] – (1 – ¾ 
)B
0 > – ½ D + ½ E – ¼ B
2.4(A)* New Firms—which will move in without IJC bids—Scenario 
Without Externalities
Definitions and game matrix:
• T: D – B
• R: ½ D
• P: ½ (D – B)
• S: 0
No Bid Bid
No Bid 1/2D,  1/2D  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
2.4(A)1*     Prisoners’ Dilemma
• T > R: D – B > ½ D
– B > – ½ D
B < ½ D prisoners’ dilemma valid if this 
condition is met
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• P > S: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• R > P: ½ D > ½ (D – B)
D > D – B 
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
• 2R > T+S: 2( ½ D)  >  D – B + 0
D > D – B 
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
2.4(A)2*     Assurance Game
• R > T: ½ D > (D – B)
B > ½ D assurance game is valid if this condition
is met
• P > S: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• T > P: D – B >  ½ (D – B) 
2D – 2B > D – B
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
2.4(B)* New Firms—which will move in without IJC bids—Scenario With 
Externalities
Definitions and game matrix are:
• T: D – B 
• R: ½ D + ½ E




1/2D + 1/2E,  
1/2D + 1/2E  E,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  E
1/2(D-B) + 1/2 E, 
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E
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2.4(B)1*     Prisoners’ Dilemma
• T > R: D – B >  ½ D + ½ E
2D – 2B > D + E
– 2B >  – D + E
B < ½ (D – E) prisoners’ dilemma valid only if this 
condition is met
• P > S: ½ (D – B) + ½ E > E
D – B + E > 2E
D – B > E per IJC game parameter
• R > P: ½ D + ½ E > ½ (D – B) + ½ E
D + E > D – B + E 
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
• 2R > T+S: 2( ½ D + ½ E) > (D – B) + E
D + E > D – B + E
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative quantity
2.4(B)2*     Assurance Game
• R > T: ½ D + ½ E >  D – B 
D + E > 2D – 2B
2B > D – E
B > ½ (D – E) assurance game valid if this condition
is met
• P > S: ½ (D – B) + ½ E  >  E
D – B + E > 2E
D – B > E per IJC game parameter
• T > P: D – B > ½ (D – B) + ½ E
2D – 2B > D – B + E
D – B > E per IJC game parameter
2.4(C)* Generalization to n-Players
In this game, in each round an outside, or ‘new’, firm announces its intention 
to relocate to the urban area.  While it does not demand incentives, its final selection 
of a specific jurisdiction would be influenced by them if offered by a component 
jurisdiction.  
This generalization is best demonstrated first without externalities.  A 
jurisdiction either gets a firm or it doesn’t.  Note that the fraction which forms the 
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basis for probabilities is now  1/N,  not  ‘1/N-1’,  because this is not a raiding 
situation.  The entire set of jurisdictions is the relevant group, not N-1 because a 
jurisdiction will not raid itself.     Here is the expanded game matrix plus graphs of 
the n-PD and n-Assurance games.
number of other jurisdictions which bid (others defect, "d" ):
N - 1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]0 … [1 - (1/d+1)]0 [1 - (1/d+1)]0
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
(1/N)D +
 No Bid: 0 … 0 0
[1 - (1/N)]0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
Note that Cell i substitutes “1/N” for “1/d+1”.  The two are equivalent in this cell:
1/d+1
where d = N – 1 


























• Cell i > Cell ii: (1/N)(D-B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• Cell iv > Cell i: (1/N)D > (1/N)(D – B) 
D > D – B 
0 > – B zero is greater than a negative 
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quantity
• Positive slopes: For defection (bidding), note that the line starts on the 
left with the smallest fraction of  ‘D – B’ ( ‘1/d+1’  where ‘d’ is one short of 
all ‘N’), gains in value with an increasing coefficient and ends with  ‘D – B’, a 
greater quantity than any to the left.  For cooperation, the line begins with 0 
and is a step function from 0 to the positive  (1/N)D.  Additionally, note that 
for the prisoners’ dilemma immediately below, the defection function lies 
above cooperation at all points—the defection payoff adds a fraction of the 
positive quantity ‘D – B’ to the 0 baseline shared by both sets of cells.  The 
special case of cells iii and iv is discussed below.
• Cell iii > Cell iv (Prisoners’ Dilemma): D – B > (1/N)D 
first, observe that  B = (1 – 1/N)D is the border 
between the conditions for the PD and 
Assurance games.  This follows from the  B < ½ 
D  prisoners’ dilemma condition (and related 
Assurance condition,  B > ½ D) of the 2-player 
game.  As N increases, potential competitive 
pressures on bid size increase, so the ceiling on 
B increases as a proportion of D, from (1 – ½) 
to (1 – 1/3) to (1 – ¼), and so on.  Now, 
consider the case in which B = (1 – 1/N)D,  the 
border between the conditions for PD and 
Assurance games:
D – ((1 – 1/N)D) = (1/N)D
D – (D – (1/N)D) = (1/N)D
D – D + (1/N)D = (1/N)D
(1/N)D = (1/N)D
Thus, when B < (1 – 1/N)D:
D – B > (1/N)D,  and the game is n-Prisoners’ 
Dilemma.
Alternatively, 
• Cell iv > Cell iii: Following the proof of ‘Cell iii > Cell iv’ immediately 
above,  when  B > (1 – 1/N)D,  then  (1/N)D > D – B, and the game is the 
n-Assurance Game.  
************
The generalization to n-players with externalities is similar.  Here is the new 
game matrix:
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number of other jurisdictions which bid (defect, "d" ):
N - 1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]E … [1 - (1/d+1)]E [1 - (1/d+1)]E
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
(1/N)D +
 No Bid: E … E E
[1 - (1/N)]E
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
• Cell i > Cell ii: Note that the probabilities within each cell sum to unity.  
Cell i  is ‘(1/N)(D – B) + (1 – 1/N)E’.   Cell ii can be restated as ‘(1/N)E + (1 
– 1/N)E’.   By the IJC game parameter,  D – B > E.   Thus, while the ‘… + (1 
– 1/N)E’ components of both cells are equal, the inclusion of  ‘(1/N)(D – B)’  
in Cell i makes  Cell i > Cell ii.
• Cell iv > Cell i: Again, Cell i  is ‘(1/N)(D – B) + (1 – 1/N)E’.   Cell iv 
contains the equivalent portion of ‘E’, but the remainder is  (1/N)D, which is 
greater than  (1/N)(D – B).  Thus, Cell iv is greater than Cell i.   
• Positive slopes: For defection, once again remember Cell i is ‘(1/N)(D –
B) + (1 – 1/N)E’.   Cell iii can be restated as  ‘(1/N)(D – B) + (1 – 1/N)(D –
B).  The first parts of each term, ‘(1/N)(D – B)’, are equivalent.  However, 
because by the game parameter  D – B > E, the second parts are not.  Thus, 
Cell iii is greater than Cell i.  Cells between Cell i and Cell iii see an increase 
in their ‘D – B’ component as they move from left to right, completing this 
part of the argument.  For cooperation (not bidding), by similar reasoning E in 
Cell ii can be divided into two parts, one of which is equivalent to ‘+ (1 –
1/N)E’.  The other part compares (1/N)D with (1/N)E.   By the nature of 
externalities, Cell iv is greater than Cell ii.  Note that once again, cooperation 
is a step function. 
• Cell iii > Cell iv: D – B > (1/N)D + (1 – 1/N)E
first consider the case in which B = {(1 – 1/N)D 
–
(1 – 1/N)E}, the border between the conditions 
for PD and Assurance games:
D – {(1 – 1/N)D – (1 – (1/N))E} =  (1/N)D + (1 – 1/N)E
D – {D – (1/N)D – (1 – (1/N))E} =  (1/N)D + (1 – 1/N)E
(1/N)D + (1 – (1/N)E =  (1/N)D + (1 – 1/N)E
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Thus, when B < {(1 – 1/N)D – (1 – 1/N)E}:
D – B > (1/N)D + (1 – 1/N)E,  and the game is an
n-Prisoners’ Dilemma
Alternatively, 
• Cell iv > Cell iii: Following the proof of ‘Cell iii > Cell iv’ immediately 
above,  when  B < {(1 – 1/N)D – (1 – 1/N)E},  then  (1/N)D + (1 – (1/N))E  > 
D – B, and the game is the n-Assurance Game.
************
The existence of n-Assurance as a step function which increases only when all 
jurisdictions choose not to bid may seem troubling.  However, it is interesting and 
perhaps reassuring to contemplate respecifying the game to allow for some small 
percentage of firms deciding not only to come to the urban region without bids, but 
also to select a jurisdiction within the metropolitan area without incentives, even in 
the face of bid offers from other jurisdictions.  In this case, matrix cells left of Cell iv 
would contain a probabilistic progression of the term  (1/x)(1/N)D, becoming larger 
from right to left.  All other relationships would hold and cooperation would cease to 
be a step function.
2.5(A)* New Firms—which will NOT move in without IJC Bids—Scenario 
Without Externalities
Definitions and game matrix:
• T: D – B
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B)
• S: 0
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), ½(D-B)
• T > R: D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• P > S: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
However,
• P > R: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
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…and
• T+S > 2R: D – B + 0 > 2(0)
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
…and
• T+S = 2P: (D – B) + E = 2{½ (D – B) + ½ E}
(D – B) + E = (D – B) + E
Thus, jurisdictions would at best be indifferent between mutual defection and 
alternating ‘bid/no bid’ with ‘no bid/bid’.  This is barren ground for an 
asymmetrically optimal prisoners’ dilemma.  This is a scenario for a defection game,
not any type of prisoners’ dilemma.  
2.5(B)* New Firms—which will NOT move in without IJC Bids—Scenario 
With Externalities
Definitions and game matrix are:
• T: (D – B)
• R: 0
• P: ½ (D – B) + ½ E
• S: E
No Bid Bid
No Bid 0,  0  E,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  E
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E, 
1/2(D-B) + 1/2E
• T > R: D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• P > S: ½ (D – B) + ½ E > E
D – B + E > 2E
D – B > E per game parameter
However,
• P > R: ½ (D – B) + ½ E > 0
D – B + E > 0 D – B > 0  per rationality assumption;
E is also a positive quantity.
• T+S > 2R: (D – B) + E > 2(0)
D – B + E > 0 D – B > 0 per rationality assumption;
E is also a positive quantity.
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• T+S = 2P: (D – B) + E  =  2{½ (D – B) + ½ E}
(D – B) + E  =  (D – B) + E
Once again, this is not a prisoners’ dilemma and there is no motivation for an 
aysmmetrically optimal prisoners’ dilemma.  The scenario produces a defection 
game.
2.5(C)* Generalization to n-Players
The n-player matrix is:
number of other jurisdictions which bid (defect, "d" ):
N - 1 … 2 1 0
(1/N)(D-B)  + (1/d+1)(D-B) + (1/d+1)(D-B) +
      Bid: (D-B)
[1 - (1/N)]E … [1 - (1/d+1)]E [1 - (1/d+1)]E
{Cell i} {Cell iii}
 No Bids: E … E E 0
{Cell ii} {Cell iv}
Analyzing relationships among key cells, we find that:
• Cell i > Cell ii: Cell ii can be expressed as ‘(1/N)E + (1 – 1/N)E’ and 
compared with Cell i.  The two have ‘(1 – 1/N)E’ in common, but in that  (D –
B) > E by the game parameter, Cell i is greater than Cell ii.  By extension of 
this argument, all defection cells to the left of 0 other defectors are of greater 
than their cooperation counterparts.
• Cell iii > Cell iv: D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• Cell i > Cell iv: Both terms in Cell i are fractions of positive quantities, 
thus positive and greater than 0.  Thus, Cell i > Cell iv.  Note that this would 
be the same even if Cell iv retained the ‘E’ value of cells to the left, as proven 
in demonstrating that Cell i > Cell ii, above.
The fact that Cell i > Cell iv means that the payoff to defection is at all times greater 
than the payoff to cooperation.  The situation is illustrated below.  The n-player game 
remains one of complete defection.  The demonstration of the scenario without 
















2.5(D)* “Almost” Complete Defection: Varying Assumptions Produce 
Different Games…at the margin
The demonstration of a prisoners’ dilemma and the conditions on it are best first 
demonstrated with a numerical example, then algebraically.  A possible 2-player 
game matrix is: 
No Bid Bid
No Bid 1/3D,  1/3D  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), ½(D-B)
• T > R: D – B >  1/3 D
D – 1/3 D > B
B < 2/3 D prisoners’ dilemma valid only if this 
condition is met
• P > S: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• R > P: 1/3 D > ½ (D – B)
2/3 D > D – B
B > 1/3 D prisoners’ dilemma valid only if this
condition is met
• 2R > T+S: 2 ( 1/3D) > D – B + 0
2/3 D >  D – B 
B >  1/3 D prisoners’ dilemma valid only if this
condition is met
Thus, the condition on B is:  ‘2/3 D  >  B  >  1/3 D’.
************
More formally, the definitions are:
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• T: D – B 
• R: (x/y)D, where x/y < ½. (Note that were x/y = ½, it would be the “New 
Firms—WILL move without bids” Scenario.)
• P: ½ (D – B)
• S: 0
Thus, 
• T > R: D – B > x/y D
D – x/y D  > B 
B < (1 – x/y) D
• P > S: ½ (D – B) > 0
D – B > 0 per rationality assumption
• R > P: x/y D > ½ (D – B)
2x/y D >  D – B
B > D – 2x/y D
B > (1 – 2x/y) D
• 2R > T+S: 2 (x/y)D > D – B 
B > (1 – 2x/y) D
Thus, more generally, this is a prisoners’ dilemma when:
(1 – x/y)D > B > (1 – 2x/y)D
2.6* Nested Games
No appended arguments.
2.7* Objections (And Responses) To This Approach for IJC Modeling
The differences between a pure public good and a non-pure ‘constant value’ 
public good are illustrated in this chart, adapted from Russell Hardin’s Collective 




Pure vs. non-Pure Public Goods
n  nVi Vi C  Vi/C  1 -Vi/C  C/Vi k
Baseline 
'small' 
group 5 $10m $2m $3m 0.67 0.33 1.5 2
Constant-
value' 
p.g. 20 $10m $0.5m $3m 0.16 0.84 6 7
Pure p.g. 20 $40m $2m $3m 0.67 0.33 1.5 2
Legend: n = number of jurisdictions in UA
nVi = total value of public good
Vi = value of public good to individual jurisdiction
C = total cost of the public good
Vi/C = return to jurisdiction per dollar
1 - Vi/C = disincentive to pay $1 to public good
C/Vi = pre-k computation
k = smallest group which can produce public good
The first row of the table covers the case of a ‘small’ group numerically, such 
as urban area X.  The second treats urban area Y, with its twenty jurisdictions.  The 
third row is presented to illustrate the contrast between the Olson-Buchanan constant-
value public good and a pure public good, as examined in Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
(1970).  The decisive difference between the two is highlighted: The constant-value 
public good does not increase in total value if there are more players; accordingly, the 
value to the individual player decreases.  On the other hand, in the pure public good 
case, the value per player (jurisdiction in this case) remains constant and the total 
value increases with an increased number of players.  Of course, as argued in the 
chapter proper, an urban area has a maximum absorptive capacity of new economic 
development per period, so the pure public goods case of row 3—which generates the 
$40 million public good—is not appropriate to the IJC analysis.
The value of the public good to individual jurisdictions (Vi) is the result of 
dividing the two previous columns.  The move from a 5-jurisdiction urban area to the 
20-jurisdiction urban area with IJC analyzed in the constant-value public good sense 
necessarily leads to a lower Vi.  The next column, cost, reflects such things as the 
funding of a regional council and staff, or the risk that another community(ies) might 
defect and use Level #2 IJC to reduce the amount of new development to be shared 
by those cooperating in the regional council.  Vi/C also represents the marginal 
benefit of contributing, so 1-Vi/C in the next column is the disincentive to pay.  Note 
the increase in the disincentive from the first to the second row.  This again supports 
testing the Olson numbers-based collective action hypothesis.  The final two columns 
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compute ‘k’, the smallest group which can produce the public good.  This increases 
between rows 1 and 2.  For sake of completeness, note that in the case of a pure 
public good (moving from row 1 to 3), ‘k’ remains the same even with larger group 
sizes.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Plan of the Study
3.1 Introduction
Chapters One and Two outlined the dimensions of interjurisdictional 
competition as a public, policy and theoretical issue, demonstrating that IJC among 
communities in an urban area is a valid instance of a game theoretic portrayal of the 
collective action problem, predominantly in the form of the prisoners’ dilemma.
Chapter Three will elaborate the means of investigating this phenomenon in order to 
test the free-rider hypothesis and other explanations of collective action.
3.2  Unit of Analysis
Rigorous studies in social science must designate units of analysis—
individuals, groups, organizations or artifacts from editorials to revolutions “…that 
we initially describe for the ultimate purpose of aggregating their characteristics in 
order to… explain some abstract phenomenon (Babbie, 1983, p 76).”  Our natural 
experiment  in IJC corresponds closely to laboratory collective action experiments.  
The purpose of such experiments is to explain human behavior in the face of the 
prisoners’ dilemma.  In the laboratory, the individual is the unit of analysis.  In the 
great prisoners’ dilemma of IJC, the individual jurisdiction is the unit of analysis.  
Faced with a prisoners’ dilemma situation, how will the local jurisdiction react?  In 
the laboratory, individuals are studied as parts of groups.  Each group generally 
undergoes multiple trials under the same or differing conditions, and a single 
experiment will almost always study a number of groups.  Nonetheless, individual 
behavior in the context of the prisoners’ dilemma is still the main concern, and the 
unit of analysis remains the individual.  Similarly, in this study jurisdictions are 
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examined in their regional settings.  The natural experiment looks at behavior across 
numerous metropolitan regions, but the jurisdiction is the unit of analysis.
3.3  Data Sources
Of course, testing the link between interjurisdictional competition and 
metropolitan fragmentation is not going to be a straightforward task.  Because data 
does not grow on trees, the first task is to identify main sources of information for the 
study.  As it turns out, two very good resources provide datasets pertinent to the 
subject.
3.3(a)   ICMA Economic Development Survey.
The International City/County Managers Association (ICMA) conducts an 
economic development survey every seven years.  This survey asks general 
background questions as well as inquiries about how local general-purpose 
governments attract new businesses and retain existing firms.  Thus, the survey 
results can be used to correlate characteristics of local jurisdictions—such as form of 
government—with indicators of interjurisdictional competition.  Questions on the 
survey vary somewhat from iteration to iteration.
This study employs the 1994 ICMA Economic Development Survey.  The 
survey was sent to all counties, cities and towns in the United States.  Overall, there 
were 1781 responses.  Depending upon the formulation of the research question in 
our study, preliminary analyses found approximately 325 to 625 useful observations.  
The use of return-mail questionnaires can of course be criticized for self-
selection of respondents (Fowler, 1988, pp 48-60; Kent, 2001, pp 56-59).  Perhaps 
only certain types of communities respond.  For example, the administration of a 
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strong-mayor city may be less likely to respond than that of a council-manager polity 
because no one in the former wants to risk jotting down a response which might if 
publicized embarrass the mayor.  Alternatively, possibly larger bureaucracy makes 
the task of conscientiously completing a survey more difficult in a city than a small 
town.  
Another reservation is that many survey questions measure perceptions as 
opposed to more comparable realities.  Question responses expressed in terms such as 
frequency (‘never, seldom, sometimes, usually, always’) or relative quantity (‘few, 
many’) are sometimes seen as nebulous because individuals’ definitions of these 
terms vary widely.  Furthermore, respondents may answer more in terms of what they 
think they should say rather than factually.  The most notorious example is that in 
survey after survey, almost everybody votes in all elections—a “fact” belied by 
election statistics.  
On the other hand, we will shortly see that the ICMA 1994 survey questions 
we will use are well constructed to avoid the major pitfalls (Fowler, 1988, pp 74-98).  
Furthermore, this dataset covers a substantial range and is not limited to one type of 
community.  Respondents represent 241 Urbanized Areas (UA)—almost 2/3 of the 
total of 396 UAs identified by the United States Census.  While the median UA 
population of the survey sample is 115,041 versus 945,237 for the Census, the survey 
sample entirely covers the range of UA populations, from the smallest (roughly 
50,000 residents) to the largest (New York City/Northern New Jersey, at 16,044,493).  
Median per capita income in responding polities was $17,840; the mean was 
$22,195—very close to the national mean income of $22,979 (Bureau of the Census, 
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1997, Table 699).   Municipalities surveyed represented a good downtown/suburb 
mix: 157 central cities and 490 suburban communities.  The mean number of central 
cities per UA was 2.75, with a range from 1 to 9 central cities.  The city manager-
council form of government was used in 423 jurisdictions; mayor-council form of 
government in 202; commission, 26; and some form of town meeting, 26.  There 
were 436 cities, 74 towns, 37 villages, 30 boroughs and 60 counties.  Thus, the survey 
appears to be a reasonable measurement instrument, allowing us to garner the value 
of its responses as a natural experiment in collective action.  
3.3(b)   1990 United States Census.
At the opposite pole from sampling concerns surrounding vehicles such as the 
ICMA survey is the decennial United States Census, a nose-count of all persons as 
well as much commercial and governmental activity.  While basic data on urban 
regions is a part of the Census, the researcher still has important decisions to make.  
The Census publishes two types of information on urban clusterings.  Best known is 
the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and its corollaries, the consolidated 
metropolitan statistical area for extremely large metroplexes and the primary 
metropolitan statistical area (a portion of a CMSA).   Definitions of these areas are 
actually designed and revised by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
Terminology changes over time: The MSA is successor to the old SMSA (standard 
metropolitan statistical area), and in 1990 the Census Bureau introduced the term 
metropolitan area (MA) as a generic term referring to MSAs, CMSAs and PMSAs.  
And just to add more icing to the cake, New England local governance is sufficiently 
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unique that it merits its own method of MA accounting, the NECMA (New England 
County Metropolitan Area).
The other approach to assembling data on urban regions is the Urbanized Area 
(UA).  This relatively lesser known measure has been published since 1950.  The UA 
tends to encompass less area and fewer people.  UAs and MAs will be described 
further below in choosing ways to operationalize the main independent variable, 
urban area fragmentation.
3.4   The Dependent Variable: Measuring Interjurisdictional Competition.
3.4(a)   Problems in Measurement.
At the outset, we defined IJC as “the use by a government of tax, spending, 
zoning and/or other regulatory provisions as incentives to induce a specific firm—or 
firms in general—to locate (or remain) in its own jurisdiction as opposed to another 
city, state or nation (page 1).”   Like good art, we all know it when we see it.  
Operationalizing such a definition in a way which supports statistical research is 
unfortunately a much more difficult proposition.  The components of the definition—
tax, spending, zoning and/or other regulatory provisions—are not readily comparable.  
While tax relief and spending programs can be measured in dollar terms, how well 
can we capture the impact of a decision to loosen environmental standards for a new 
industry, or to change zoning of an area to allow radically increased traffic and a 
larger physical footprint?  Putting together a composite assessment of IJC in a single 
case study would be difficult enough.  Finding data to do so in a nationwide study is 
simply impracticable.  Even one of the most impressively detailed studies of the 
economic impacts of IJC bemoans that “[t]he data we have on city grant, loan, and 
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loan guarantee programs are not detailed enough to permit the creation of even the 
limited ‘expert systems’ that have been discussed (Fisher and Peters, 1998, p 93).”
The whole enterprise is further complicated by the lack of data series on the 
subject.  Ideally, we would have comprehensive information on all instances of IJC, 
allowing us to contrast urban regions which are highly competitive with those that are 
cooperative in very precise quantitative terms.  We would expect to see competitive 
regions engender substantial movement among firms as management and 
shareholders seek the best IJC offers in a constantly changing environment.  
Undoubtedly per capita IJC outlays would be greater in less cooperative areas than in 
more cooperative metropolitan areas.  
Unfortunately, the data are not of this depth or quality.  The packages of 
business incentives finally accepted by incoming firms are generally—although not
always1--public knowledge.  However, this only covers successful IJC bids.  The 
incentive bids of unsuccessful suitors usually go unrecorded.  Thus, an important part 
of the ideal dataset is automatically missing.
As was just noted, Fisher and Peters (1998) present a commendably detailed 
data set consisting of information on state and—with lesser resolution—local 
historical data on grants, loans, taxes and other programs to pinpoint maximum 
incentive awards.  However, this data set does not capture items such as zoning 
variances and programs such as training new workers and employee screening.  Even 
if it did, the data—while great for economic analysis—would not necessarily be the 
best for evaluating the collective action problem in the prisoner’s dilemma setting: It 
makes no distinction between the extent to which tax and spending programs reflect 
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preferences of current residents and the extent to which these outlays represent actual 
competition for specific industries, the focus of our study.
3.4(b)   IJC Measurement with Additive Indices.
The 1994 ICMA survey contained questions which are specifically geared to 
competing for industries.  These questions lead to six additive indices representing 
IJC.  An additive index sums responses to a question to provide a measure of strength 
for an indicator.  For example, the intensity of local tourism promotion efforts might 
be measured by the number of tourism promotional programs employed in by the 
local government and chamber of commerce.  A town which maintains an Internet 
tourism site, provides brochures for interstate rest stops, and purchases 
advertisements in popular magazines might thus be considered to have a more intense 
tourism effort than one with only a website.2
Question 30 of the ICMA survey asks which incentives the local government 
offers prospective newcomer industries.  Note that by focusing attention on 
incentives—hence IJC—the research gets at least partially around the problem of 
determining the extent to which programs and budgets are IJC rather than simply 
reflecting local tastes and preferences for government spending:
Q 30:  Please indicate which of the following incentives you offer:
a.  Tax abatements j.  Training Support
b.  Tax credits k.  Utility rate reduction
c.  Enterprise zones l.  Zoning/permit assistance
d.  Tax increment financing m.  Regulatory flexibility
e.  Grants n.  Relocation assistance
f.  Infrastructure improvements o.  Low-cost loans
g.  Land write-downs p.  One-stop permitting
h.  Subsidized buildings q.  Special assessment districts
i.  Employee screening
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Presumably, the more a jurisdiction engages in IJC, the more likely it is to utilize a 
greater number of the measures in Question 30.  Thus, this will be our first additive 
index.  The complete set of questions useful in assembling additive indices are in 
Appendix 1 to this chapter.  
Question 15 occasions a pair of somewhat more conventional indicators.  This 
question asks: What percent of staff time is devoted to: (a) Business Retention ____ , 
and (b) Business Attraction _____ ?  In a manner similar to additive indices, the 
answers to parts (a) and (b) are another measure of intensity of competitiveness for 
industrial location.
Additive indices can be controversial.  Fisher and Peters (1997b) assert that 
the sum of different programs is not the same as competitive effort.  On the other 
hand, additive indices (or ‘summated rating scales’ ) have been used for some years 
in psychology and have begun finding their way into political science research (cf: 
Alt, Lassen and Skilling, 2002).  Paul Spector  (1992, p 4) summarizes the case for 
additive indices:
…[W]hy not just ask…a single, straightforward, yes- or-no 
question?  There are three good reasons why single yes-or-no 
questions are insufficient.  They concern reliability, precision and 
scope.  Single items do not produce responses by people that are 
consistent over time.  A person may answer “yes” today and “no” 
tommorrow.  Thus single items are notoriously unreliable.  They are 
also imprecise because they restrict measurement to only two levels.  
People can be placed into only two groups, with no way to distinguish 
among people in each group.  Finally, many measured characteristics 
are broad in scope and not easily assessed with a single question.  
Some issues are complex, and several items will be necessary to assess 
them.
Spector’s comments on surveys directed at individuals ring true for our use of 
the ICMA survey of local governments.  While a single general question such as ‘how 
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intensely does your jurisdiction practice IJC?’ is vague and would undoubtedly 
produce unreliable results, asking questions about individual practices which we 
would associate with incentives and IJC would yield results not only more reliable 
but more precise (as these terms are defined in Spector’s quotation).  And asking for 
responses on all aspects of IJC allows researchers to range the entire scope of such 
competitive practices.  Furthermore, statistical tests can help assess the internal 
validity of additive indices (Spector, 1992, pp 29-36), and sensitivity analysis can 
assess the usefulness of additional items in the scale (Chatterjee and Hadi, 1988, pp 
58-70; Spector, 1992, pp 31-5).  Section 4.2 of Chapter Four will present additive 
indices for this study and assess their adequacy.
3.5   Main Independent Variable: Urban Area Fragmentation
3.5(a)   Choosing From a Variety of Fragmentation Measures.
Fragmentation has been implicitly defined by critics of home rule in terms of 
“too many” governments in a metropolitan region.  This coincides nicely with a study 
of the Olsonian approach to the collective action problem in that it has a numerical 
base.  However, once again, operationalizing the conceptual definition can be 
difficult.  
For example, we might simply use the number of jurisdictions within an urban 
region as the independent variable for fragmentation in our statistical study.  The 
greater the number of town, city and county governments within the area, the more 
fragmented it is.  But comparing urban areas using this approach quickly develops 
major problems.  Is a ten-jurisdiction urban area in which the central city contains 
91% of the population and each other jurisdiction only 1% really as fragmented as 
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one in which each jurisdiction contains an equal share—10%-- of  the populace?  
Intuition says no, but the raw number independent variable claims that the two are in 
fact equally fragmented and will tailor the statistical output accordingly.  In a similar 
vein,  is an urban area consisting of twenty communities necessarily twice as 
fragmented as an urban cluster of ten cities?  Again, our statistic tells us in all cases 
‘yes’, no matter the relative populaces of the component jurisdictions.  Perhaps 
number of jurisdictions is not so good a measure of fragmentation.  Operationalizing 
the concept turns out to be a more difficult proposition than anticipated.  
Numerical indicators such as number of jurisdictions have the virtue of 
simplicity in collection and computation.  At the opposite end of the complexity 
spectrum are power indices.  David Miller (2002) computes a “Metropolitan Power 
Diffusion Index” (MPDI) as the sum of the square roots of the percentage 
contributions of each jurisdiction’s budget to the sum of the budgets of all 
governments in the urban area.3
Paul Lewis (1996) presents a more complex power index: the political 
fragmentation index (PFI).  The PFI first computes the probability that, within a given 
urban region, two randomly selected dollars of government expenditure were not
spent by the same jurisdiction.  It then multiplies this fraction by the total per capita 
expenditure of all local governments in the metropolitan area.4
A serious drawback of power indices is that because they utilize current 
expenditures,  power indices measure present, not potential, strength.  This is 
analogous to assessing the military power of a nation based upon the number of 
infantry and tank divisions the nation currently possesses.  Unless a war ends quickly, 
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the nation will be able to translate other resources—manpower and industrial 
capability—into armies.  Hence, potential power can be converted into actual power, 
and concentrating on present power alone can be very misleading.5
Given the shortcomings of the approaches above, this study will utilize a 
traditional indicator of relative strength which measures power potential, the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI).  The HHI has been used for decades in industrial 
organization studies and anti-trust lawsuits to assess the degree of concentration in an 
industry.  In other words, does a single firm (or do several large companies) dominate 
an industry and inhibit competition?  Because concentration is the opposite of 
fragmentation, the HHI is a very good candidate to operationalize the concept of 
fragmentation.  
The HHI formula is of midrange complexity (Scherer, 1970, pp 51-52).  It can 
be used for either income or population numbers.  The calculation takes each 
percentage share of the whole, squares the shares, then sums them.  The result varies 
between 0 and 1, allowing a more precise comparison among urban regions than 
counting numbers of jurisdictions.  As an example, consider an urban region of three 
cities.  The largest has 70% of the population; the smallest, 10%; the third, 20%.  To 
calculate the HHI: 0.72 = 0.49; 0.12 = 0.01; and 0.22 = 0.04.  Summing these, we get 
HHI = 0.54.  
What if each jurisdiction had possessed equal shares of budget, income or 
population?  0.332 = 0.1089.  0.1089 x 3 = 0.33 (with rounding).  This follows our 
intuition—equal shares implies more fragmentation, just as in the previous paragraph 
one jurisdiction with a disproportionate share implies predominance, hence 
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fragmentation. Thus, the HHI measures two dimensions of fragmentation: the number 
of jurisdictions and the relative differences in shares.  Fragmentation increases when 
(a) the number of jurisdictions increases and/or (b) the shares of population or income 
become more equal.3
Thus, while all types of measures above have strong points, the ability to 
measure and compare potential power, and the interesting distinction in components 
between fragmentation as number and as relative shares, make the HHI the indicator 
of choice for this study.  The HHI works well with either income or population.  This 
study will employ both, creating a more robust set of indicators.  In order to adapt this 
concentration measure to a fragmentation basis, the HHI will actually be subtracted 
from 1.  Thus, an HHI of 0.98, reflecting high concentration, will become 1 – 0.98 = 
0.02, which expresses low fragmentation.  To avoid confusion, the ‘HHI- subtracted-
from-1’ will be referred to as the fragmentation index in subsequent sections of 
Chapter Three and in all future chapters.  Tables and charts will abbreviate the 
fragmentation index as “FragI”.
3.5(b)   Operationalizing “Urban Area”.
Having selected the fragmentation index with income and population data as 
the statistic to represent the concept fragmentation, we must now choose a dataset to 
represent urban regions.  Once again, several choices are possible.  
An interesting first possibility is the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (U.S. 
Department of Commerce) economic area.   The economic area is focused on one or 
3 Alternatively, given equivalent shares, the HHI returns an index number equal to the percentage 
share of each jurisdiction.  If shares are not equal, the HHI returns the percentage share if they had 
been equal plus an additional increment.  
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more major cities and the surrounding region.  Boundaries are determined by the 
measured degree of economic interaction between the urban economic centers and the 
suburban and rural economic hinterlands (Barnes and Ledebur, 1998).  There are 172 
economic areas in the United States.  Thus far, the definition sounds appealing.  
However, there is a problem: All territory of the United States is in one economic 
area or another.  Thus, we would be losing the urban-ness aspect of the study by 
employing data from BEA economic areas.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (U.S. 
Department of Labor) labor market area has the same drawback.  While these 
definitions work well for regional economics, they would skew our study with too 
much data from non-players in urban IJC.
The Bureau of the Census’ (U.S. Department of Commerce) metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA)—already mentioned—also is based upon economic 
interactions among component parts of an urban region.  The Census Bureau first 
identifies a central city or cities comprising at least 50,000 persons in a county of at 
least 100,000 persons (alternatively, an urbanized county of 100,000 persons).     
Neighboring counties are included in their entirety based upon analysis of commuting 
patterns and population density and patterns (Lavin, 1996).  Thus, the MSA retains 
the nice feature of measuring economic interactions while not including every part of 
the nation—urban, suburban and rural.  
Unfortunately, the MSA is generally county-based (except for New England) 
and therefore still takes in a great deal of sparsely-populated and even rural territory.  
A casual glance at an MSA map of the United States is sufficient to convince a 
researcher that the geographically huge MSAs in states such as Nevada do not reflect 
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the urban area concept very precisely.  Therefore, we will turn to the Census-
designated Urbanized Area (UA).  See Appendix 2 to this chapter for maps 
illustrating metropolitan areas and urbanized areas.
The UA was in fact designed to differentiate between urban and rural areas of 
MSAs.  It requires an incorporated or Census-designated ‘central place’ of at least 
50,000 persons.  Additional territory is added based upon census blocks, which are 
the smallest census tracts and usually comprise 200 persons or fewer.  Generally 
speaking, census blocks are added if they have a population density equivalent to 
1,000 persons per square mile or more.  Whole jurisdictions are added if over half 
their census blocks meet the 1,000 person per square mile standard.  One 
complicating factor made apparent by this discussion is that a number of jurisdictions 
will be only partially in a UA.  However, because it is a simple bookkeeping task to 
count only UA portions of such jurisdictions, this complication can be readily dealt 
with.  
The Census UA population density standard also helps exclude low-density, 
high income residential boutique suburbs from the sample.  The economic 
development strategy of these jurisdictions tends to be the attraction of more 
McMansions rather than participation in the IJC world of business incentives; hence, 
their inclusion might skew the statistical outcome.  No other measure to preclude 
boutique communities proved practicable.  As examples, Economic Census data on 
industries by SIC code knocked many observations out of the ICMA sample because 
specific data is not available for many jurisdictions, and geographic area devoted to 
residential (versus industrial) use is not available on a per-jurisdiction basis.  Thus, 
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using UAs instead of broader entities such as MSAs is the best way to address the 
problem of boutique communities.  
UAs retain the MSA feature of multiple central cities if necessary, but do not 
involve analysis of economic interactions and commuting patterns.  The lack of 
economic interaction analysis should not constitute a major problem, however.  
Analytically, UAs are subsets of MSAs—as noted, this was their original purpose.  
Thus, significant economic interaction is implicit.  UAs retain the aspects of MSAs 
which are favorable to our study while shedding sparsely populated terrain.  The 
Urbanized Area is therefore the best data source to represent the “urban area” part of 
“urban area fragmentation”, the best resource to which we can apply this 
fragmentation index.  Our quest to operationalize the main independent variable is 
now complete.
3.6   Other Independent Variables: Control Variables
The basic hypothesis, IJC = f(UA fragmentation), is of course not sufficient 
for a rigorous scientific test.  Other variables may well exert an influence on IJC.  
Such variables need to be included in the equation.  The list of control variables 
follows, annotated with sources and comments as necessary.
• Jurisdiction population.  Population is one source of leverage in raising taxes 
to pay for IJC.  The greater the population, the greater the IJC effort 
affordable.  This assertion is supported by a literature demonstrating a 
correlation between jurisdiction population and the range of services offered.  
More populous jurisdictions offer a greater range of services; even poor but 
populous large cities have zoos (hence the moniker “the zoo effect”).  Thus, 
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the importance of controlling for jurisdiction population.  (Schmandt & 
Stephens, 1960; Oates 1986)  Source: 1990 Census.
• Income per capita.  Income per resident is another source of power.  A 
numerically smaller jurisdiction may still be able to afford a substantial IJC 
effort if it has a high per capita income.  Source: 1990 Census.
• Property tax.  The property tax rate is an underlying aspect of 
interjurisdictional competitiveness.  It is a background factor businesses look 
at in location decisions, similar to quality of workforce, educational 
institutions, and business orientation of local and state governments.  Thus, 
while jurisdictions establish property tax levels in part with an eye to 
attracting business, the property tax level is not employed in specific incentive 
deals for specific firms and should therefore not be a source of a statistical 
endogeneity problem.  An endnote discusses this at further length.6 Source: 
ICMA survey data includes responses to a property tax question, “What is 
your real property tax rate per $1,000 of assessed value?”.    
• Mayor versus council-city manager form of government.  Popularly elected 
mayors may engage in more IJC in order to please constituent groups.  City 
politics in mayoral cities may be more highly politicized, making economic 
development a more prominent public issue.  Source: ICMA data coded into 
1994 Economic Development Survey by ICMA staff.  The dummy variable 
developed for this study groups mayor and commission governments versus 
various professional manager forms of government.
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• Racial Diversity.  Racial and ethnic differences can impose barriers to 
effective cooperation in urban areas.  Studies exemplifying difficulties include 
Elkin (1987), Reed (1987) and Stone (1989).  Miller (1999, pp 262-3), 
examining the matter from a social justice perspective, summsarizes that “The 
real challenge of multiculturalism, then, is not that it makes agreement about 
principles of social justice impossible to achieve, but that it makes it harder 
for people to see themselves as members of an inclusive community across 
which these principles are to be implemented… This will lead to a contraction 
of the ethical universe within which conceptions of justice are applied…”  In 
this study, racial diversity is assessed based upon HHIs computed from 1990 
Census UA data.   The American FactFinder at www.census.gov lists the 
racial compositions of all urbanized areas.  These numbers can of course be 
transformed into HHIs.  Unfortunately, as will be detailed in Chapter 4, 
Section 3, the HHIs were very colinear with UA population.  For this reason, a 
0,1 dummy variable was employed to denote whether the urban area had an 
above- or below-average racial diversity HHI.  Source: 1990 Census.
• State IJC aid/programs.  State IJC funding can be a particularly intense 
component of IJC in UAs spanning two or more states, as in the Marriott case 
related in Chapter One.  Source: Interstate IJC effects can be factored out by 
studying not only all UAs but also those falling entirely within a single state.  
• Urbanized Area population.  This is essential to implement non-pure public 
goods theory as developed in Chapters One and Two, in which UA population 
determines the absorptive capacity for new industries.  Source: 1990 Census.
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• Given all the above, our operationalized hypothesis becomes: 
IJC = f( UA fragmentation + control variables)
3.7   Major Implicit Assumptions
Implicit in the above study plan is an assumption that the opportunity for IJC 
at local level is roughly the same across all metropolitan regions.  In other words, the 
Chapter One tale of raiding a television studio in the Portland, Maine Urbanized Area 
had an equal chance of an analogous opportunity among jurisdictions in the Portland, 
Oregon Urbanized Area… and indeed in all other UAs.  Relatedly, in describing IJC 
as a prisoners’ dilemma as well as in the discussion of the Metro Denver Network in 
Chapter One, we introduced the concept that some amount of IJC may be necessary 
to attract an industry to a UA, while an additional increment of incentives proves 
useful in bringing that business to one’s own jurisdiction within the UA.  The latter 
intra-UA IJC is the focus of this study.  States, regional chambers of commerce and 
some jurisdictions may troll to attract industries in general, but the action of interest 
to this study takes place once a firm expresses interest in an urban region and 
individual jurisdictions compete for that business.   In the Chapter One Boeing 
example, we are interested in Chicago-area and/or Denver-area and/or Dallas-Fort 
Worth area competition, not IJC among Illinois, Colorado and Texas.  
3.8   Statistical Analysis
The equation IJC = f (fragmentation + control variables) will be evaluated by 
applying multiple regression analysis using the STATA statistics package (StataCorp, 
1999).  Given the exploratory nature of this first investigation into the collective 
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action nature of IJC and urban area fragmentation, the study identifies as statistically 
significant all coefficients with t-value significance of .00 to .15.
3.9 Presentation of Results; Indicator Matrices
Interjurisdictional competition (IJC) effort will be measured by several 
proxies, or indicators, based upon additive indices and other questions from the 
ICMA survey.  Generally, the regression equation for each indicator will also be 
computed using fragmentation indices based upon population and income.  This will 
provide a robust series of perspectives on IJC and its causation—if one additive index 
fails to pick up competition in an urban area, another can.  
Marshaling this data will be challenging, but an analogous conceptual model 
is available in the indicators and warning matrix method used by the strategic 
intelligence community.  Intelligence analysts compile lists of indicators of a possible 
action (such as the launching of a war) by another nation, then add depth by detailing 
each indicator, effectively creating its own list denoting the status of each indicator.  
For example, preparation for an attack on a neighboring state might start years in 
advance, with increased production of armaments and political preparations such as 
propaganda and diplomatic efforts to seek allies.  This would continue through 
shipment of weaponry and ordnance to combat units, increased training and upgrades 
to combat vehicles.  In the final stages, communications, logistics and artillery 
positions would be moved forward while infantry and armor units would occupy 
forward assembly areas—jumping-off points near the border.   Matrices similar to the 




Hypothetical Defense Indicator Matrix





























































Note: Vertical scale is time periods before attack
While the table above is extremely simple (actual indicator charts are far more 
detailed and specific to particular situations and geography) the strength of the 
system—its robustness in multiple indicators—is apparent.  Available information on 
a number of matrix cells may be spotty or non-existent, but other indicators can allow 
an accurate appraisal of the government’s intentions and progress.  (Grabo, 2002, Ch 
2; Heuer, 1999, Chs 7 & 8.  A poignant recent example: Branigin, 2004, notes how 
the critical omission of the use of airliners as suicide bombs led to the lack of an 
indicator of ‘terrorists learning to fly large aircraft’ which would have tipped the 
intelligence community off to the 11 September 2001 attacks.)  
The next two chapters of this study will employ a variant of this method.  The 
various additive indices and other questions which are indicators of IJC effort will be 
listed horizontally.  Vertically, cells will record coefficients and statistical 
significance of t-values for indicators based upon whether they are computed using 
population or income fragmentation.  The absolute value of the t-value is displayed 
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directly beneath the coefficient and statistical significance. Here as an example is the 
first such matrix from Chapter 4:
TABLE 4-2 







& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -1.81/.03 -1.74/.05 -1.94/.05 -1.47/.02 -12.2/.02 -----
population |2.21| |1.95| |1.96| |2.32| |2.31|
   FragI- -2.00/.02 -2.01/.03 -2.23/.03 -1.55/.02 -11.3/.03 -6.76/.13
income |2.41| |2.23| |2.22| |2.42| |2.15| |1.51|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -2.12/.03 -1.87/.07 -1.76/.12 -1.34/.07 -15.3/.01 -----
population |2.27| |1.81| |1.55| |1.79| |2.61|
   FragI- -2.21/.02 -2.02/.05 -1.94/.09 -1.41/.06 -14.1/.02 -----
income |2.35| |1.95| |1.70| |1.87| |2.39|
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
The table is split into two major subheadings, all urban areas and urban areas within 
single states only.  Entries show coefficient magnitude and significance level for the 
main independent variable, fragmentation.  For example, in the first cell 
fragmentation has a coefficient of  – 1.81 at t-value significance of 0.03.  The 
absolute value of the t-value is |2.21|.  A series of dashes (“-----”) indicates no 
statistically significant coefficient.   While the complete list of all variables for all 
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regressions is at the end of each chapter, the matrix motif facilitates focus on the main 
question far better than attempting to pick detail from twenty-four separate equations.
3.10 Follow-on Analysis
Thus far, we have described gathering and analyzing data to evalue the 
Olsonian explanation of collective action.  As noted in Chapter One, subsequent 
theoretical investigation has consigned this free-rider explanation of collective action 
to non-pure public goods alone.  This later research has also produced alternative 
explanations of success in collective action: potential returns to cooperation which 
players might expect, degree of communication among players, and leadership.  
Chapter Five will detail this literature and devise and implement tests for each in the 
non-pure public goods IJC world.  
Despite the impressive power and results of statistical programs, key concepts 
are almost invariably represented by proxies.  Reification of variables is a hazard, and 
much rich detail can be lost.  As a doublecheck on Chapters Four and Five—and to 
add depth and texture to the study—Chapter Six will comprise a mini-case study of 
interjurisdictional competition.  For example, Chapter Five will treat leadership 
statistically via civil society indicators while Chapter Six will present a case study 
asking in part, “What do leaders do?  What functions and results does leadership 
accomplish?”  The case study will be in Tidewater Virginia—Greater 
Norfolk/Hampton Roads—an  urbanized area entirely within the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, precluding the complicating effects of cross-border competition.  This mini-
case study will examine both basic and alternative theories in the context of recent 
regional history and political affairs.
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1
 In earlier research, I was informed by one chamber of commerce which received city funds to attract 
new businesses that the amount of incentives was proprietary information—privileged and not 
available to the public.  In a separate interview, a journalist noted that he sometimes had to threaten 
Freedom of Information Act lawsuits to pry incentive information from jurisdictions.  
1i
  Note that additive indices are essentially different from the issue of additive separability of utility 
functions in normative analysis.  Briefly, the latter is the claim that social welfare is the sum of the 
utility levels of individuals, and individual utility levels are not interdependent.  For more detail, see 
Sen (1973, pp 39-42).  
3 Miller gives this example (p 79):  Consider two metropolitan regions.  One has six jurisdictions; the 
other, twelve.  The sum of the budgets in each region is the same: All the governments combined 
spend $1 million.  Both regions have a single central city which spends $900,000 per year.  The other 
jurisdictions within the urban area spend equal amounts-- $20,000 apiece for the six-jurisdiction 
region; $9,091 for the twelve-jurisdiction area.
Region A Region B
City A1 $900,000 City B1 $900,000 
City A2 $20,000 City B2 $9,091 
City A3 $20,000 City B3 $9,091 
City A4 $20,000 City B4 $9,091 
City A5 $20,000 City B5 $9,091 
City A6 $20,000 City B6 $9,091 
City B7 $9,091 
City B8 $9,091 
City B9 $9,091 
City B10 $9,091 
City B11 $9,091 
City B12 $9,091 
Totals: $1 million $1 million
MPDI: 1.656 1.997 
At gut level, we’d probably consider the twelve-jurisdiction region more fragmented, even 
though each jurisdiction in the six-jurisdiction cluster has a somewhat bigger budget.  The MPDI bears 
this out:  $900,000 divided by $1 million is 90%.  The square root of 0.90 is 0.949.  This is the base 
figure common to both regions.  The six-jurisdiction region’s smaller municipalities each have 2% of 
the overall million dollar combined government spending.  The square root of 0.02 is 0.141.  
Multiplied by 5, that’s 0.707.  0.707 plus 0.949 equals 1.656, which is the MPDI for the six-
jurisdiction region.  Using the same method, we find an MPDI of 1.997 for the twelve-jurisdiction 
region.  MPDI scores further from unity represent more fragmented regions, so the MPDI coincides 
with our impression that the twleve-jurisdiction region is more fragmented.
4 Lewis’ political fragmentation index (PFI) is calculated as (p 49-50):
PFI = TE (1 – SSP)
where
TE = total per capita expenditures (in thousands) by all local governments    combined
SSP = sum of squared percentages of TE accounted for by each jurisdiction
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The term (1-SSP) ranges between 0 and 1.  It is essentially “the probability that two randomly selected 
dollars of local public expenditure in a given metro area  were not spent by the same local government
(p 49).”  Mathematically, consider the case in which one city spends 90% of the government 
expenditures in a two-city region, while the other spends 10%.   0.92 = 0.81, and 0.12 = 0.01.  0.81 + 
0.01 = 0.82 = SSP.  1 – SSP in this example equals 0.18.  Thus, there is only a slight chance—18% --
that two dollars of local government spending emanate from different governments.  Given the vast 
size differential between the two localities’ budgets, this certainly makes intuitive sense as well as 
mathematical logic.
The term (1 – SSP) is an interesting fragmentation measure in its own right, but the PFI 
formula further weights (1 – SSP) by TE.  This means that an urban region with higher general 
spending levels gets a higher PFI.  While somewhat disturbing, this aspect of the formula is justified 
because greater overall spending levels effectively magnify an existing level of fragmentation  as 
measured by (1 – SSP).  This fulfills the author’s goal because PFI “distinguishes metropolises by 
their total levels of local per capita expenditure (p 49).”
5
 As can be seen from the two endnotes above, another significant drawback is that power indices 
require difficult-to-obtain local budget data for all jurisdictions within the metro areas studied.  
Significantly, power indices have, to my knowledge, only been used for case studies comparing small 
numbers of urban areas, never for statistical analyses of all (or a large number of) urbanized areas in 
the United States.
6
 The property tax is a background factor (as would be level of educational spending or general road 
maintenance) which can have an impact on firms’ location decisions.  On the other hand, the property 
tax is set primarily to provide funding for the municipal budget, albeit with the knowledge that too 
high a tax rate will drive business away.   Now, this dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of 
jurisdictions competing for specific firms with various targeted tools, such as an offer of publicly 
funded job training, water district fee reductions, or tax rebates over a specified period.  Thus 
conceived, the property tax per se has an impact on IJC effort only in that a jurisdiction with low tax 
rates might try a lower IJC offer—the general property tax  level is not a tool or component of specific 
fights to get specific firms.  Using the Chapter One example, Fairfax County touted its generally lower 
tax level to tempt Marriott to relocate… but it did not say, “We’ll lower everyone’s property taxes if 
you come to our jurisdiction.”  Thus, IJC is a function of the property tax, but the property tax is not a 
function of IJC incentive deals.  The causation is unidirectional, presenting no endogeneity problem.
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Chapter 3 (Methodology and Plan of the Study) Appendix 1:
ICMA Survey IJC Questions
Q12:  Please indicate which of the following sources of government revenue are used 
to fund your economic development programs:
a. Local revenues/general fund e.   Revenue bonds
b. Federal grants-in-aid f.   Tax increment financing 
c. State grants-in-aid g.  Special assessment districts
d. General obligation bonds
Q13:  Which of the following technology applications has your local government 
implemented as part of its economic development efforts:
a.  Kiosks with touch-screen computers
b.  Videos
c.  Hand-held computers used in the permit and inspection process
d.  On-line computer services (access to government services and information)
e.  Interactive faxing (permits, forms, and applications for a fee)
f.  Smart buildings (e.g., equipped with technologies that turn lights on and 
off, that read security cards, etc)
g.  Intelligent vehicle highway systems (e.g., electronic toll collectors)
Q 19:  Please indicate which of the following business retention activities your local 
government conducts:
a. Local government representative calls on local company
b. Local government representative calls on national company headquarters
c. Surveys of local businesses
d. Business roundtable
e. Revolving loan fund
f. Ombudsman program
g. Acheivement awards
h. Local business publicity program
i. Replacing imports with locally supplied goods
j. Export development assistance
Q21:  Which of the following methods does your local government use to attract 
business?
a. Community resources databases h.  Hosts special events
b. Promotional material i.   Ambassador program
c. Media advertising j.   Trade missions abroad
d. Direct mail
e. Participation in trade shows
f. Attendance at conferences
g. Local government representative calls on prospective companies
121
Q 30:  Please indicate which of the following incentives you offer:
a.  Tax abatements j.  Training Support
b.  Tax credits k.  Utility rate reduction
c.  Enterprise zones l.  Zoning/permit assistance
d.  Tax increment financing m.  Regulatory flexibility
e.  Grants n.  Relocation assistance
f.  Infrastructure improvements o.  Low-cost loans
g.  Land write-downs p.  One-stop permitting
h.  Subsidized buildings q.  Special assessment districts
i.  Employee screening
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Appendix 2 (Chapter Three)
Metropolitan Area and Urbanized Area Maps
Note: Maps provided for general visual comparison of MSA and UA sizes, not for 
detailed analysis.  For more detailed cartographic and tabular data for comparisons 
in specific urban regions, see source Census documents.
Map—MSAs, Western U.S.  (www.census.gov)
123
Map, Western UAs, U.S. (Bureau of the Census: 1990 Census)
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Map, Eastern MSAs, U.S. (www.census.gov)
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Map, Eastern UAs, U.S. (Bureau of the Census: 1990 Census)
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Chapter 4: Analysis I—Free Rider Hypothesis
4.1 Overview
This chapter applies the methodology of the last chapter to the free-rider 
explanation of collective action expounded in Chapter Two, Theory.  We will first 
specify additive indices as proxies for IJC effort, then use those indices to evaluate 
the free-rider theory of collective action first enunciated by Mancur Olson in The 
Logic of Collective Action.  The statistical analysis will not only fail to substantiate
the free-rider theory; it will indicate an opposite direction of causation entirely 
counter to the intuition of that paradigm.  We will next conduct some corollary 
investigations:  What is the effect of racial diversity?  …of form of government (e.g., 
mayor versus city manager)?  The chapter will conclude by assessing the impact of 
the control variables (those other than fragmentation) on interjurisdictional 
competition.
4.2 The Free-rider Hypothesis—Additive Index Construction and a Test
4.2.1 Introduction
To synthesize the argument to this point: Mancur Olson asserted that political 
science had in effect selected on the dependent variable in developing its original 
explanation of collective action.  Scholars had observed pressure groups and lobbies, 
then concluded that collective action is an inherent part of the democratic mode; 
indeed, of the spirit of liberty.  Olson looked at a broader spectrum of groups, 
successful and ephemeral, and recognized that many attempts at collective action had 
failed.  Collective action in this new paradigm was plagued by free riders.  The 
rational individual response to calls for collective action was to defect from 
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cooperation—to let the proverbial ‘other guy’ bear the burdens—dooming most 
collective action attempts to failure unless the number of potential participants is 
extremely small or the group leadership provides selective benefits to members.
These components of the collective action problem lead to the game theoretic 
prisoners’ dilemma model of free-rider collective action theory.  As detailed in 
Chapter Two (Theory), the IJC/urban area fragmentation world fits nicely into the 
prisoners’ dilemma structure, facilitating a testable hypothesis that interjurisdictional 
competition is a function of fragmentation.  If the free-rider theory is accurate, then 
we would expect to see a positive correlation:  an increase in fragmentation should 
lead to an increase in IJC.  However, in point of statistical fact, we actually observe 
the opposite.  An increase in fragmentation leads to a decrease in IJC.
The following three sections build to the full presentation of this finding and 
the statistics behind it.  Section 4.2.2 presents the additive indices which form proxies 
for IJC effort.  Section 4.2.3 very briefly assesses the adequacy of these indices, a 
subject treated at length in Appendix Two to this chapter.  Section 4.2.4 provides a 
detailed explanation of the statistical output tables which were initially introduced at 
the end of Chapter Three (Methodology), and shows what how such a table would 
appear if the free-rider theory is substantiated.  Section 4.2.5 presents the actual 
computer output.
4.2.2 Questions, Answers and Indices
As noted in the previous chapter, additive indices have the advantage of 
capturing information more precisely than a single question does, especially if the 
choice of answers to the single question is either-or, yes or no.  The multiple 
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questions involved in our additive indices are at the appendix to Chapter Three, 
Methodology.  They can be arranged to construct additive indices covering 
promotional activities, incentives employed, funding sources and the like.  The 
following indices were constructed, based upon the questions listed in Appendix 1 to 
Chapter Three:
• Activities:  Comprising the answers to questions 19 and 21 (“Please 
indicate which of the following business retention {attraction} 
activities your local government conducts…”), this indicator gives the 
jurisdiction a combined total of twenty possible responses ranging 
from visits to national corporate headquarters to export development 
assistance.  
• Activities and Technology (in tables, abbreviated act & tech):  This 
adds question 13 to the Activities additive index, enabling responding 
jurisdictions to choose up to seven technologies such as on-line 
computer services and videos used in economic development efforts.
• Activities, Technology and Funding (in tables, abbreviated act, tech & 
funds):  This index completes this family of three related indices by 
including question 12 on funding sources.  The seven answers to this 
question include local revenues to federal grants as well as revenue 
bonds and tax increment financing.
• Incentive Types (in tables, abbreviated incntype):  The seventeen 
answers to question 30 (“Please indicate which of the following 
incentives your local government offers…”) in themselves constitute a 
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valuable additive index.  Answers include several financial incentives 
as well as training support and regulatory flexibility.
Two other questions have been employed.  While not strictly additive indices, 
questions 15a and 15b ask “What percentage of your staff’s time is devoted to 
[business retention and business attraction]?”  These questions constitute another 
perspective on the intensity of incentive efforts and hence interjurisdictional 
competition.  In the tables, these variables are abbreviated as Staff Time % --Retention 
and Staff Time % --Attraction.
4.2.3 Index Testing
The adequacy of an additive index is assessed with two measures: reliability
and validity. Reliability consists both of getting similar results over time and of 
internal consistency—the strong correlation of individual items within the index with 
each other.  A reliable additive index undeviatingly measures a phenomenon… but 
there is no guarantee exactly what it is describing.  Therefore, validity of the index 
ensures its consistent output is on the mark.  (Spector, pp 6-9.)  Ideally, a survey 
using additive indices would be pre-tested, revised and re-evaluated with test groups 
before being administered to the overall population sample.  However, the same 
statistics and similar techniques can be used to assess the adequacy of additive indices 
derived from a previously-administered questionnaire, such as the ICMA survey in 
this study.  
Appendix Two to this chapter employs these methods to substantiate the 
reliability and validity of additive indices within this study.  In quick summary, 
Cronbach’s alpha establishes the internal consistency of the additive indices.  
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Spearman’s Rank-Difference Correlation and Kendall’s Tau tests substantiate the 
validity of the questions which comprise the additive indices:  the rank-order of 
answers remains the same whether the jurisdiction is highly competitive or less 
competitive.  Another test involving specific urban areas and data from Lexis-Nexis 
news archives also underscores the validity of the additive indices by correlating high 
(or low) additive index scores with high (or low) IJC effort in news or scholarly 
accounts.  Thus, a variety of perspectives and methods support the reliability and 
validity of the ICMA survey additives indices with actual conditions in the American 
metropolis.
4.2.4 Basic Regression (‘Fragmentation’ Independent Variable)
The basic operationalization of the hypothesis IJC = f(fragmentation) is the 
regression equation:
IJC = fragmentation measure + jurisdiction population + jurisdiction income 
per capita + real property tax + UA population
Symbolically, 
IJC = a + b1FragI + b2jurispop + b3incomepercap + b4propertytax + 
b5Uapop + e
The effects of state IJC aid were compensated for by running the regressions 
again, this time using only urban areas which are entirely within the borders of a 
single state.  Overall, this results in twenty-four regressions.  Chapter appendix 1, 
Table 4-A-1, presents each regression in detail.  This chapter will highlight key 
variables in matrix chart form.  In this section, the key variable is fragmentation
itself.  Results are entered only for statistically significant t-values for fragmentation 
indicators.  Coefficients with t-value significance greater than 0.15 are represented 
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with dashes (“-----”).  Each entry in the matrix lists the fragmentation coefficient and 
sign, then the significance level for the t-value.  The n for an IJC indicator (such as 
“activities” or “incntype”) is listed on a separate row below each matrix.  The 
fragmentation indices (defined in Section 3.5(a)) along the left -hand side of the table 
are:
• FragI-population:  The fragmentation index based upon jurisdictional 
shares of urban area population.
• FragI-income:  The fragmentation index based upon jurisdictional 
shares of urban area income.
If the free-rider explanation for cooperation holds, the matrix cells should 
report a predominance of positively-signed results.  The more fragmented the urban 
area (controlling for urban area population size), the greater the competition among 
jurisdictions… and the less likely is cooperation.  Table 4-1 is a hypothetical 
illustration of such a result:
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TABLE 4-1 







& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- + + + + + +
population
   FragI- + + + + + +
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
 FragI- + + + + + +
population
   FragI- + + + + + +
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
4.2.5 Statistical Output—‘Fragmentation’ Independent Variable
Table 4-2 reports the actual statistical output for fragmentation indices.  There 
are no positive correlations of fragmentation with increased IJC effort.  On the other 
hand, fully twenty-one regressions—87.5% —generated an inverse result:
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TABLE 4-2 







& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -1.81/.03 -1.74/.05 -1.94/.05 -1.47/.02 -12.2/.02 -----
population |2.21| |1.95| |1.96| |2.32| |2.31|
   FragI- -2.00/.02 -2.01/.03 -2.23/.03 -1.55/.02 -11.3/.03 -6.76/.13
income |2.41| |2.23| |2.22| |2.42| |2.15| |1.51|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -2.12/.03 -1.87/.07 -1.76/.12 -1.34/.07 -15.3/.01 -----
population |2.27| |1.81| |1.55| |1.79| |2.61|
   FragI- -2.21/.02 -2.02/.05 -1.94/.09 -1.41/.06 -14.1/.02 -----
income |2.35| |1.95| |1.70| |1.87| |2.39|
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
This counter-intuitive result in the face of a prisoners’ dilemma situation will 
motivate a search for other explanations of IJC behavior in the next chapter, using 
reasons suggested by alternative explanations of collective action.
What is the actual magnitude of the impact of fragmentation on IJC effort?  Of 
course, the coefficients above show the impact of a one-unit change in fragmentation 
on the IJC indicator for that matrix cell.  In the first cell of Table 4-2 above, for 
example, a change of 1 in FragI-population will cause IJC as measured by the 
activities additive index to decrease by 1.81.  This is a bit nebulous, given that 
fragmentation indices constitute a 0-1 scale and that each additive index and other IJC 
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measure comprises a different number of response options.  A more intuitively 
appealing way to envision the results—one which will be employed again to augment 
key results tables in the next chapter—is to answer the question, by what percentage 
does IJC change from the lowest to the highest value of the actual range of FragI?
Thus, in the first cell of Table 4-2, does the  —1.81 coefficient translate into a large 
percentage change in the ‘activities’ IJC additive index, say, a 40% difference in IJC 
effort from the least to the most fragmented urbanized areas? …a small change, such 
as 1%?  …or some change in the middle of the extremes?  We can make the 
calculation for the first matrix cell in the following manner:
IJCActivities =  –1.81
The actual range of FragI-population is not 0-1 but from 0.05
to 0.99, thus 0.99—0.05 = 0.94.  To standardize, (IJCActivities x 
FragI-population) is:
(–1.81)(0.94) =  –1.7014.
Finally, the IJCActivities additive index contains 20 responses; 
thus the maximum, 100% change would be 20.  Instead, we 
have a standardized change of  –1.7014.  We need to compute 
what percent –1.7014 is of 20.  Thus, 
–1.7014/20 =  -9%        
This result indicates that if we move from the case of the minimum 
fragmentation to the maximum fragmentation as measured in the sample, there would 
occur a change of approximately two of the twenty activities in the index.  This 
change represents a 9% decrease in IJC effort—not massive but certainly not at all 











& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -9% -6% -5% -8% -11% na
population
   FragI- -10% -7% -6% -9% -11% -7%
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -10% -7% -5% -7% -14% na
population
   FragI- -11% -7% -5% -8% -14% na
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
The percentage decreases are not negligible, especially as the free-rider  explanation 
would have the signs point in the opposite direction.  The different IJC measures 
appear to be of similar magnitude, 5%-11% for additive indices and 7%-14% for staff 
time devoted to retention or attraction of firms.
This algorithm was run again for all regressions in Table 4-2(a) as well as for 
all similar charts in Chapter Five (Tables 5-2(a), 5-3(a), 5-4(a) and 5-5(a)), this time 
using observations within +/–  1 standard deviation of the mean fragmentation index.  
This range constitutes the middle 68% of jurisdictions based upon degree of 
fragmentation.  All percentages remained within seven percentage points of the 
original percentages for Table 4-2(a) as well as for all but 7 of 48 cells in the Chapter 
Five tables.  The largest difference in the Chapter Five tables was eighteen percentage 
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points.  In 12 of 60 cells in Chapters Four and Five, the algorithm for +/– 1 standard 
deviation regressions generated a statistically significant result while the original 
computation did not, or vice versa. In sum, this indicates relative smoothness 
throughout the functions rather than an abrupt difference in the rate of change in the 
upper or lower reaches of fragmentation.    
Regression Diagnostics.  Regression diagnostics indicated significant 
heteroskedasticity—the tendency for the variation around a variable’s mean to change 
throughout the range of observation.  For example, typing errors in a typing class may 
have a wide dispersion at the beginning of a school year but be far less dispersed later 
in the year.  Heteroskedasticity can cause a regression to miss a relationship where 
one actually exists.  Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and Szroeter tests revealed the 
theoretically critical control variable urban area population to be heteroskedastic.  
White-Huber robust standard errors were therefore run with all regressions to offset 
this problem.  This procedure does not affect the size or sign of coefficients.
The major concern about the regressions is that the data are noisy; R-squareds 
are very low.  However, scholarship of the past fifteen years has raised considerable 
doubt about the efficacy of R2 (Brown, 1999; Cox and Wermuth, 1992; Lardaro, 
1993; Nau, 2004).   Another statistic appraising regression equations, the F-test, will 
be reported in the detailed appendices to this and the next chapter.1  The F-statistic 
measures “the overall significance of the equation” (Kennedy, p 65) by determining 
if any (or all) independent variables have an impact on the value of the dependent 
variable.  The F-test is however free of the criticisms leveled at R2.  (Kennedy, pp 65-
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7; Gujarti, pp 245-50.)  The overwhelming majority of F-statistics in this study are 
significant at the .00 level of confidence.  An endnote provides further detail.2
4.3 Corollary Investigations: The Effects of Racial Diversity and Form of 
Government
As noted in Chapter Three, numerous scholars have commented on the impact 
of race on governmental processes, including American urban politics (see for 
example Elkin, 1987; Miller, 1999; Reed, 1987; Stone, 1989).  A testable hypothesis 
is that outcomes are a function of racial diversity—the more ethnically fragmented a 
jurisdiction or region, the more fractious the politics.  In our setting, the higher the 
racial fragmentation, the greater the interjurisdictional competition.  
Urban political scientists have also frequently described a difference in 
responsiveness to citizens and powerful interests between more traditional strong 
mayor and commission government on the one hand and council-manager 
government on the other.  Progressive Era reforms involving professional city/town 
managers and civil service (versus patronage) systems are frequently criticized as 
making government more remote from and less responsive to citizens (see for 
example Bridges, 1997).  Given this difference between the more politically 
responsive mayor and commission forms of government, and given that business 
interests would presumably want to maximize tax breaks and public works which 
support their firms, we would hypothesize that mayor and commission governments 
would be associated with greater amounts of interjurisdictional competition.
These two hypotheses can be tested by adding appropriate variables to our 
regression, transforming it to:
IJC = f(fragmentation, race, form of government) + control variables
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and reporting results in a table similar to that of the basic computer run.
Form of government was operationalized as a dummy variable in which 
mayor and commission governments were assigned a “1” score and council-manager 
a “0” score.  The small number of town meeting governments in the sample were 
given a “0” score also because such governments generally rely on full-time 
managers.
Operationalizing racial diversity of an urban area proved immensely more 
challenging.  Hirschman-Herfindahl Indices were constructed for each urban area 
based upon 1990 census data.  Unfortunately, the 1990 Census did not directly 
account for Hispanic origin, which was a separate question.  According to Bureau of 
the Census analysts, most Hispanics checked “white” for ethnic origin, so a separate 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of ethnic concentration was computed by adding 
‘Hispanic’ while subtracting Hispanic from ‘white’.  In most urban areas, this 
modification did not significantly change the final HHI score by more than a few 
points, except for several urban areas in California, Florida and Texas.  However, 
correlation matrices—a type of regression diagnostic—indicated that such HHIs were 
highly colinear with urban area population.  The greater the UA population, the less 
homogenous the ethnic makeup of the region.  Kennedy (p 184) notes this to be one 
of the circumstances in a data set which can give rise to multicolinearity: “…there 
could in fact exist some kind of approximate relationship among some of the 
regressors.”  Multicolinearity leads to high variance in OLS estimates of coefficients 
of the colinear variables; hence, to low confidence in the coefficients.  Changing to a 
series of dummy variables denoting HHI-derived gradations of racial diversity did not 
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help.  Neither did using the percentage of urban area population accounted for by the 
largest racial or ethnic group.  Finally, employing a 0,1 dummy variable denoting 
whether an urban area had above-average racial fragmentation or not resulted in no 
significant multicolinearity during regression diagnostics.  Accordingly, this racial 
diversity measure was adopted.
The results are summarized in Table 4-3:
TABLE 4-3 







& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -1.97/.02 -1.94/.03 -2.18/.03 -1.57/.01 -12.2/.02 -----
population |2.42| |2.19| |2.23| |2.50| |2.29|
  mayor/ -.99/.01 -1.25/.00 -1.23/.00 -0.43/.08 ----- -----
comm |2.84| |3.34| |2.91| |1.76|
  race ----- ----- ----- -0.39/.15 ----- -----
diversity |1.45|
   FragI- -2.09/.01 -2.13/.02 -2.37/.02 -1.62/.01 -11.4/.03 -----
income |2.54| |2.37| |2.39| |2.54| |2.15|
  mayor/ -0.97/.01 -1.24/.00 -1.21/.00 -0.41/.09 ----- -----
comm |2.78| |3.28| |2.86| |1.69|
  race ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
diversity
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -2.17/.02 -1.94/.06 -1.94/.09 -1.46/.05 -16.1/.01 -----
population |2.33| |1.88| |1.70| |1.95| |2.71|
  mayor/ -0.72/.09 -1.01/.03 -1.07/.04 -0.49/.09 ----- -----
comm |1.72| |2.22| |2.10| |1.72|
  race ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
diversity
   FragI- -2.21/.02 -2.03/.05 -2.01/.08 -1.49/.05 -14.9/.01 -----
income |2.36| |1.97| |1.79| |1.98| |2.51|
  mayor/ -0.69/.10 -0.99/.03 -1.05/.04 -0.48/.10 ----- -----
comm |1.65| |2.17| |2.06| |1.66|
  race ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
diversity
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
Of note, 
• Once again, no fragmentation coefficient is positively signed.  Twenty of 
twenty-four coefficients—83%--exhibit the inverse relationship.
• Race does not appear a significant factor in the IJC world.  Only one of the 
two dozen regressions carried a statistically significant racial diversity 
coefficient.
• Mayor and commission government does appear to have an effect on 
interjurisdictional competition.  Sixteen regressions (66%) carried statistically 
significant negative mayor/commission coefficients, while none were 
positively signed.  Mayor and commission government is thus generally 
associated with a more cooperative IJC stance—opposite the predicted sign of 
the equation.  Chapter Five will show that greater numbers of business, 
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political and professional groups tend to be associated with greater 
cooperation and less IJC, offering an explanation for the reversed sign.  
Mayoral and commission government is more responsive, but pressure groups 
tend to favor cooperation.
• It is also important to ask what effect the inclusion of mayor/commission and 
racial diversity variables has on the strength of the basic fragmentation 









& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -0.16/-.01 -0.2/-.02 -0.24/-.02 -0.1/-.01 .00/.00 -----
population
   FragI- -0.09/-.01 -0.12/-.01 -0.14/-.01 -0.07/-.01 -0.11/.00 *see
income note






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -0.05/-.01 -0.07/-.01 -0.15/-.03 -0.12/-.02 -0.76/.00 -----
population
  FragI- .00/.00 -0.01/.00 -0.07/-.01 -0.08/-.01 -0.8/-.01 -----
income
Note * : Statistic becomes insignificant at 0.17 level.
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level 
Of twenty-one matrix cells which contained statistically significant scores, eighteen 
coefficients became more negative with the addition of the mayor and race variables.  
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All but five also received higher significance levels.  The others retained their original 
significance levels.  Only one cell (FragI-income, Attraction for ‘all urban areas’)
became weaker (indeed, statistically insignificant) both in coefficient and significance 
when mayor and race were taken into account, and only one regression stayed the 
same.  Thus, the addition of the two variables overwhelmingly made the inverse 
relationship between urban area fragmentation and competition stronger.
4.4 Comments on Control Variables
Although it is useful for summarizing key results, the indicator matrix method 
obscures full regression equations.  This is unfortunate in that control variables are 
themselves of interest in various disciplines.  The tables in chapter Appendix One list 
all statistically significant coefficients with the significance of their t-values.  
Summary comments on the two matrices (comprising 48 cells) follow:
• Jurisdiction population is always positive.  Increased population of a 
jurisdiction (in a regression which controls for overall urban area population) 
clearly gives the jurisdiction more resources to devote to incentives and IJC 
activities.  It also may put more pressure on municipal officials to use any 
means possible to expand the job base, including the use of IJC.  Because the 
next control variable, income per capita, is not generally significant, the latter 
political (versus resource-based) explanation may be more compelling.  The 
apparently small coefficients are somewhat deceptive: The +0.000009 
coefficient in the first cell means that for every increase of one hundred 
thousand persons, the value of this IJC indicator goes up by almost a whole 
point on a scale of 1 – 20.  Note that this result provides yet another 
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substantiation of the zoo effect mentioned in Section 3.6.  (Schmandt & 
Stephens, 1960; Oates 1986)
• Income per capita is, interestingly, not generally significant (12 of 48 cells), 
even though it should also be a source of financial strength facilitating higher 
levels of IJC.  
• Property tax is inversely correlated with IJC in 29 of 48 cells, or 60%.  The 
size of the coefficient is small but the sign reinforces the image of the property 
tax as another tool of IJC: Lower property taxes are an incentive to business 
location and in this survey are associated with more aggressive levels of IJC.  
The Chapter One example of Fairfax County, Virginia offering Marriott 
Corporation a smaller package of public works benefits combined with much 
lower property taxes than Montgomery County, Maryland is a case in point.
• Urban Area population is generally not significant.  Overall, coefficient signs 
are mixed and significant only in 13 of 48 cells.  Positive signs make up 6 of 
48 cells (12.5%) while negative coefficients account for 7 cells (15%).
4.5 A Comment on High- versus Low-IJC Polities.
While not answered by analysis of control variables, another interesting 
question regards differences between jurisdictions which practice IJC very intensely 
and those which do not.  If we examine polities which score above average for IJC 
and contrast them with communities which exhibit below average IJC effort, what do 
highly competitive jurisdictions do that less competitive cities and towns do not?
The answer turns out to be that both above- and below-average IJC polities 
use roughly the same tools.  As detailed more extensively in Section 4.3* of 
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Appendix Two of this chapter, when the responses to the ICMA survey questions 
underlying the additive indices are broken into two groups—the responses of above-
average IJC jurisdictions and the responses of below-average IJC jurisdictions—and 
the responses are ranked according to frequency of use, the resulting prioritized lists 
are remarkably similar.  For example, on question 30—the variety of incentives 
offered by jurisdictions—both high- and low-IJC municipalities displayed markedly 
similar preference orderings.  The top five incentives employed were the same, with 
only one pair inverted between the rankings of high- and low-IJC polities:
           TABLE 4-5 
 
Top Five Incentive Offerings: 
High- vs Low- IJC Jurisdictions
   (question 30)
AV+ AV-
% using: IJC Tool: IJC Tool: % using:
0.85   Zoning/permit assistance 0.379
0.814 Infrastructure improvements 0.192
0.532 TIF* One-Stop* 0.154
0.5        Tax abatements 0.119
0.473 One-Stop* TIF* 0.117
* Notes: "TIF" is "tax increment financing"; 
   "One-Stop" is "one-stop permit 
    assistance".
Further, out of 18 incentives offered as options in this survey question, in only four 
cases were the preferences of high- and low-IJC polities more than two rankings 
apart.  For example, for highly competitive communities “Free land or land write-
downs” ranked as the 7th most-used incentive while for the less competitive this 
incentive was ranked 12th.
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Thus, what works for one type of community evidently works approximately 
as well for another type.  The efficacy of incentives, methods and funding sources 
appears to be much the same for communities whether or not they are highly 
competitive for new firms.
4.6 Conclusion
If the free-rider explanation is correct, then more fragmentation should doom 
cooperation in attracting industries to metropolitan regions.  The greater the 
fragmentation, the greater the IJC effort.  Instead, statistical analysis shows that more 
fragmented urbanized areas experience not more competition but rather greater 
cooperation.  What might account for a result so counter-intuitive to free-rider 
theory?  Chapter Five will test three major alternative explanations of collective 
action.
1
 Given the use of White-Huber robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity, the STATA 
statistics package actually computes a Wald statistic in place of the F-statistic.  Peter Kennedy (1998) 
notes that the Wald statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the F-test (p 60).  The Wald test employs a 
chi-square distribution; however, for linear regression, the chi-square distribution approximates an F 
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distribution with degrees of freedom 1 and the residual degrees of freedom from the original model 
(Kennedy, p 60; STATA Reference Manual, p 235).
2 Scholarship of the past fifteen years has raised considerable doubt about the efficacy of R2.  Cox and 
Wermuth (1992) observe that “Much has been written in dispraise of the coefficient of determination  
R2 as an overall summary of the effectiveness of a least squares equation.”  Brown (1999) and Nau 
(2004) note that stock market predictions routinely have R2 below 0.30.  Lardaro (1993; p 186) 
includes a cautionary discussion of R2 in his text:
…there are a number of potential pitfalls associated with using R2 to 
judge the performance of a single equation or as a basis for comparing 
several equations:  (1) Spurious correlations can produce large R2
values…(2) Time series equations almost always generate higher R2 values 
than cross-section equations… (3) Low R2 values are not necessarily the 
result of including an incorrect explanatory variable in the sample regression 
function… [Available proxies may not adequately measure one or more 
independent variables.] 
McGuirk and Driscoll (1995) elaborate on this theme with examples based upon computer-
generated simulation data.  The first example in their paper features a model with an R2 of 0.38 and yet 
“the regression model is correctly specified (all statistical assumptions are met) and the (simulated) 
expected values of the estimated coefficients are all close to their respective population parameters.”
Their second example generates a high R2 but coefficients wildly off the mark: – 7.7 instead of +5;  
+47.2 instead of  +0.5.  Subsequent simulations demonstrate that R2 can be a highly inconsistent 
measure. 
Peter Kennedy summarizes in the fourth edition of his Guide to Econometrics (1998, p 27):
…a high R2 is not necessary for “good” estimates; R2 could be low 
because of a high variance of the disturbance terms, and our estimate of beta 
could be “good”  on other criteria… In general, econometricians are 
interested in obtaining “good” parameter estimates where “good” is not 
defined in terms of R2.  Consequently the measure R2 is not of much 
importance in econometrics.  Unfortunately, however, many practitioners act 
as though it is important, for reasons that are not entirely clear…
The F-test will be reported in the detailed appendices to this and the next chapter.  The F-
statistic measures “the overall significance of the equation” (Kennedy, p 65) by determining if any (or 
all) independent variables have an impact on the value of the dependent variable.  The F-statistic is 
related computationally to R2 in that it divides the numerator and denominator of R2 by degrees of 
freedom based upon the number of variables and the number of observations, respectively.  The F-test 
is however free of the criticisms leveled at R2.  (Kennedy, pp 65-7; Gujarti, pp 245-50.)  The 
overwhelming majority of F-statistics in this study are significant at the .00 level of confidence. 
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activities act & tech
act, tech & 
funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -1.81/ -1.74/ -1.94/ -1.47/ -12.17/ -----
population 0.03 .05 .05 .02 .02
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.03 .00 .00 .00 .00 .12
   income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/ -----
per cap .07
   property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .15 .05 .08
UA pop -.00000007 -.00000008 -.0000001/ ----- ----- -----
/.13 .07 .04
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04
   FragI- -2.00/ -2.01/ -2.23/ -1.55/ -11.29/ -6.76/
income .02 .03 .03 .02 .03 .13
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .12
   income ----- ----- ----- ----- .009/ -----
per cap .08
   property -.00002/ ----- -.00002/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .06 .08
UA pop ----- -.0000008/ -.0000001 ----- ----- -----
.11 /.05
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 0 .00 .03
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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4-A-1 con't
     urban areas within single states only:
Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech & 
funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -2.12/ -1.87/ 1.76/ -1.34/ -15.34/ -----
population .03 .07 .12 .07 .01
juris pop +.000009/ +.000001/ +..00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .08
   income ----- ----- ----- +.001/ -.01/ -----
per cap .02 .03
   property -.00002/ ----- -.00002/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .06 .07 .14
UA pop +.0000001/ ----- ----- +.0000001/ ----- -----
.14 .02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .19
   FragI- -2.21/ -2.02/ -1.94/ -1.41/ -14.1/ -----
income .02 .05 .09 .06 .02
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ .000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .08
   income ----- ----- ----- +.001/ -.01/ -----
per cap .02 .03
   property -.00002/ ----- -.00002/ .00002/ ----- -----
tax .07 .08 .14
UA pop +.000007/ ----- ----- +.0000001/ ----- -----
.14 .02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .14
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level (significance only for F)








activities act & tech
act, tech & 
funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -1.97/ -1.94/ -2.18/ 1.57/ -12.2/ -----
population .02 .03 .03 .01 0.02
     mayor: -0.99/ -1.25/ -1.23/ -0.43/ ----- -----
.01 .00 .00 .08
     race: ----- ----- ----- -0.39/ ----- -----
.15
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.000009/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .14
   income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/ -----
per cap .04
   property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax 0.02 .08 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0000006
/.10
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07
   FragI- -2.09/ -2.13/ -2.37 -1.62/ -11.4/ -----
income .01 .02 .02 .01 .03
     mayor: -0.97/ -1.24/ -1.21/ -0.41/ ----- -----
.01 .00 .00 .09
     race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.000009/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .14
   income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/ -----
per cap .05
   property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .03 .08 .03 0.07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0000005/
.13
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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4-A-2 cont
     urban areas within single states only:
Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech & 
funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -2.17/ -1.94/ -1.91/ -1.46/ -16.1/ -----
population .02 .06 .09 .05 .01
     mayor: -0.72/ -1.01/ -1.07/ 0.49/ ----- -----
.09 .03 .04 .09
     race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .08
   income ----- ----- ----- +.001/ -.011/ -----
per cap .02 .02
   property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .04 .12 .05 .12
UA pop ----- ----- ----- +.0000001 ----- -----
/.02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .30
   FragI- -2.21/ -2.03/ -2.01/ -1.49/ -14.9/ -----
income 0.02 .05 .08 .05 .01
     mayor: -0.69/ -0.99/ -1.05/ -0.48/ ----- -----
.10 .03 .04 .10
     race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .09
   income ----- ----- ----- +.001/ -.011/ -----
per cap .02 .02
   property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .13 .05 .12
UA pop ----- ----- ----- +.0000001 ----- -----
/.02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .25
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level (significance only for F)
Note: UA pop is urban area population
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 4 (Free-Rider Hypothesis): Additive 
Index Testing
4.1*  Introduction:  The adequacy of an additive index is assessed with two 
measures: reliability and validity. Reliability consists both of getting similar results 
over time and of internal consistency—the strong correlation of individual items 
within the index with each other.  A reliable additive index undeviatingly measures a 
phenomenon… but there is no guarantee exactly what it is describing.  Therefore, 
validity of the index ensures its consistent output is on the mark.  (Spector, pp 6-9.)
The procedure for assessing adequacy of the ICMA-derived additive indices 
must be modified from Spector’s ideal in which an additive index is pre-tested on 
pilot groups, reliability refined until internal consistency is high, then gauged for 
validity… and redesigned/retested if necessary.  In that beggars can’t be chosers, 
consistency and validity of an already-administered survey must be assessed ex poste.  
Fortunately, means similar to Spector’s can boost confidence in our additive indices.
4.2*  Reliability:  While re-administering the survey is clearly impracticable, internal 
consistency of the additive indices can be established using Spector’s prescribed 
means, Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach; Spector, pp 31-5).   Cronbach’s alpha ranges 
from 0 to 1 and varies as a function of the number of items in the additive index and 
the degree of correlation they show with each other.  An alpha of 0.70 or above 
indicates acceptable internal consistency.  All four additive indices in this study 
scored well:
Retention/Attraction Activities: 0.86
Activities & Technology: 0.85
Activities, Tech & Funding: 0.85
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Incentive Types: 0.77
A computer program for Cronbach’s alpha will list all index components and 
indicate which ones, if dropped, will raise internal consistency and by how much.  
This posed a bit of a dilemma in the ex poste setting: When would it be proper to drop 
an answer in one of the additive indices from a survey already administered, as 
opposed to one undergoing pilot testing?  Fortunately, few responses would raise 
Cronbach’s alpha by their elimination—and those so selected would do so by less 
than a hundredth of a point.  The one response which was ejected was “Other:_____”.  
In all four indices, “Other:_____” lowered internal consistency somewhat and once 
even varied in a different direction from all other index components.  Given the 
different, catch-all nature of such an open-ended answer nestled among otherwise 
specified responses, omitting “Other:_____” seemed fully justified.
4.3*  Validity(1):  Might not one city engage in only one IJC practice to the tune of 
millions of dollars, yet receive a lower additive index score than another city which 
spreads only a few thousand dollars across a range of competitive mechanisms?  This 
issue can first be addressed by inspection of the questions behind the additive indices.  
The efficacy of IJC practices should be constant, whether implemented by highly 
competitive jurisdictions or by those which only occasionally engage in IJC.  Thus, 
competitive jurisdictions—those with high IJC additive index scores—would use 
about the same practices as do other jurisdictions… and in basically the same order of 
preference.
Four questions among the bases of the additive indices are displayed below 
(ICMA reports Question 21 only by overall total; it cannot be analyzed in this 
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manner.)  These bear out the contention that jurisdictions above and below average 
IJC intensity use similar means to attract and retain businesses.  Question 30 is most 
obvious, so the discussion will begin there and proceed in descending order.
Question 30: Incentives Offered.
Displaying the data from highest to lowest responses for both above- and 
below-average groups produces the following chart:
Q30: AV+ AV--
0.85 L L 0.379
0.814 F F 0.192
0.532 D P 0.154
0.5 A A 0.119
0.473 P D 0.117
0.437 O* J 0.061
0.365 G O 0.055
0.365 J* Q 0.052
0.341 M* E 0.047
0.335 E* R 0.047
0.314 C* M 0.04
0.261 Q G 0.032
0.197 B C 0.026
0.177 I* I 0.02
0.167 N* K 0.015
0.147 K* B 0.009
0.093 H* N 0.009
0.087 R H 0.006
The first five most popular responses are the same for jurisdictions with above-
average (“AV+”) and below-average (“AV—”) additive index scores, with third and 
fifth places reversed—LFDAP versus LFPAD.  Nine of the thirteen others were 
separated at most by two places in the orderings, as denoted by asterisks in the AV+ 
column.
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Question 19: Business Retention Activities.
Listing responses in the more conventional ‘19a, 19b, …’ order, and noting 
place number for the more popular responses (with asterisks now denoting ties):
Q19 AV-- AV+
19a #1 0.24 0.91 #1 same
19b 0.01 0.26
19c #2 0.13 0.82 #2 same
19d #4 0.08 0.52 #3
19e #3 0.09 0.45 #4
19f #6* 0.03 0.39 #6 same
19g #6* 0.03 0.32 #7 same
19h #5 0.07 0.42 #5 same
19i 0.007 0.08
19j 0.01 0.23
The first two places are the same.  The third and fourth place preferences are 
reversed.  Fifth place is the same.  There is a tie for sixth place on AV— which 
corresponds to sixth and seventh place on AV+.




13b #1 0.2 0.8#1 same
13c #4 0.01 0.13#5*
13d #3 0.05 0.54#3 same
13e #2 0.06 0.57#2 same
13f #5 0.005 0.14#4
13g 0.002 0.07
The first three places are the same.  Fourth and fifth places are reversed.
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Question 12:  Funding Sources for Attraction/Retention Activities and Incentives.
Q12:
AV+ AV--
12a #1 0.88 0.58#1 same
12b #3* 0.42 0.01#3*
12c #2 0.44 0.01#3*
12d 0.13 0.003
12e 0.19 0.003
12f #3* 0.42 0.04#2
12g 0.17 0.003
The first place is the same.  Ties for third place make the chart difficult to visualize, 
but note the closeness of the correspondence: None of the top half of responses has an 
ordering deviation greater than one.  
Several statistics exist for evaluating ordinal listings of this kind.  Spearman’s 
Rank-Difference Correlation employs a multiple of the sum of the squared 
differences between the rankings for an item (say, Group A ranked it as first while 
Group B ranked it as fifth in preference).  Kendall’s Tau goes further by correcting 
for differences in the range of responses between the two groups (Group A scores 
might range from, say, 11 for the first place item to 7 for last place while Group B 
scores cover a spectrum from 37 down to 1).  It is also more sensitive to outliers.  The 
following chart lists confidence levels which reject the null hypothesis of complete 
independence between the two rankings:
Spearman Kendall
Question 30: .00 .00
Question 19: .00 .00
Question 13: .00 .00
Question 12: .01 .04
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Thus, in summary, visual inspection of rankings suggests a correlation which is 
confirmed statistically.  The ICMA additive index responses appear internally 
consistent.
4.4*  Validity(2):  Another interesting cross-check involves a Lexis-Nexis search of 
local newspapers for instances of IJC.  Several major urban areas have well-
documented means of restricting intra-urban IJC, such as Denver’s anti-raiding 
agreement, tax revenue-sharing in Minneapolis-St. Paul and regional government in 
Portland, Oregon.  On the other hand, we have seen the Washington DC area 
engaging in significant IJC among its components, and Gary Miller’s Cities By 
Contract would lead us to expect the Los Angeles area to be very competitive.  A 
search on the terms economic development and incentives plus component city names 
for the decade of the 1990s revealed few instances of raiding or enticements for the 
Denver, Minneapolis-St Paul and Portland, Oregon urban areas.  The same search 
uncovered significant competition among jurisdictions in the Washington, DC and 
Los Angeles regions:
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Cooperative Areas & Incentive Use:
DENVER URBANIZED AREA





US West Lakewood Consolidation Fee waivers, $327k 1000 jobs
1999 Various Cities prop tax rebate $327/job
Ryder Aurora New facility Sales tax $30k 125 jobs
1995 Lakewood waiver $240/job
Denver
MINNEAPOLIS-ST PAUL TWIN CITIES





Lawson Minneapolis Relocation $31m 1000 jobs
Software St Paul $31k/job
1997 Comment: Called "raid" by Minneapolis; Lawson president says it
was he who initiated contact with St. Paul officials.
PORTLAND OREGON URBANIZED AREA







Non-Cooperative Areas & Incentive Use:
WASHINGTON, DC URBANIZED AREA





AOL Data Loudoun County New facility Fee waiver, $4.062m 125 jobs
Center Pr William Cnty prop tax down over 10 yr $32.5k/jb
2000 Comment: Press reports this will be a $550m facility. Pr William
subsequently gains other data centers as well.
MCI Office Distr. of Columbia Consolidation "several 2000 jobs
1998 Fairfax County $ million"
Redskins Distr. of Columbia Relocation $80m
Stadium Pr Georges Cnty
1990-97 Alexandria
Comment: Originally in District of Columbia
Aspen Rockville Expanded $500k 150 jobs
Systems Northern Virginia Facility $3.3k/job
1996 Comment: $7.6m facility
Wilson Distr. of Columbia Relocation $800k 200 jobs
Wyatt Bethesda ($280k-Va $4k/job
1996 Northern Virginia 'low'-DC)
Comment: Originally in District of Columbia
Bureau of Distr. of Columbia Consolidation
Tax deferral; 
10 $7.7m 1500 jobs
National Various suburbs years $1.5k/job
Affairs 
1996
British Fairfax County New facility + Prop tax $1.5m
Aerospace Loudoun County Relocation waived
Training
Complex
1988-96 Comment: Headquarters moved back to Fairfax County; training and
simulator stay in Loudoun County
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Wang Bethesda Relocation Lower corp tax 250 jobs
Federal Fairfax County
1995 Comment: Originally in Bethesda
American Rockville Relocation $18m
Type Pr William County
Culture  
1995 Comment: Biotech; Originally in Rockville
AT&T Distr. of Columbia Consolidation $1.1m 750 jobs
1995 Various suburbs $1467/job
Comment: Silver Spring loses 350 jobs; Fairfax County loses 200
jobs; Arlington loses 50 jobs; 150 new jobs added
Equal Distr. of Columbia Relocation Loan at 10% $400k 25 jobs
Access Various suburbs principle
Phone Co
1995 Comment: Possible expansion to 200 jobs in outyears
General Distr. of Columbia New facility 250 jobs
Dynamics Falls Church
1991 Maryland suburbs
Comment: Most jobs filled by personnel transfering in from elsewhere
Washing- Distr. of Columbia Relocation 100% construc-
ton COG Various suburbs tion financing;
1991 no prop tax-5 yr
low prop tax-5 
yr
Comment: Incentives offered offset increased rent at original location
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Non-Cooperative Areas & Incentive Use:
Los Angeles Urbanized Area
LOS 
ANGELES 





Art Center Pasadena Expansion & not
College Los Angeles  Relocation disclosed
2000
Dream- Los Angeles New facility $70m
works Glendale
SKG Burbank
Studio  Santa Clarita
1996-99
Comment: LA was selected but financing problems ultimately
precluded any new Dreamworks studio
LPGA Santa Clarita New venue $160k
Tourna- Simi Valley
ment Yorba Linda  
1999 La Habra  
Glendale
Condor Simi Valley Expansion & $15k 100 jobs
Systems Moorpark Relocation $150/job
1999 Newbury Park
Various cities
MICOM Simi Valley Expansion & $226k 500 jobs
1998 Various cities Relocation $452/job
Microwave Simi Valley Expansion & $32,750 65 jobs
Monolithics Various cities Relocation $492/job
1997
Princess Los Angeles Relocation Land bargain; 600 jobs
Cruises Santa Clarita no business tax
1997 Comment: Adds $2.74m to area with multiplier benefits
Numerically, the cooperative urban areas have far fewer instances of intra-regional 
IJC than do non-cooperative regions (Denver, 2; Minneapolis-St Paul, 1; Portland 
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Oregon, 0 versus Washington DC, 13 and Los Angeles, 7).  Los Angeles is, of course, 
a megaregion outlier both in terms of urban area population (‘absorptive capacity’, 
from the theoretical chapter) and number of jurisdictions.  Nonetheless—and despite 
this being a small sample—a t-test supports a difference of means in the average 
number of IJC incidents per jurisdiction per decade between the cooperative and non-
cooperative UAs:
UA population








Denver 1.5m 2 30 0.07
Minn-St Paul 2.1m 1 95 0.01
Portland, OR 1.2m 0 6 0
Wash DC 3.4m 13 57 0.23
Los Angeles 11.4m 7 121 0.06
t = 1.7062
confidence level = 0.09
In summary, the validity of the ICMA survey additive indices is supported by 
a variety of perspectives and methods regarding actual conditions in the American 
metropolis.           
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Chapter 5:  Analysis II—Alternative Theories
5.1 Overview
Theoretical analysis in Chapter Two has shown interjurisdictional competition 
within urban areas to be based in the prisoners’ dilemma and hence a collective action 
problem within the scope of Olson’s logic for non-pure public goods, but Chapter 
Four demonstrated that the anticipated defection outcome did not result.  Indeed, 
increased fragmentation leads to greater cooperation.  What might explain this result, 
so at odds with earlier theory?
This chapter will apply three major alternatives to the numbers-based 
explanation of collective action: anticipated returns, communication and leadership.  
Each section will first summarize the explanation and theory, then propose a test in 
the IJC/fragmentation context and, finally, present the results of that test.  We will 
find that while the evidence generally fails to support anticipated returns as an 




A major critique of Olson came early with publication of Norman Frohlich 
and Joe Oppenheimer’s 1970 article “I Get By With A Little Help From My Friends”.  
The authors demonstrate that the free-rider effect is independent of group size.  Free-
riding is always a possibility in collective action.  However, no matter what the group 
size, individuals who are rational, self-interested, and oriented on the expected value 
163
of outcomes can get past free-riding motivations to achieve successful collective 
action.  
Frohlich and Oppenheimer present a matrix arraying an individual’s possible 
donations to a collective action attempt (no donation, $1, $2, $3, … $n) against all the 
amounts by which others’ donations may fall short of providing the public good 
which the collective action is trying to fund.  In other words,  a group may be raising 
money to transform a rotting, rat-infested wharf area into a safe, appealing public 
park.  If others’ donations are just $100 shy of the amount needed for the restoration 
and Mr/Ms “J” donates $98, the effort fails.  If J donates $100 or more, the effort 
succeeds.  J receives the benefit of the public good he or she desired.  
The expected value, VD, of each possible donation by J is defined as the sum 
of the expectations-weighted possible donations levels for all others, plus J’s 
donation.  For example, J may consider donating $50 but estimate that there is only a 
small possibility others will donate the full renovation cost minus $50, a greater 
possibility others will donate full cost minus $100, a much greater possibility that 
others will donate full cost minus $200, and so forth.  We can put numbers on this: 
Assume that J’s estimate for others’ cost-minus-$50 is 0.1, that his/her estimate for 
cost-minus-$100 is 0.3, for cost-minus-$200 is 0.4, and to round things out, assume 
that J considers one more possibility, others contribute the full cost minus $300, a 0.2 
possibility.  The calculation thus becomes (-$50)(0.1) + (-$100)(0.3) + (-$200)(0.4) + 
(-$300)(0.2) = -$5 + -$30 + -$80 + -$60 = -$175. This anticipated shortfall 
combined with J’s $50 still produces a shortfall of -$125.  J thus tries other personal 
donation levels until his/her donation plus the probable donations of others raise 
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enough to complete the maritime park restoration project.  More precisely, J chooses 
the donation which maximizes VD.  
Frohlich and Oppenheimer show algebraically that the expected value of 
receiving the good must outweigh the cost of a donor’s contribution to the collective 
effort.  In fact, a greater donation increases the probability that the public good will 
be provided.  The larger donation becomes in effect an insurance policy against the 
event that the donor has overestimated others’ contributions by some amount.  
Frohlich and Oppenheimer summarize (p 117):
[Nontechnically, the individual] must estimate the 
probability that his donation will be efficacious.  He must 
estimate the probabilities associated with the possible levels of 
donations by others.  This allows an estimation of the efficacy of 
his donation in obtaining an increase in his own utility.  For by 
making a larger donation the individual increases the 
probability that he will receive the good for any given set of 
probabilities he attaches to the behavior of others...  [If the good 
is not “lumpy”, like the waterfront park, but rather “nonlumpy” 
like quality and quantity of public radio airtime], larger 
donations merely bring larger amounts of the good.
The anticipated returns approach finds corroboration in other studies.  Elinor 
Ostrom notes that successful collective action depends crucially upon the benefits of 
cooperation outweighing the costs of monitoring individual compliance with group 
rules or norms.  Once again, the number of potential beneficiaries is not the decisive 
factor in success of collective action.  Rather, the ability of individuals to receive 
benefits greater than their costs (here, in terms of monitoring effort) is key.  (Ostrom, 
1990; a concise summary is in Dixit and Skeath, 1999, pp 375-377.)
A series of laboratory experiments tested the effect of remuneration to 
individuals versus number of individuals.  These are referred to as collective action 
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experiments or public goods experiments, and the general set-up of such procedures 
will become clear after reading accounts below.  A concise summary occurs in 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1997):  
Prisoners’ (social) dilemma game models of collective 
action problems are structured so that all players have a 
dominant strategy to defect (or withhold all their resources) 
from the collective action… [All such experiments] share some 
basic elements: (a) participants have resources to allocate, (b) 
participants then choose how to allocate resources between 
private savings and collective projects, (c) each participant most 
prefers that the others allocate their resources to the public 
activity while they keep their resources as savings, and (d) some 
level of collective project allocation leaves all players better off 
than would be the case if all the resources were allocated to the 
private projects.  The dilemma consists of how to induce public-
oriented behavior so that the group can be better off through the 
provision of enough public activity.
Generally, these experiments find that the return to the individual at the margin (but 
not the number of individuals) has a strong effect upon experimental outcomes in 
collective action.   
Marwell and Ames (1979) conducted an early experiment the results of which 
seriously questioned the near-universality of free-riding (or ‘defection’).  The authors 
conducted telephone interviews (with follow-up questionnaires)  with 256 high school 
students in Madison, Wisconsin.  Students were broken into groups of four, but half 
were deceived into thinking group size was eighty, allowing a test for group size 
effects.  The subjects were then asked about how much money they would keep and 
how much they would contribute to the group.  Different subjects faced different rates 
of return for contributing to the group.  The result: Not only was group size an 
insignificant factor in determining donation levels, but a higher rate of return (the 
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authors use the term ‘interest’ in the group outcome) produced more donations—a 
more successful collective action effort.
Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) studied University of Arizona students in a 
setting which minimized subject contact with experimenters: Students indicated their 
decisions to donate or keep tokens at a computer terminal; terminal carrels were 
separated by sideboards to ensure individual decisions were private.  The ‘small’ 
group size was four; ‘large’ groups comprised ten individuals.  The marginal per 
capita return (MPCR) to each student for donating a token varied between either 
$0.33 and $0.75 in different iterations of the experiment.  A critical result is that the 
higher MPCR level resulted in far fewer defectors (Figure 3, p 135).  
Kim and Walker (1984) emulated Marwell and Ames (1979) by inducing 
individuals in a numerically small group to believe they were in a group comprising 
100 members.  (The deception was accomplished by multiplying each participant’s 
donation by twenty.)  Subjects were given tables showing returns from various 
amounts donated to the group.  The MPCR was increased on the fourth and eleventh 
rounds of the experiment.  Donations during these periods increased significantly.
A final contribution from a year which produced a bumper crop of collective 
action experiments was Isaac, McCue and Plott (1984).  This study involved college 
students’ reactions inter alia to different payoff structures.   Students were seated in a 
classroom but at a distance from one another and not allowed to communicate except 
in a later iteration of the experiment.  Students with greater payoffs (higher MPCR) 
contributed more than those with lower payoffs.
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Isaac and Walker (1988a) directly compared group size and MPCR.  The 
authors studied University of Arizona students in the same minimal-contact computer 
setting described above in Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984).  Subjects twice 
underwent ten rounds of donate/retain decisions.  In one series of rounds, the MPCR 
was 0.3; in the other, 0.75.  The sequence was mixed—some groups faced the lower 
MPCR first; others, second.  Groups were either ‘small’ with four persons or ‘large’ 
with ten participants.  The low-MPCR groups uniformly had more free-riders than the 
high-MPCR groups.  However, group size had an effect only in low-MPCR groups.  
Interestingly, the smaller groups experienced more free riding.    
Subsequent studies by Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1988) and Fisher, Isaac, 
Schatzberg and Walker (1993) provide similar results.  Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
(1998) found that altering payoffs had a substantial impact on calling forth 
contributions to a group goal.  Ledyard (1995) reviews many of the studies above as 
well as other reports to conclude that while numbers have little to no effect, the 
marginal payoff the individual receives—in our terms, the return he or she can 
anticipate—is one of the most important causes for successful collective action in 
public goods experiments over almost a quarter century of research by a variety of 
scholars.
5.2.2 A Test of Anticipated Returns
Once again, the paucity of national data series precludes direct measurement.  
However, a statistical insight into anticipated returns in the IJC/fragmentation arena 
comes in the realm of home ownership rates.  Homeowners tend to be far more 
politically active locally than renters (Fischel, 2001, pp 80-81).   77% of homeowners 
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vote in local elections as opposed to only 52% of renters (Rossi and Webber, 1996, p 
23).  Case studies in New Orleans and Columbia, Maryland further support Fischel’s 
assertion (Moomau and Morton, 1992; Burkhardt, 1981).    An extensive literature on 
why individuals vote acknowledges a cost to voting—both in terms of becoming 
informed and in actual inconveniences and costs of missing work or transportation 
out of one’s way—and frequently portrays the individual act of voting in a 
cost/benefit motif (Hinich & Munger, 1998, pp 144-152; Mueller, 1989, Chapter 18; 
Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997, pp 251-259).  But there is evidence that the 77%-52% 
differential is not attributable to some huge difference in voting costs between renters 
and homeowners: Burkhardt found that Columbia’s renters were far less active in 
homeowner association elections and offices than owners of similarly priced 
dwellings.  Voting patterns combined with theory thus support the conclusion that 
homeowners have a higher anticipated return from local government activity.  Thus, 
homeownership rate is a powerful proxy for anticipated returns to add to the right-
hand side of the basic regression equation.  A statistically significant negative 
correlation between this variable and IJC would constitute evidence substantiating the 
anticipated returns explanation for successful collective action.  As homeownership 
goes up, we would expect that pressure for cooperation would increase and that IJC 
would perforce be diminished.
A possible objection to the above characterization of homeowners might come 
by way of research contrasting renter-voters with homeowner-voters.  Econometric 
studies have established that renter-voters generally support significantly higher local 
government spending than homeowner-voters in the same income brackets.  
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However, in IJC terms, this renter effect would work in the same direction as the 
homeownership rate variable discussed above: Ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
homeowner rate would imply a decrease in the renter rate, and either leads to a 
decrease in local IJC spending. 
Further, the renter effect is not a viable alternative to the homeowner rate in 
this hypothesis.  First, no treatment of anticipated returns has been based upon 
Keynesian-esque illusions of players, yet fiscal illusion is one of several explanations 
posited for the renter effect.  Renters might suffer from fiscal illusion (‘renter’s 
illusion’) because they do not actually see the property tax bill which becomes part of 
their monthly fee.  Equally possible, the amount of the property tax actually might not 
be fully passed from landlords to tenants, or renters might really receive more goods 
and services from local government than homeowners.  Despite a number of studies, 
no one explanation has been widely and conclusively accepted by specialists in public 
finance (Oates, 1998).  So unclear a causal mechanism seems unsuited for this 
hypothesis.  Second, while we have established that the IJC phenomenon 
encompasses a variety of tools which are not dollar-denominated (zoning, 
administrative services, and pollution regulations, as examples), the renter effect is a 
relationship dealing only in dollar budgets.  And of course our tool for measuring IJC 
effort in regression analysis is not a dollar measure but rather an additive index of 
program types.  Third and finally, the studies which established the renter effect dealt 
either with entire municipal budgets or with components such as police, parks, and 
education (Oates, 1998, Table 1).  None of these are the subject of prisoners’ 
dilemma characterizations in either the press or policy literature.  Thus, the renter 
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effect appears inapplicable to IJC.  Even if it were applicable, causation would be 
complementary to the homeowner effect for reasons in the previous paragraph and 
because renters, like homeowners, in the specific budget area of incentives 
presumably do not like their tax dollars devoted to intergovernmental competition
which could be avoided by local cooperation.
Thus, a testable hypothesis is that:
IJC = f(homeownership rate + control variables4)
Presumably, the greater the percentage of homeowners in an urbanized area, the 
greater their perceived ability to foster cooperation and the greater their anticipated 
reward.  Citizens in a UA with only 40% homeownership may find it difficult to rally 
others to the cause of cooperation and hence find probability-weighted rewards low.  
Citizens in a UA with 80% homeownership on the other hand should find it less 
difficult to bring about cooperation, raising their anticipated rewards because of lower 
cost of successfully organizing for collective action.  Thus, the test should result in an 
inverse relationship between IJC measures and homeownership rates.
Homeownership rates can be readily computed at urbanized area level from 
Census figures on owner- versus renter-occupied housing.  Control variables are the 
usual suspects: mayor versus manager government, racial diversity, jurisdiction 
population, jurisdiction income per capita, jurisdiction property tax rate, and UA 
population.  Fragmentation measures are also included as control variables.
4
 Per Section 3.6 and the development of the argument in Chapter 4, control variables in this chapter 
are FragI, jurisdiction population, jurisdiction income per capita, real property tax rate, and UA 
population as well as mayor-vs-council/manager form of government, and racial diversity.   
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5.2.3 Test Results
Regressions were conducted with robust standard errors because of 
heteroskedasticity.  Regression diagnostics revealed no evidence of multicolinearity.  
Table 5-1 reports results for the homeownership variable (a full listing of regressions 
and variables is at Appendix Table 5-A-1 to this chapter).  Entries in Table 5-1 are 
coefficients for homeownership given either FragI-population or FragI-income, as 









& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -27.1/.15
population |1.43|
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
income
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -30.9/.15
population |1.46|
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
income
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
The regressions of staff time devoted to attraction using FragI-population contain the 
anticipated inverse relationship between homeownership and IJC.  This is the only 
172
indicator tending to substantiate the anticipated returns explanation in the IJC 
environment.  Thus, while the uniformity of ‘attraction’ using FragI-population is 
tantalizing, it constitutes only 8% of the matrix and is uncorroborated by any other 
indicator.  We cannot claim to have found substantial evidence of the anticipated 
returns thesis in this data.
5.3 Communication
5.3.1 Theoretical Background
Another top cause in Ledyard’s hierarchy of reasons for successful collective 
action is the ability of experimental subjects to communicate with other participants.  
While some experimenters in section 5.2.1 above noted apparent attempts at signaling 
one’s bona fides to others by dramatically increasing donations for a period or two
(Isaac, McCue and Plott, 1984), most expressly forbade communication as part of 
experiment design.  However, theorists stress that lack of communication, while part 
of the intrigue of the original prisoners’ dilemma story, is not common to most 
interactions in the social and political world.  Note that we are talking only about 
communication, not making binding agreements or contracts.  
Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee (1977) conducted public goods experiments 
which allowed different participant groups differing degrees of communication.  
Some were forbidden to talk at all.  Others could talk about subjects other than 
contributions to a  public goods fund.  This tested the effect on cooperation of simply 
getting to know others affected by one’s cooperate/defect decision.  Other groups 
were allowed to talk and make non-binding coordination; some were allowed to take 
non-binding roll call votes.  Groups without communication or with communication 
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only about subjects not related to the donation decision experienced high rates of 
defection.  No-communication was the worst, at 73% defection, while irrelevant-
communication groups experienced a somewhat smaller rate of defection at 65% (p 
5).  Communication about the decisions improved the situation dramatically: Only 
26% defected… and only 16% in groups allowed to conduct a non-binding roll call.  
This of course still meant that a number of subjects defected.  Later analysis of a 
participant questionnaire revealed that a subject’s general expectation of what others 
would do was an important predictor of defection.  Those predicting most others 
would defect were themselves four times more likely to defect.  
Chamberlin (1978) tested Olson’s claims in a setting in which subjects 
increased their likehood of gaining a reward by contributing to a public good.  The 
donation was subtracted from the reward, but the greater the contribution, the greater 
the chance of getting the (lowered) reward.  Each group ran the experiment twice, 
once without communication and once with communication about everything except 
what participants actually donated.  In this experiment, communication did not have a 
statistically significant effect.  Ledyard (1995, p 158) attributes this result to the 
experiment’s somewhat unusual threshold environment.  Instead of a sliding payoff 
scale, this experiment provides rewards on an all-or-nothing basis.  Depending in 
essence on the roll of the dice, the participant either receives the reward or does not.  
Greater contributions only load the dice more in the donator’s favor.  The argument is 
somewhat analogous to Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s treatment of lumpy versus non-
lumpy goods in section 5.2.1 above. Later, in 1983, Van der Kragt, Orbell and Dawes 
conducted an experiment with a threshold environment in which communication was 
174
key to successful collective action.  Groups allowed to communicate designated 
sufficient contributors to ensure the public good was provided, using means from 
soliciting volunteers to drawing straws.  In these groups, the public good was 
invariably provided, usually at optimum levels.  On the other hand, over a third of 
non-communicating groups did not must sufficient cooperation to produce the public 
good.   
Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985), already described in section 5.2.1, relaxed the 
prohibition on communication in later phases of their experiment, allowing 
participants to discuss the experiment (but not their exact past or planned 
contributions) during one period.  Even this slight communication increased the 
amount of cooperative behavior observed.  Isaac and Walker (1988b) refined their 
familiar computer-based experiment method to allow most groups to communicate 
during some phase of the experiment.  Unlike Van der Kragt, Orbell and Dawes 
(1983), they followed the standard practice of forbidding discussion of actual 
contribution levels.  Communicating groups approached 100% of required donation 
levels for optimum public good provision while those not allowed communication 
started at 50% of optimum and rapidly declined.  Tellingly, groups allowed 
communication in the first round and not in the second maintained a level of 
donations which did not slump below 85%.  Changes in the environment concerning 
information and MPCR did not alter the increased effectiveness of communication in 
eliciting significantly higher cooperation levels.  Orbell, Dawes and Van de Kragt 
(1990) conducted yet another experimental extension, finding that groups in which all 
members promised to contribute had donation rates of 84%, as opposed to 58% when 
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not all had promised cooperation.  Ostrom and Walker (1991) implemented an 
essentially two-stage communications prisoners’ dilemma: Participants first had to 
donate sufficient funds to be allowed a communications period, then they needed to 
tackle the public goods provision challenge—with communication if they had 
successfully resolved the first challenge; otherwise, without.  While many times 
groups failed to obtain the communications periods because of this ‘costly 
communication’, donation levels as a percentage of the optimum level increased from 
42% to 80% in these groups.  Control groups which were allowed free 
communications had increased from 30% to 98%.  
David Sally (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of communication-based 
prisoners’ dilemma experiments conducted between 1958 and 1992.  The meta-
analysis combined results of thirty-seven papers, many of which had multiple 
iterations of a basic scenario, effectively providing a rich field of 130 observations 
and several thousand participants.  Sally regressed the cooperation rate of subjects on 
independent variables such as participant characteristics, the payoff matrix, 
anonymity and communication.  Many of the original studies pointed to the major 
impact the ability to communicate has on success in collective action efforts.  And 
indeed, Sally’s regression found that communication had the most important impact 
of all variables tested.
Rapaport and Diekmann (1995) found that rudimentary communication in the 
form of simple feedback summarizing the others’ donation levels—provided not in 
person but via computer summary—helped most of thirty-two pairs of subjects to 
achieve and maintain the cooperate/cooperate solution to the basic prisoners’ 
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dilemma.  Also in 1995, Majeski and Fricks tested the effectiveness of 
communication in international relations using 414 participants in 79 iterations of a 
basic prisoners’ dilemma experiment.  Each iteration consisted of two groups of three 
participants who first made group decisions, then—in groups allowed to 
communicate with their paired group—selected a representative to deal with the 
representative of the other group.  After representatives had reported back, groups 
made final decisions on allocation of resources.  Majeski and Frick found that when 
inter-group communication was allowed, groups cooperated more often and earned 
more money ($73 versus $57).  
Four studies in the latter nineties again substantiate the efficacy of 
communication.  In a study of leadership we will revisit in the next section, Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer (1997) found communication to have a significant independent role 
in successful action.  Receiving a message increased subjects’ average contribution 
levels from 39.8% to 53.9%.  A subsequent 1998 study by the same authors found 
that communication played a substantial role in successful collective action in the 
controversial environment of incentive-compatible devices—fiscal or tax incentives 
designed to optimize individual actions in an environment rife with opportunities to 
free-ride.  Another 1998 Frohlich and Oppenheimer study (1998b) further 
substantiated the effectiveness of communication in prisoners’ dilemmas and 
established a ‘lingering effect’ of communication: Even after communication is shut 
down, groups which had been permitted communication earlier were markedly more 
cooperative than those which had never communicated.  Finally, Frey and Bohnet 
compared the results of prisoners’ dilemmas in which college students were allowed 
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communication versus those that were not.  Communication doubled the number of 
subjects opting to cooperate.
5.3.2 Two Tests of Communication
5.3.2.1(a) Geographic Distance Test
“Distance…is both a barrier to and a defense against social interaction
(Knox & Pinch, 2000, p 266).  Political and social geographers suggest the effect of 
geographic distance on communication; for example, the amount of communication 
between towns as a function of the distance between them.  The greater the distance, 
the less the interaction because of “the friction of distance…  Distance imposes 
transactions costs…” (Harvey, 1989, pp 220-2).
The established relationship between communication and distance allows a 
test using Census data on urbanized areas’ areas in square kilometers.  The UA area 
can be divided by the number of jurisdictions to get average square kilometers per 
jurisdiction.  The larger the average jurisdictional area, the greater the average 
distance between population and governmental centers (assuming both to be located 
generally in the center of geographic mass of the political entity).  And the sheer land 
area of a jurisdiction will tend to inhibit communication with members of neighboring 
jurisdictions.  Thus, given the experimental evidence on the effectiveness of 
communication in collective action, the smaller the average size of jurisdictions 
within an urban area, the more we would expect cooperative IJC outcomes.  More 
formally, the hypothesis is:
IJC = f(communication~average geographic area + control variables)
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Control variables remain the same as in the anticipated returns test above.  If the 
communications explanation of collective action is substantiated by this test, the sign 
of the coefficient will be positive:  the greater the average area, the less the 
communication and hence the greater the IJC.
5.3.2.1(b) Geographic Distance Test Results
Regressions were again conducted with robust standard errors because of 
heteroskedasticity.  There was no evidence of multicolinearity.  Table 5-2 reports 
results for the geographic distances variable (a full listing of regressions and variables 










& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- +.019/.00 +.021/.00 +.022/.00 +.006/.13 ----- +.064/.01
population |4.17| |4.07| |4.02| |1.48| |2.71|
   FragI- +.019/.00 +.021/.00 +.021/.00 +.005/.15 ----- +.062/.01
income |4.10| |3.99| |3.93| |1.40 |2.63|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- +.022/.00 +.024/.00 +.024/.00 +.007/.09 ----- +.059/.04
population |3.98| |3.74| |3.58| |1.71| |2.10|
   FragI- +.022/.00 +.024/.00 +.024/.00 +.007/.10 ----- +.057/.04
income |3.95| |3.70| |3.54| |1.67| |2.04|
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
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20 of 24 regressions—83%--found a positive relationship between IJC and the 
average area per jurisdiction.  Only staff time devoted to retention of businesses 
consistently had no statistically significant relationship.  Converting Table 5-2 to the 
percentage change in IJC from the smallest average area to the largest (as done for 










& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- +31% +25% +21% +12% na +21%
population
   FragI- +31% +25% +20% +10% na +20%
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- +35% +29% +23% +13% na +19%
population
   FragI- +35% +35% +23% +13% na +19%
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
These percentages are substantially higher than the generally single digit percentages 
for fragmentation in Chapter 4.  Inspection of Appendix 2 of this chapter shows that 
coefficients—and hence percentage changes—for fragmentation remain on the same 
order of magnitude as those in Chapter 4.  (Mayor and race indicators are dummy 
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variables; the percentage change method used here is not readily applicable.  In any 
event, the percentage changes would be relatively quite small: IJCActivities contains a 
‘mayor’ value of  -.748, which when multiplied by the maximum change of 1 for a 
dummy variable and then divided by 20 responses for IJCActivities produces a –4% 
change.)  The geographic distance proxy for communication thus is stronger than 
fragmentation in explanatory power.  This first test of communication provides 
impressive substantiation of the communication explanation of collective action in the 
IJC/fragmentation setting.
This result, by the way, makes sense in a more rigorous, formal way:  Ceteris 
paribus, a more fragmented urban area will have geographically smaller jurisdictions, 
facilitating and increasing the expected number of interactions among members of 
different jurisdictions.  The analogy would be to the frequent comparison of 
Europeans to Americans—because of smaller nations, Europeans are often said to be 
more internationally oriented and attain working ability in more languages than 
citizens of the United States.
5.3.2.2(a) Civic Society Test
The civic society literature spawned by Robert Putnam’s classic Bowling 
Alone (2000; also Putnam, 1995) emphasizes not only the leadership value of civic 
society but its contribution to communication as well:
When philosophers speak in exalted tones of “civic 
engagement” and “democratic deliberation”, we are inclined to 
think of community associations and public life as the higher 
form of social involvement, but in everyday life, friendship and 
other informal types of sociability provide crucial social 
support.  To be sure, informal connections generally do not 
build civic skills in the ways a club, a political group, a union or 
a church can, but informal connections are very important in 
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sustaining social networks.  …we need to pay attention to trends 
in ‘schmoozing’.  (Putnam, 2000, p 95.)
Putnam presented figures on sports clubs as evidence such ‘schmoozing’; 
most famously, of course, the decline of bowling leagues since 1960.  In subsequent 
examples (see his chapters seven and eight), he links membership in relatively 
informal social and sports clubs—as well as churchgoing and hosting friends at 
home—with propensity to become involved in community projects.  Putnam also 
points out that informal networks  help not only individual prosperity but a 
jurisdiction’s economic development (p 323), increase a community’s ability to 
enforce informal norms, foster a general sense of trust, and are effective in “widening 
our awareness of the many ways in which our fates are linked” (p 285).  The 
communication aspect of civic society thus stands powerfully on its own.  
Because civic society indicators thus measure communication, we should be 
able to compare urbanized areas on the basis of civic society.  The stronger UA civic 
society, the stronger the communication and hence the less the IJC effort:
IJC = f(communication~civic society + control variables)
Control variables remain the same.  We would expect a negative correlation between 
IJC and communication.
Putnam’s data are national.  Organizations listed in his study do not (in many 
cases, cannot) provide membership data for local chapters, precluding an exact 
replication of his study at urbanized area level.  However, the 1997 Economic Census  
includes a North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS—formerly
Standard Industrial Classification, or ‘SIC’) category 8134101: “Civic and Social 
Groups, with Restaurants and Bars”.  The Census definition is in line with civic 
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society concepts of informal connections, particularly in this category’s specification 
of restaurants and bars as opposed to 8134102, whose component organizations do 
not offer such schmoozing facilities:
NAICS 8134101: Civic and Social Organizations with 
Restaurants and Bars.  Establishments primarily engaged in 
promoting the civic and social interests of their members and 
offering bar and restaurants facilities for their members and 
their guests.  [Examples include but are not limited to] alumni 
associations, book discussion clubs, booster clubs, ethnic 
associations, farm granges, fraternal associations or lodges, 
garden clubs, parent-teacher associations, poetry clubs, 
scouting organizations, social clubs, student clubs, university 
clubs, veterans’ membership organizations, youth social clubs.
In that NAICS data is available only for MSAs, not UAs, this test uses the 
corresponding population and income data for the MSA which contains the urbanized 
area in each observation.
5.3.2.2(a) Civic Society Test Results
Regressions were conducted once again with robust standard errors because of 
heteroskedasticity.  Regression diagnostics did not indicate multicolinearity.  Table 5-
3 reports results for the communication/NAICS 8134101 variable (a full listing of 











& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -.005/.00 -.005/.00 -.006/.00 ----- -.035/.00 -.027/.01
population |3.05| |3.13| |2.88| |3.49| |2.74|
   FragI- -.005/.00 -.005/.00 -.005/.01 ----- -.035/.00 -.027/.01
income |2.88| |2.96| |2.73| |3.45| |2.57|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -.003/.08 -.004/.05 -.004/.08 ----- -.029/.01 -.03/.01
population |1.76| |2.01| |1.73| |2.67| |2.60|
   FragI- -.003/.10 -.004/.06 .-004/.10 ----- -.029/.01 -.029/.01
income |1.66| |1.91| |1.64| |2.67| |2.47|
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
Note: Entries denote coefficient/significance level & |absolute value| of 't'
Once again, the figures support the communications explanation of success in 
collective action.  20 of 24 indicator matrix cells—83%--are statistically significant, 
all in the predicted inverse relationship.   Table 5-3(a) converts the coefficients to 











& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -13% -10% -9% na -18% -14%
population
   FragI- -13% -10% -9% na -18% -14%
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -8% -8% -6% na -15% -16%
population
   FragI- -8% -8% -6% na -15% -15%
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
While of less magnitude than the percentages in Table 5-2(a) measuring 
communication as a function of geographic distance, these figures are still far from 
negligible.  
Overall, then, the effectiveness of communication in reducing the collective 
action problem seems well supported in the IJC/fragmentation experience.
5.4 Leadership
5.4.1 Theoretical Background
In their 1970 article, “I Get By With A Little Help From My Friends,” Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer conclude that self-interested persons must provide for themselves 
“…some mechanism whereby they can coordinate their expectations regarding the 
185
probable actions of others…” in order to ensure successful collective action to 
procure public goods (p 119).  While cultural traditions or ethical norms may support 
certain collective actions, they suggest political leaders as the major source of 
coordination in political society.  For some type of remuneration, these political 
entrepreneurs will provide the leadership and management to ensure a supply of 
public goods without the vagaries of constant attempts at mass movements.
A little reflection provides numerous examples of political entrepreneurship.  
The institution of common law and civil lawsuits in American jurisprudence 
frequently becomes the engine of social change.  Civil and economic rights are 
largely enforced not through criminal prosecutions but rather via laws allowing 
aggrieved parties to sue for restoration of rights and restitution of damages.  This calls 
forth batteries of specialized lawyers as political entrepreneurs to manage this aspect 
of societal organization for the polity.  In another example, private research firms 
promote their services to local governments and citizen groups to coordinate 
volunteer efforts and manage specialized aspects of policy, such as coordinating and 
implementing river clean-up, zoning and use among among interested communities 
and user groups over the miles of the river’s course.  
Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young (1971) elaborate the nature and role of the 
political entrepreneur (p 25):
Whenever the members of a group find it worthwhile to 
contribute toward the supply of a collective good and perceive 
that a marginal-cost-sharing arrangement is possible, there may 
be potential profit for an entrepreneur.  Such an entrepreneur 
can establish a collection organization, gather the contributions, 
and provide the public good…when there is scope for sharing 
the marginal costs of supplying the goods through the 
introduction of some mechanism for the pooling of resources.
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Formally, this insight allows the authors to algebraically describe the 
interactions between citizens and political entrepreneurs using concepts of utility and 
marginal analysis familiar from microeconomics.  In essence, the following equation 
defines the political entrepreneur (pp 35-6): 
UA(LA) = UA(XA) + sum of Dj(A)  - C(XA) – C(OA)       where
A  is the political entrepreneur
UA(LA) is the utility the political entrepreneur receives from his/her 
labors
Dj(A) is a donation from citizen ‘j’
C(XA) is the cost of supplying public good X
C(OA) is the cost of A’s organization
Thus, when the political leader believes the return from the effort will outweigh the 
costs, he or she will undertake the organizational effort.  Just as the private 
entrepreneur celebrated in economics organizes productive resources and ultimately 
pushes society to its optimal level of production at a given level of technology, so too 
does the public entrepreneur, marshaling collective rather than private resources and 
ensuring the socially most desirable levels of public rather than private goods (p 59).
To date, the sole public goods experiment to deal directly with political 
leadership is Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1997).  233 participants were designated 
members of various groups but sat anonymously behind computer terminals.  Each 
group made seven collective decisions.  An individual designated the leader was
allowed to see what group members had donated and to send one-way computer 
messages to individual group members—for a price to be deducted from his/her own 
earnings.  Members earned the standard fare of private savings plus payoff from any 
successful collective actions.  Leaders earned these amounts, and one set of leaders 
was also paid 65% of the funds collected from group members, reflecting the 
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theoretical definition of leader activities above.  Inter alia, the authors found that 
leaders with the additional 65% profit incentive caused their groups to earn more.  
Much of the increase in group welfare went to the leaders; nonetheless, group 
members were better off than those whose leaders were not so compensated.
This was the only explicit leadership experiment.  Implicitly, we can infer 
leadership attempts in various of the studies reported in sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 
above.  When an experiment subject signals a desire for cooperation through a spike 
in his or her donation level in an experiment in which communication is barred, he or 
she is incurring a cost—as in C(OA)—in the attempt to bring about production of the 
public good.  When in a costly communication experiment, the same person donates 
to allow discussion and then takes the ego risks attendant with publicly speaking for 
cooperation, our impression would be that this is leadership.  
Ledyard (1995) summarizes studies in which moral suasion is tested by 
means of subjects knowing that the experimenters know who actually donated and 
who defected.  Some experiment instructions have been framed to remind subjects of 
moral and ethical aspects of their decisions as well.  Ledyard reports an “…effect is 
apparently there but weak and difficult to replicate (pp 143,167).”   And of course, 
once again, moral suasion is an aspect of political leadership but not a full test.  
5.4.2 A Test of the Leadership Explanation
A direct test of the leadership explanation would involve concepts so broad 
that no measurement of the many nuances of leadership, such as moral suasion or 
leadership by example as described in the preceding paragraphs, is possible.  
However, we can again lean upon the relationships established in the civic society 
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literature to postulate a strong correlation between civic society as manifest in 
numbers of civic groups on the one hand and the quality and capacity for civic and 
political leadership on the other.  
Putnam (2000, pp 338-9) identifies leadership effects of civic group 
membership on local communities:
Voluntary associations and the social networks of civil 
society…contribute to democracy in two different ways:  they 
have “external” effects on the larger polity, and they have 
“internal” effects on participants themselves.  Externally, 
voluntary associations… allow individuals to express their 
interests and demands on government… {T]heir individual and 
otherwise quiet voices multiply and are amplified.  …Internally, 
voluntary associations are places where social and civic skills 
are learned—“schools for democracy”.  Members learn how to 
run meetings, speak in public… organize projects, and debate 
public issues with civility. …Just as associations inculcate 
democratic habits, they also serve as forums for thoughtful 
deliberation over vital public issues.
Thus, the number of such organizations in an urbanized area should be 
correlated with increased cooperation and reduced levels of IJC.  Two civic society 
Census NAICS are appropriate for this purpose.  First, the most general category—
arguably overly broad because it includes not only strictly-defined leadership and 
interest organizations but a diverse range of religious, grantmaking, advocacy and 
other non-profits—is:
NAICS 813: Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional and 
Similar Organizations.  Industries in this subsector group 
establishments that organize and promote religious activities; 
support various causes through grantmaking; advocate various 
social and political causes; and promote and defend the interests 
of their members.  The industry groups within the subsector are 
defined in terms of their activities, such as establishments that 
provide funding for specific causes or for a variety of charitable 
causes; establishments that advocate and actively promote 
causes and beliefs for the public good; and establishments that 
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have an active membership structure to promote causes and 
represent the interests of their members.  Establishments in this 
subsector may publish newsletters, books, and  periodicals, for 
distribution to their membership.
More specifically, regime theory—the examination of how coalitions 
(particularly involving economic interests and government officials) grow, acquiring 
and using power to shape local government policy—suggests attention to business 
and similar interest groups within a city or an urban area when exploring its politics 
(Knox and Pinch, pp 154, 423; Stone, 1989).   Thus, the second NAICS is:
NAICS 8139: Business, Professional, Labor, Political and 
Similar Organizations.  This industry group comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in promoting the interests of 
their members (except religious organizations, social advocacy 
organizations, and civic and social organizations).  Examples of 
establishments in this industry are business associations, 
professional organizations, labor unions, and political 
organizations.
The hypothesis is:
IJC = f(leadership + control variables)
…with control variables remaining the same as in previous sections of this chapter.
At this point we should reinforce the distinction between the effects on IJC 
from these two NAICS (813 and 8139) on the one hand and NAICS 8134101 (Civic 
and Social Organizations with Restaurants and Bars) as used in the sections above on 
communication.  The difference rests in their respective places within the civil society 
literature.  As noted in previous quotations, Robert Putnam equates schmoozing with 
communication (“informal communications are very important in sustaining social 
networks… we need to pay attention to trends in ‘schmoozing’.”)  Thus, NAICS 
8134101 is a proxy for such activity, which Putnam equates with communication.  
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From the alternative hypothesis on communication and collective action, an increase 
in communication tends to lead to increases in cooperation… and hence in the case of 
this study to a decrease in IJC.  Similarly, Putnam sees voluntary organizations such 
as those in NAICS 813 and 8139 as critical to leadership in civil society (“voluntary 
associations allow individuals to express their interests and demands on 
government… [and] are places where social and civic skills are learned—‘schools 
for democracy’.”)  Thus NAICS 813 and 8139 become proxies for leadership, and 
from the relevant alternative collective action hypothesis, an increase in leadership 
brings about an increase in cooperation; in the context of our study, a decrease in IJC.
5.4.3 Leadership Test Results
Regressions were of course conducted with robust standard errors because of 
heteroskedasticity.  Regression diagnostics did not indicate multicolinearity.  Tables 
5-4 and 5-5  present results for the leadership/NAICS 813 & 8139 variables (a full 










& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -.0002/.14 ----- -.0002/.08 ----- -.002/.00 -----
population |1.47| |1.76| |3.12|
   FragI- ----- ----- -.0002/.09 ----- -.002/.00 -----
income |1.69| |3.07|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
population
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
income
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)










& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -9% na -5% na -18% na
population
   FragI- na na -5% na -18% na
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- na na na na na na
population
   FragI- na na na na na na
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
The overall NAICS 813 sector—while exceedingly broad for our purposes—
nonetheless has an interesting impact.  5 of 12 matrix cells—42%-- are significant 
and inversely signed for ‘all urban areas’ while none are significant for ‘urban areas 
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within single states only’.  Apparently leadership exerted by all manner of not-for-
profits is most influential in attaining noticeable cooperation in interstate urbanized 












& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -.0002/.09 -.0002/.11 -.0003/.05 -.0002/.14 -.003/.00 -----
population |1.69| |1.60| |1.99| |1.47| |3.29|
   FragI- -.0002/.11 -.0002/.12 -.0003/.05 ----- -.003/.00 -----
income |1.62| |1.54| |1.93| |3.23|
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.004/.11 -----
population |1.62|
   FragI- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.004/.11 -----
income |1.59|
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)











& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- -6% -5% -6% -7% -19% na
population
   FragI- -6% -5% -6% na -19% na
income






& funds incntype Retention Activities
   FragI- na na na na -25% na
population
   FragI- na na na na -25% na
income
Note: FragI is "Fragmentation Index", defined in Sections 4-2 and 3/5(a)
NAICS 8139 comprises the groups one would expect to become part of the urbanized 
area’s political regime, not only business but political, labor and professional leagues 
as well.  As with the overarching NAICS 813, the biggest effect of leadership appears 
to be in the interstate urban area setting, bridging the gap left by state government 
borders.  9 of 12 matrix cells—75%--in  that half of the matrix are inversely signed.  
The more the interstate leadership organizations, the less the IJC and greater the 
cooperation.  Full regression results are at Appendix Table 5-A-5.
5.5 The Role of Fragmentation vis a vis Alternative Explanations
In this and the preceding chapter, statistical analysis has found fragmentation, 
communication and leadership to have substantial influence on IJC effort.  As 
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alternatives to the numbers-based theory of collective action, communication and 
leadership are not surprise explanations of the increases in cooperation through 
decreases in interjurisdictional competition.  However, as noted in the graphic below, 





What is the nature of the fragmentation/IJC connection?  Is there some 
theoretical reason to expect direct causation, or is there an intermediate mechanism at 
work?  Our previous examination of communication (Section 5-2) noted that 
logically, a more fragmented urban area would be expected to have greater 
communication, as measured by the geographic distance proxy—ceteris paribus, 
increased fragmentation implies shorter distances between jurisdiction centers which 
in turn imply greater ease of communication.  This mechanism of fragmentation 
giving rise to increased communication can be statistically substantiated, as can a 
similar relationship between leadership and IJC.  Regression of communication and 
leadership proxies on fragmentation yielded the following results:
195
TABLE 5-6
Fragmentation and Alternative Explanations
Geographic NAICS
Distance 8134101 NAICS 813 NAICS 8139
 FragI-population -42.8/.00 +248.6/.00 +2015/.00 +1031/.00
 FragI-income -46.9/.00 +262.2/.00 +2215/.00 +1170/.00
   …percentages:
Geographic NAICS
Distance 8134101 NAICS 813 NAICS 8139
 FragI-population -12% +44% +22% +16%
 FragI-income -14% +48% +24% +18%
The coefficients are substantial in magnitude as well as statistically significant at the 





While nothing in theory would indicate that fragmentation would actually ‘cause’
communication and leadership (although the facilitation of communication by 
decreased geographical distance comes close), communication and leadership appear 
to spring up to compensate for the void in formal regional governmental bodies.  This 
should not be surprising.  In numerous laboratory experiments, enhanced ability to 
communicate or lead has similarly arisen overcome the barriers to cooperation 
imposed by the prisoners’ dilemma.  Now, in this real world experiment, we see such 
political functions arise in reaction to fragmentation and the prisoners’ dilemma. 
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5.6 Conclusion
In contrast to the statistical refutation of the numbers-based theory of 
collective action in the IJC/fragmentation world in Chapter Four, the analysis in 
Chapter Five has substantiated two of three major alternative explanations.  
Communication and leadership enhance cooperation in the IJC world.  The result is 
doubly impressive in that these explanations were developed for pure public goods, 
yet explain the collective action problem better than the numbers-based exposition 
which theoretically better fits the non-pure public goods case.
The cases in Chapter One revealed instances and environments of both 
competition and cooperation among jurisdictions within various urban regions.  The 
statistical analysis conducted on a national dataset substantiated the cooperative 
paradigm even in more fragmented metro areas.  We will now return to the case study 
method to flesh out the detail of one urbanized area, Hampton Roads, Virginia in its 
response to interjurisdictional competition.
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Appendix to Chapter 5 (Alternative Theories): Control 
Variables
TABLE 5-A-1     
Control Variables-- homeownership
all urban areas:
    Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
  home- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -27.1/.15
ownership
  FragI- -1.95/.03 -1.966/.04 -2.28/.03 -1.84/.01 -12.74/.03 -----
population
mayor: -.985/.00 -1.26/.00 -1.24/.00 -.466/.06 ----- -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .10
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.04 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .02 .08 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0000008/
.04
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .06
  home- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
ownership
  FragI- -2.09/.02 -2.18/.03 -2.50/.02 -1.89/.01 -11.8/.05 -----
income
mayor: -.967/.01 -1.24/.00 -1.23/.00 -.446/.07 ----- -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .10
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.05 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .03 .08 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0000007/
.06
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .05
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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Table 5-A-1 (con't)
urban areas in single states only:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
  home- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -30.9/.15
ownership
  FragI- -2.34/.02 -2.17/.06 -2.22/.07 -1.71/.04 -16.2/.02 -----
population
mayor: -.735/.08 -1.03/.02 -1.09/.03 -.518/.08 +4.04/.18 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .06
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.04 -.011/.02 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .04 .12 .05 .11
UA pop ----- ----- ----- +.0000002/ ----- -----
.01
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .22
  home- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
ownership
  FragI- -2.38/.02 -2.28/.05 -2.34/.06 -1.73/.03 -14.8/.03 -----
income
mayor: -.709/.09 -1.01/.03 -1.07/.04 -.498/.09 +4.28/.16 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .02 .07
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.04 -.011/.02 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ .00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .13 .05 .12
UA pop +.0000001/.05 ----- ----- +.0000002/.01 ----- -----
.05 .01
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .19
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note:Entries denote coefficient/ significance level (significance only for Pr > F)
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TABLE 5-A-2     
Control Variables-- geographic distance
all urban areas:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
 square km +.019/.00 +.021/.00 +.022/.00 +.006/.13 ----- +.064/.01
(avg)
  FragI- -1.21/.15 ----- ----- -1.36/.04 -13.04/.02 -----
population
mayor: -.749/.04 -.997/.01 -.959/.03 -.359/.14 ----- -----
race: ----- ----- -.939/.05 -.476/.09 ----- -----
juris pop +.000008/ +.000009/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ -----
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.06 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .03 .08 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0000005/
.15
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
 square km +.019/.00 0.021/.00 +.021/.00 +.005/.15 ----- +.062/.01
(avg)
  FragI- -1.27/.14 -1.23/.19 ----- -1.39/.04 -12.4/.02 -----
income
mayor: -.738/.04 -.989/.01 -.949/.03 -.346/.16 ----- -----
race: ----- ----- -.920/.05 -.457/.10 ----- -----
juris pop +.000008/ +.000009/ +.00002/ +.000005/ +.00002/ -----
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.0089/.07 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .03 .08 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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Table 5-A-2 (con't)
urban areas in single states only:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
 square km +.022/.00 +.024/.00 +.024/.00 +.007/.09 ----- +.059/.04
(avg)
  FragI- -1.54/.11 ----- ----- -1.25/.10 -16.2/.01 -----
population
mayor: ----- -.719/.12 -.777/.14 -.408/.16 +4.04/.18 -----
race: ----- ----- -.738/.16 ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000006/ +.000009/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ -----
.00 .00 .00 .00 .03
  income ----- ----- -.001/.18 +.0009/.06 -.011/.03 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .14 .06 .12
UA pop ----- ----- ----- +.0000001/ ----- -----
.02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .13
 square km +.022/.00 +.024/.00 +.024/.00 +.007/.10 ----- +.057/.04
(avg)
  FragI- -1.51/.11 ----- ----- -1.26/.10 -14.9/.01 -----
income
mayor: ----- -.706/.13 -.766/.15 ----- ----- -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000007/ +.000009/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ -----
.00 .00 .00 .00 .03
  income ----- ----- ----- +.0009/.05 -.0107/.03 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .06 .14 .06 .13
UA pop ------ ----- ----- +.0000001/ ----- -----
.02
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .11
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note:Entries denote coefficient/ significance level (significance only for Pr > F)
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TABLE 5-A-3     
Control Variables-- NAICS 8134101
all urban areas:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
  NAICS -.005/.00 -.005/.00 -.006/.00 ----- -.035/.00 -.027/.01
8134101
  FragI- -1.74/.07 ----- -1.68/.14 -1.13/.13 ----- -----
population
mayor: -.888/.01 -1.16/.00 -1.13/.01 -.381/.12 +3.84/.12 -----
race: ----- ----- -.756/.11 ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .11
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.04 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ ------ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .08 .08 .09
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
  NAICS -.005/.00 -.005/.00 -.005/.01 ----- -.035/.00 -.026/.01
8134101
  FragI- -1.84/.06 -1.64/.12 -1.85/.11 -1.16/.12 ----- -----
income
mayor: -.872/.01 -1.14/.00 -1.11/.01 -.369/.13 +3.98/.11 -----
race: ----- ----- -.743/.11 ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .12
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.05 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/ ----- -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .08 .09 .09
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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Table 5-A-3(con't)
urban areas in single states only:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
  NAICS -.003/.08 -.004/.05 -.003/.08 ----- -.029/.01 -.03/.01
8134101
  FragI- -1.97/.07 ----- ----- ----- -10.9/.10 -----
population
mayor: -.628/.14 -.918/.05 -.975/.06 -.523/.08 +4.68/.12 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/ +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .05
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.03 -.012/.01 -----
per cap
  property -.000002/ ----- -.00002/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .12 .12 .14
UA pop +.00000006/ ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
.07
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02
  NAICS -.003/.10 -.004/.06 -.004/.10 ----- -.029/.01 -.029/.01
8134101
  FragI- -2.01/.07 ----- ----- ----- -9.28/.17 -----
income
mayor: ----- -.902/.05 -.959/.07 -.515/.08 +4.82/.11 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.000001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .03 .06
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.03 -.011/.01 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.12 ----- -.00002/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .12 .14
UA pop +.00000006/ ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
.07
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .02
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note:Entries denote coefficient/ significance level (significance only for Pr > F)
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TABLE 5-A-4     
Control Variables-- NAICS 813
all urban areas:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
NAICS 813 -.0002/.14 ----- -.0002/.08 ----- -.002/.00 -----
  FragI- -2.35/.01 -2.14/.03 -2.39/.03 -1.28/.07 -12.2/.04 -----
population
mayor: -.937/.01 -1.22/.00 -1.16/.01 -.367/.14 +3.93/.12 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .12
income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.04 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.02 -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .07 .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .19
NAICS 813 ----- ----- -.0002/.09 ----- -.002/.00 -----
  FragI- -2.47/.01 -2.34/.02 -2.58/.02 -1.31/.07 -10.9/.06 -----
income
mayor: -.912/.01 -1.19/.00 -1.14/.01 ----- +4.10/.11 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ------
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .13
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.04 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.03 -.00002/ -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .08 .03 .08
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .13
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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Table 5-A-4 (con't)
urban areas in single states only:
    Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
NAICS 813 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
  FragI- -2.60/.01 -2.23/.05 -2.19/.07 ----- -13.8/.03 -----
population
mayor: -.719/.09 -1.02/.03 -1.06/.04 -.576/.06 +4.32/.15 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .03 .06
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.02 -.012/.01 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.04 -.00002/.11 -.00003/ -.00002/ ------ -----
tax .05 .11
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ------ ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .29
NAICS 813 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
  FragI- -2.69/.01 -2.37/.04 -2.34/.06 ----- -12.5/.05 -----
income
mayor: -.692/.11 -.999/.03 -1.04/.05 -.565/.06 +4.48/.14 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ------ -----
juris pop +.000008/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .03 .06
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.02 -.012/.02 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.04 ----- -.00002/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .11
UA pop ----- -.00002/.12 ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .26
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note:Entries denote coefficient/ significance level (significance only for Pr > F)
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TABLE 5-A-5     
Control Variables-- NAICS 8139
all urban areas:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
NAICS 8139 -.0002/.09 -.0002/.11 -.0003/.05 -.0002/.14 -.003/.00 -----
  FragI- -2.38/.01 -2.18/.03 -2.44/.03 -1.31/.07 -12.6/.03 -----
population
mayor: -.929/.01 -1.21/.00 -1.16/.01 -.353/.15 +3.93/.12 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .12
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.04 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.02 -.00002/.07 -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .03 .07
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .18
NAICS 8139 -.0002/.11 -.0002/.12 -.0003/.05 -.0002/.16 -.003/.00 -----
  FragI- -2.50/.01 -2.38/.02 -2.64/.02 -1.33/.06 -11.3/.05 -----
income
mayor: -.904/.01 -1.18/.00 -1.13/.01 ------ +4.11/.10 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .00 .13
  income ----- ----- ----- ----- -.009/.05 -----
per cap
  property
tax -.00002/.02 -.00002/.08 -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
UA pop .03 .07
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .13
n = 619 619 619 619 437 436
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Table 5-A-5 (con't)
urban areas in single states only:
     Staff Time %
activities act & tech
act, tech 
& funds incntype Retention Attraction
NAICS 8139 ----- ----- ----- ----- -.004/.11 -----
  FragI- -2.56/.01 -2.19/.05 -2.15/.08 ----- -13.9/.03 -----
population
mayor: -.712/.10 -1.02/.03 -1.05/.04 -.551/.07 +4.31/.15 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000008/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .03 .05
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.02 -.012/.02 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.05 -.00002/.12 -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .05 .13
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .29
NAICS 8139 ----- ----- ----- ----- -.004/.11 -----
  FragI- -2.65/.01 -2.34/.04 -2.29/.06 ----- -12.5/.05 -----
income
mayor: -.685/.11 -.992/.03 -1.03/.05 -.541/.07 +4.47/.14 -----
race: ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
juris pop +.000009/.00 +.00001/ +.00001/ +.000005/ +.00002/ +.00001/
.00 .00 .00 .03 .06
  income ----- ----- ----- +.001/.02 -.012/.02 -----
per cap
  property -.00002/.05 -.00002/.13 -.00003/ -.00002/ ----- -----
tax .06 .13
UA pop ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
Prob > F .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .25
n = 472 472 472 472 340 339
Note:Entries denote coefficient/ significance level (significance only for Pr > F)
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Because of the length of the exposition, Chapter 6 is divided into two parts.  
Part A constitutes an introduction to the geography and politics of Hampton Roads 
while Part B, building on the history in Part A, presents theoretical arguments.
Chapters 4 and 5 presented statistical support for communication- and 
leadership-based success in collective action while refuting the still-common 
assertion that—absent selective incentives— anything beyond a small number of 
players dooms collective action to failure.  While Chapter 1 included a sketch of 
interjurisdictional competition and cooperation in metropolitan Denver,  Chapter 6 
comprises a far more detailed case study of the Hampton Roads urban region in 
southeastern Virginia.  After presenting a brief orientation on Hampton Roads 
geography and history in Section 6(A).2, Section 6(A).3 develops a narrative of 
relevant Hampton Roads governmental and economic events since 1990.  Part B will 
extend the Chapter 5 themes of leadership and communication, describing the roles of 
each in Hampton Roads regional cooperation while revisiting an element of Chapter 2 
to argue that the theoretical possibility of a transition from the prisoners’ dilemma
game to the assurance game occurred in Hampton Roads as the cost of defection rose 
to a degree unacceptable to interested citizens.  Essentially, both leadership (and 
leadership-engendered communication) and game transition reinforced each other to 
move the region to stable mutual cooperation.
208
A few words on methodology are in order:  First, in order to fully tap the rich 
experience of fin de siecle and early new millennium Hampton Roads, the focus of 
the study will encompass not only cooperation to limit interjurisdictional competition 
but all cooperative efforts on regional economic development in general.  IJC is after 
all logically an element of overall economic development strategy.  More to the point, 
while Hampton Roads did adopt an anti-raiding agreement similar to that of greater 
Denver, the critical scholar may justifiably be concerned that this event might be a 
lonely single success in an environment awash in defection and doomed collective 
action attempts.  The exposition in this chapter should dispel such doubts.  
Second, interviews in the Hampton Roads area were conducted on a not-for-
attribution basis.  While this limits the ability to employ juicy quotations, it does 
facilitate  far more frank and informative interviews.  The question, of course, is how 
to report findings thus gleaned.  Chapter 6 employs the typical journalistic standard of 
having a behind-the-scenes event confirmed by two or more observers or participants.  
Of course, where academic studies or newspaper articles can be used for reference 
instead, they are.  In the rare instances in which individuals are cited, they have been 
explicitly asked for permission.
6(A).2 Hampton Roads Background
Hampton Roads comprises sixteen jurisdictions.  The Census-defined 
Urbanized Area  accounts for a dozen of these communities, ranging in population 










Newport News 170045 12711 119
Hampton 133793 13099 136
York County 30953 15128 108
James City County 16542 19355 143
Williamsburg 11530 11822 9
Poquoson 11005 16930 78





Virginia Beach 389533 15234 497
Norfolk 261229 11643 96
Chesapeake 146527 13838 351
Portsmouth 103907 11158 47
Suffolk 39076 11740 429
Sources: American Fact Finder, www.census.gov ;  York
County area from York County Ofc of Econ Development
Hampton Roads Urbanized Area
Source: www.census.gov
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Two major features distinguish the social geography: First, the two-mile-wide 
James River forces most north-south traffic over two frequently congested bridge-
tunnels.  (An outlying bridge and a car ferry are located considerably further from 
main population and business centers.)  Second, the urbanized area is frequently 
described as a linear city.  Averaging 18 miles wide, built-up Hampton Roads is 
almost 65 miles long on a southeasterly axis jutting down the Virginia Peninsula to 
Chesapeake, its most southerly municipality5.  
Construction on the bridge-tunnels (tunnels being necessary to permit ships 
transit to harbor facilities) began in 1957 and was completed in 1992.  Prior to this, 
transportation from the northern Peninsula (Newport News, Hampton and vicinity) to 
Southside (Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Portsmouth and environs) was by ferry.  This 
resulted in the two parts of the present Hampton Roads area developing separately 
until relatively late in current history.  Indeed, the two were different MSAs until 
1983.  The legacy of these years continued into the new millennium both in separate 
sets of subregional institutions (e.g., economic development cooperatives, chambers 
of commerce) for either side of the James and in the continued appellations Peninsula
and Southside.  Tellingly, the region’s two major daily newspapers still circulate in 
and cover mainly their respective subregions: the Peninsula for the Daily Press and 
Southside for the Virginian-Pilot.  Additionally, residents frequently refer to the 
subregion in which they are not as “the other side of the tunnel [or bridge].”  The 
region is also known as Tidewater, Peninsular Virginia, Southeastern Virginia and—
generally to Norfolk residents—as Greater Norfolk.  A well-known sub-subregion 
5
 Width of the urbanized area excludes Gloucester County in the northeast across the York River.  
Average width for the Peninsula north of the James River is 12 miles; average width south of the 
James is 22.5 miles.  Figures are based upon author’s mapspotting. 
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also exists: the Historical Triangle comprising Williamsburg, York County and 
James City County.
The name Hampton Roads is derived from one of the original royal land 
grants in Virginia, Southampton Roadstead— a roadstead (later contracted to a roads
or road) being a coastal area less enclosed than a harbor but still safe for anchored 
ships (Babcock, 1998).  Similarly colorful etymologies attend to other place names, 
such as Newport News, originally named for the location where, in the early 
seventeenth century, colonists could come to receive the latest updates on world 
events from the ships crews of explorer Christopher Newport.  
Norfolk became the longstanding financial and industrial center of Southside; 
however, a series of defensive city-county mergers in the mid-1900s limited its 
annexations of adjacent lands.  One of these mergers—between the City of Virginia 
Beach and Princess Anne County — set the stage for the rise of Virginia Beach to 
become the region’s most populous jurisdiction and latter-day rival to Norfolk for 
regional dominance throughout Hampton Roads.  (An endnote provides the 
interesting perspective of changes in Census terminology regarding Virginia Beach 
and the MSA.1)  Thus, whatever success regional cooperation enjoys in Hampton 
Roads is achieved against a historical background of rivalry, separation and, at times, 
intrigue.
Contemporary Hampton Roads nonetheless also exhibits a certain 
complementarity among jurisdictions.  Norfolk retains a large role as home to high-
rises and headquarters.  Outlying cities and counties have developable land at lower 
prices.  Virginia Beach has the ocean frontage and recreation.  Norfolk, Newport 
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News and Portsmouth host heavy manufacturing.  The Williamsburg-centered 
historical triangle offers national-park-based tourism.
At a more general level, the Hampton Roads economy is an interesting blend 
of themes.  Defense spending in this traditional Navy region—site of the famed Civil 
War battle between the ironclads U.S.S. Monitor and C.S.S. Virginia (formerly U.S.S. 
Merrimac)—comprises 31% of gross regional product (Regional Studies Institute 
2003, Graph 2).  Major installations include three major naval activities in Norfolk 
(56,500 military, 3100 civilian employees), Fort Monroe and Langley Air Force Base 
in Hampton (10,000 military, 3100 civilian employees), Fort Eustis in Newport News 
(5810 military, 1950 civilian employees), and Fort Story, Amphibious Base Little 
Creek and Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia Beach (24,000 military, 1900 civilian 
employees) (HRPDC 2004, Table 5).   Analysts frequently attribute Hampton Roads’ 
relatively milder economic recessions (when the national economy catches cold, 
Hampton Roads sneezes or at worst gets a sniffle) to military spending cycles 
historically offsetting the business cycle (e.g. HRPDC 2004, p 5).  However, troop 
deployments can also have an initially depressing effect on the regional economy 
(HRPDC 2004, pp 23-28).
Shipbuilding contributes to a large manufacturing base which produces 
roughly a quarter of regional income (Bureau of the Census: 1997 Economic Census).
Higher education (including the College of William and Mary; Hampton and Old 
Dominion Universities) and high tech (such as NASA’s Langley Research Center) 
provide a cutting edge modern component, while Colonial Williamsburg, Jamestown 
and Yorktown Victory Center hark back to the nation’s earliest days.  The following 
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charts list (a) major industries and (b) a percentage breakout of payroll by North 
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS; successor to the Standard 
Industrial Classification system).  The second graphic also provides a comparison to 
two MSAs which Hampton Roads elites track as benchmarks for Hampton Roads 
progress.
Hampton Roads-- Largest Employers
(excluding State and local government)
Jurisdiction Employees Activity
U.S. Government All 50000 Govt, Military
Northrup Grumman Newport News 18000 Shipbuilding & Repair
Sentara Healthcare Norfolk 14500 Healthcare
Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard Portsmouth 7000 Shipbuilding & Repair
Riverside Health 
System Newport News 5000 Healthcare
Busch Gardens/ 
Water Country Williamsburg 5000 Theme Park
Portsmouth Naval
Hospital Portsmouth 4770 Hospital
Naval Medical Center 
Portsmouth Portsmouth 4028 Hospital
Old Dominion 
University Norfolk 4000 Education
Bank of America Norfolk 3600 Banking
Smithfield Foods Smithfield 3223 Meat Processing
Colonial Williamsburg Williamsburg 3200 Museums, Historical
Ford F-150 Plant Norfolk 2500 Automotive Manufacturing
NASA Langley 
Research Hampton 2300 Aerospace Research
Amerigroup Virginia Beach 2300 Medicaid Insurance
U.S. Marine Repair Norfolk 2200 Shipbuilding & Repair
Cox Communications Chesapeake 2100 Cable Calling Center, Telecoms
Source: Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance, www.hreda.com
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Hampton Roads Income Sources
1997 NAICS Percentages







Utilities 1 4 1
Manufacturing 24 26 13
Wholesale 7 13 9
Retail 14 9 11
Transportation, 
Warehousing 5 5 7
Finance, 
Insurance 8 14 20
Real Estate 3 2 2
Professional, 
Science 10 8 9
Waste, 
Remediation 7 6 7
Education 1 1 1
Health Services 10 6 11
Arts & 
Entertainment 1 1 1
Hotels & Food 6 3 4
Other Services 4 2 3
Source: 1997 Economic Census, www.census.gov
Note: Columns do not add to 100% due to rounding
6(A).3 Economic Development in Hampton Roads from 1990—A Narrative
6(A).3.1 Troubled Beginning.
The fifteen years from 1990 through 2004 eventually saw a renaissance of 
regional economic development cooperation with the birth of new regional 
organizations and revitalization of existing entities.  However, this renewal of 
regionalism had its origins in a spasm of bad news and unfavorable auguries for the 
Hampton Roads economy.  Many persons interviewed pointed in particular to five 
major events: regional per capita income falling as a percentage of the national 
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average, regional income per capita falling vis a vis similar nearby MSAs, the 1991-2 
recession, military downsizing after the end of the Cold War, and bank deregulation.  
A newpaper headline and initial sentence best capture the malaise of the times:  
“Looking Back At 1990: The Year The Going Got Tough.  ‘It was the year the 
economy finally went thud in Hampton Roads.’  (Mayfield, 1990)”
Regional Per Capita Income Falling vs National Average:  The release of 
the 1990 Census highlighted the fact that after steady growth in the early 1980s, per 
capita income in Hampton Roads had fallen as a percentage of United States per 
capita income:
Hampton Roads Income Per Capita as 































Cap as % of
U.S. Average
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEARFACTS, www.bea.gov) 
Having climbed in 1985 and 1986 to within one percentage point of the national 
average, by 1990 Hampton Roads per capita income had plummeted below its 1980 
average—from 94% in 1980 to 93% in 1990.  Five years later, it had fallen below its 
1979 mark—from 91% in 1979 to 90% of the national average in 1995.
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Comparative Regional Indicators:  Hampton Roads elites frequently compare 
their region to two other southeastern MSAs of similar population.  Hampton Roads 
was always ahead of benchmarks Charlotte, North Carolina and Jacksonville, Florida 
on per capita income until the 1990 census:















MSA CY80 CY85 CY90 1990 Population Rank Among MSAs
Hampton Roads $9471 $14544 $18091 1,457,079 32nd of 361
Charlotte NC $9236 $14356 $20092 1,030,945 42nd of 361
Jacksonville FL $9315 $14450 $19087 932,169 47th of 361
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEARFACTS, www.bea.gov) 
Note: In current dollars.
While not explicitly mentioned as benchmarks by regional leaders interviewed 
for this case study, two other nearby MSAs almost undoubtedly influenced Hampton 
Roads decisionmakers, at least at gut level.  These are Richmond, Virginia—just up I-
64—and Raleigh, North Carolina.  The bad news continues when the region is 
contrasted with these similar MSAs which started the decade slightly in front of 
Hampton Roads and then pulled significantly ahead:
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Hampton Roads Income Per Capita 













MSA CY80 CY85 CY90 1990 Population Rank Among MSAs
Hampton Roads 9471 14544 18091 1,457,079 32nd of 361
Raleigh NC 9546 15760 20821 548,874 76th of 361
Richmond VA 10561 15648 21145 954,380 46th of 361
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEARFACTS, www.bea.gov)
Note: In current dollars.
The contrast is even more dramatic in terms of income per capita of the five 
MSAs versus the national average:
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Hampton Roads versus Benchmarks: 






















Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEARFACTS, www.bea.gov)
Thus, not only was Hampton Roads declining in comparison with national 
averages, it was losing steam in comparison with Southeastern rivals as well.  Many 
of those interviewed remember these as the sharpest of the several wake-up calls:  
Hampton Roads was in trouble, falling behind the competition on all fronts.
1991-2 Recession:  Just as Hampton Roads communities and decisionmakers 
were absorbing 1990 Census data, the 1980s economic boom came to an end in the 
nation’s first ‘white collar recession’.  Although buffered by defense employment, the 
Hampton Roads economy suffered along with the rest of the nation:
219






















Source: Hampton Roads Tax Study, for Hampton Roads Planning District 
Commission by Barents Group, LLC (1999): Figure 1-4 
 
Possible Military Base Closures:  Granted, the recession was not as severe in 
Hampton Roads as in other parts of the nation.  Ironically but understandably, its lack 
of severity in this instance made the perception of Hampton Roads future even 
gloomier:  In this as well as past recessions, the major military presence in Hampton 
Roads had on balance buoyed the economy in economic downturns even in the face 
of troop deployments for the Gulf War and the concomitant temporary loss of local 
income.  However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, end of the Cold War and 
promises of a “peace dividend” from cuts in the national defense budget, how much 
longer could Hampton Roads continue to rely upon military spending to buttress its 
economy?
The answer came in the form of the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 
1988, which inaugurated the first of a series of Base Realignment and Closure 
Commissions (BRAC).  Each Commission recommends a list of base closings 
which—if accepted in toto by the Secretary of Defense—must be implemented unless 
disapproved within 45 days by a Joint Resolution of Congress.  There is no room in 
220
the process for negotiation or amendment once a list is submitted to the Secretary of 
Defense by a Commission.  Hampton Roads to date has not suffered as greatly as 
some feared initially:  The Naval Aviation Depot in Norfolk was closed by BRAC 
(Virginian-Pilot, 3/26/95) and Oceana Naval Air Station threatened with a closure 
abated by the restationing of six F/A-18 Hornet squadrons from Cecil Field, Florida 
(Dorsey, 1999).  However, concerns continue—the longevity of Oceana NAS is again 
imperiled in the upcoming round of base closings by encroachment of housing 
developments near the airstrip approach; the demise of Fort Story is reportedly under 
consideration (Dolan, 2003; Addis, 2004).  Very certainly such worries were 
prominent in the thinking of local leaders in the years around 1990.  “The shrinkage 
of the nation’s military—specifically the closing of some naval installations—…is 
focusing Hampton Roads’ attention…” noted one journalist (Virginian-Pilot, 
1/25/94).   Indeed, the BRAC process provided an impetus to regionalism during the 
study period: Hampton Mayor James Eason supported regional efforts because of the 
local economy “move from [a] defense to non-defense economy” (Mangalindan, 
3/19/95).
Bank Deregulation:  The Commonwealth of Virginia was caught flat-footed 
by Federal banking deregulation in the early 1990s, and Virginia-chartered banks 
suffered.  Virginian law encouraged competition among state-chartered banks by 
limiting their ability to open branches in adjacent communities.  While useful in 
previous eras, this state regulation was superseded by new Federal regulations 
encouraging multi-state banking mergers and acquisitions.  A Virginia-chartered bank 
still could not acquire branches or merge with banks in adjacent communities, but 
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out-of-state banks could… and did.  North Carolina banks in particular took over 
once-powerful Virginia banks.  Hampton Roads businesspersons, accustomed to 
quick responses from local bankers vested with decisionmaking authority, now found 
themselves in the less reassuring position of petitioners at branches of out-of-state 
banks, filling out applications for approval at headquarters in distant cities… such as 
Charlotte. (Levinson, 1994.)
6(A).3.2 Regional Institutions
The Hampton Roads economy, heavily dependent upon 
military and maritime-industry dollars for its health, has been 
drifting into uncharted waters.  Thanks to the Hampton Roads 
Chamber of Commerce, the region is well on its way to plotting 
safe passage through the unknown.  …This month the Hampton 
Roads Chamber completed the first step toward formulating its 
“Plan 2007” (2007 will be the 400th anniversary of the settling 
of Jamestown).  
(Virginian-Pilot, 1/25/94.)
Plan 2007, finalized in 1993, inter alia recommended the creation of the 
Hampton Roads Partnership, a public-private entity envisioned to become the overall 
coordinator of economic development.  The Partnership would replace the Forward 
Hampton Roads—the marketing arm of the (Southside) Hampton Roads Chamber of 
Commerce—and its Peninsula counterpart, the Virginia Peninsula Economic 
Development Council.  While attributed above to the Southside’s Hampton Roads 
Chamber of Commerce, Plan 2007 also saw the involvement of the Virginia 
Peninsula and Williamsburg Area Chambers of Commerce, along with numerous 
other organizations, for a total of 430 individual participants (Virginian-Pilot, 
1/25/94; Mangalindan, 3/19/95).
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The Hampton Roads Partnership was inaugurated in May, 1996 with funding 
from the recently passed state Regional Competitiveness Act.  The law allowed the 
Virginia General Assembly to “establish a fund to be used to encourage regional 
strategic planning and cooperation…[by making grants to] regional partnership[s] 
[which] include as broad a representation as practical of local government, 
elementary and secondary education, higher education, the business community, and 
civic groups… Each regional partnership shall develop a regional strategic economic 
development plan… [and address areas such as] job creation or economic 
development, regional revenue sharing or growth sharing agreements, education, 
local land use, housing, transportation, law enforcement, solid waste, fire services 
and emergency medical services…” (Code of Virginia, 15.2-1306 to -1310 ).
Hampton Roads communities decided to allow the Hampton Roads Partnership to 
retain all Regional Competitiveness Act funding as seed money for its programs.
The Hampton Roads Partnership ultimately did not encompass all roles 
foreseen in Plan 2007: Southside and the Peninsula retained their own subregional 
marketing agencies (of which more below).  However, the Partnership was 
instrumental in initiating a series of combined Southside/Peninsula marketing trips to 
Detroit, Los Angeles and Toronto.  The Partnership identified eight issue areas, such 
as port activities, regional identity, technology, workforce development and 
transportation.  Several have been closed out and the issue area list is under revision, 
with probable new areas in industry clusters and natural resource enhancement.  The 
Hampton Roads Partnership has also spun off several regional development 
organizations, such as Smart Region Hampton Roads (creating a ‘virtual region’ 
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through innovative information technology) and the Hampton Roads Technology 
Council (working with regional economic development agencies to attract high-tech 
firms) (Smart Region Hampton Roads; Probsdorfer, 2001)..
The regional revival of the mid-90s included the subregional marketing 
organizations of the Southside and Peninsula Chambers of Commerce.  Southside’s  
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce had promoted its share of the regional 
economy under its client division Forward Hampton Roads.  This allowed some 
degree of regional promotion; however, as a purely private entity, Forward Hampton 
Roads could not achieve a truly cooperative subregional marketing function without 
participation of local governments, each possessing its own economic development 
department.  In 1996, the regional marketing function was removed from Forward 
Hampton Roads and placed in a new public-private entity, the Hampton Roads 
Economic Development Alliance (HREDA).  HREDA is supported by jurisdictional 
contributions of one dollar per resident as well as by donations from participating 
businesses.  Its board comprises both local economic development agency officers 
and private businesspersons.  Through advertising, direct contacts and trade missions 
to other states and countries, HREDA claims credit for numerous new businesses 
coming to Southside.
The Peninsula Alliance for Economic Development (PAED) was founded 
under similar circumstances in 1997.  Its predecessor organization, the Virginia 
Peninsula Economic Development Council (VPEDC), had received both public and 
private funding but had developed too unwieldy and farflung a range of activities for 
effective and coherent management (Probsdorfer, 2001).    PAED did however retain 
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VPEDC’s very successful workforce training program in addition to the subregional 
marketing function.  The training program is the major difference between PAED and 
HREDA.
As noted above, HREDA and PAED have engaged in several joint marketing 
trips which were financially supported in part by the Hampton Roads Partnership.  
However, economic development officers for the various cities and counties in 
Hampton Roads often volunteer the problem created by the existence of two 
subregional marketing boards within what is now regarded as one region.  Many 
prospective new firms have reportedly been openly perplexed when, after a 
productive tour sponsored by one of the two agencies, they are in effect dropped off 
“at the bridge” for a separate tour by the other agency.  Problems such as this and the 
general tide of support for regional cooperation in Hampton Roads led to proposals 
for merging HREDA and PAED.  The daily Virginian-Pilot called for consolidation 
as early as November of 2000: “Destructive rivalry among Hampton Roads’ 
localities inevitably commands more notice than lower-visability cooperative efforts 
to improve the fortunes and raise the incomes of the region and its inhabitants.  But 
not all the news is bad.  Next step: How about merging the Peninsula and South 
Hampton Roads business-recruitment agencies?” (Virginian-Pilot, 11/8/00).  Major 
stumbling blocks included how the existing staffs were to be combined and the 
disposition of the highly regarded PAED workforce training program.  However, 
merger talks were ultimately successful and the two alliances became one truly 
regional entity retaining the name Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance
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on 1 March 2005.  Section 6(B).4.4(a) below contains details.  (Batts, 2005; Snider, 
2005b)
While not a regional organization, the anti-raiding agreement is a regional 
institution which was approved by all local city and county councils.  Its origin in 
1994 lay with community activist and then-chair of First Virginia Bank,  James 
Babcock of Virginia Beach.  Mr. Babcock was concerned about the use of tax dollars 
to lure Hampton Roads firms from one local jurisdiction to another.  Indeed, 
Babcock’s own tax dollars as a Virginia Beach resident had recently been used to lure 
the Ernst & Young accountancy from Norfolk to Virginia Beach-- $100,000 to 
remodel offices.  “That’s not economic development,” one local official told the 
Virginian-Pilot, “That’s musical chairs!” (Murray, 1994).
Babcock wrote a memorandum criticizing wastefulness of local resources in 
such competition and showed it to his vice-chairman, Mason Andrews, who was also 
mayor of Norfolk.  Andrews liked the idea, showing it to others who joined him in 
asking Babcock to develop the idea.  The banker researched the details of incentives 
and various ethics of incentives use with local development officials.  What should 
incentives be offered for?  What is a definable boundary to prevent plundering of 
neighbors’ businesses while allowing competition for firms which are going to move 
anyhow?  Babcock approached the Mayors and Chairs Caucus— a monthly meeting 
comprising all regional mayors and city councils chairpersons—with the completed 
proposal. (Interview, James Babcock; Mangalindan, 1995b.)
Consideration by city and county councils took place amid press and public 
clamor over recent incentive deals cut by one local jurisdiction at the expense of 
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another.  The $100,000 Ernst & Young deal mentioned above was rehashed.  
Ferguson Enterprises, a national leader in plumbing supplies, had become the object 
of a bidding war between current host Newport News and York County.  Newport 
News retained the 250-employee firm (average salary: $56,000) by subsidizing 
Ferguson’s new site land costs as well as purchasing the new building and leasing it 
to the firm.  The minimum cost for the land subsidy alone was $500,000.  York 
County and Newport News were also vying for a new site for Newport News’ 
Contemporary Cybernetics.  And Newport News offered ValuJet Airlines a package 
of almost $2 million to fly out of Newport News-Williamsburg International Airport 
instead of Norfolk.  (Murray, 1994; Mangalindan, 1995b).
The era’s business community concern over regional economic cooperation in 
general was exemplified by the widely reported keynote address to a day-long 
meeting in Norfolk of two hundred business, government and civic leaders convened 
to consider economic decline in Virginian urban regions.  Norfolk Southern Railway 
chairman David Goode singled out lack of regional cooperation as the key problem in 
taking the Virginia urban economy to the next level (Virginian-Pilot, 1995c)—and, as 
a Norfolk resident and businessperson, cited Hampton Roads as the worst example of 
the problem:
Many factors go into competitiveness… [Metropolitan 
Virginia has] geography…a port that is the envy of the 
world…proximity to the nation’s major population centers… 
lifestyle…[and] a moderate cost of living…
What we don’t have is regional cohesion…a regional 
identity…that we can rally behind and market to the world.
Nowhere is that more evident than here in Hampton 
Roads… The state’s largest metropolitan area has a weak 
regional identity…  
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Regionalism is much discussed, however—increasingly so.  
That’s encouraging… We do see real regional cooperation with 
such efforts as Forward Hampton Roads.  But it’s piecemeal…
What is needed… is fundamental change in the way city 
governments work together, in the way they are willing to work 
together, and in the way they are allowed to work together.  
(Goode, 1995).  
City and county councils deliberated on the anti-raiding pact throughout 1995.  
Each passed a separate resolution embodying the key elements of the proposal:
• jurisdictions will not approach companies from other jurisdictions 
• if a firm from another jurisdiction approaches your city, you will inform the 
current host city before speaking further 
• a jurisdiction will not approach an out-of-region prospect recruited by and 
engaged in negotiations with another jurisdiction 
• if negotiations with an out-of-region firm fall through, a jurisdiction will refer 
that company to other jurisdictions within the region.
 The Virginian-Pilot reported some concern among Virginia Beach councilors about 
details of the wording of the proposal; however, a check of city council minutes for 
major jurisdictions reveals only one adverse comment (from a citizen, not a 
councilor) and unanimous votes in favor of the anti-raiding agreement.  
(Mangalindan, 1995b; Council Minutes).
Interviews with municipal economic development officials, mayors and 
regional organization officers during case study research furnish a unique perspective 
on the impact of the anti-raiding agreement on Hampton Roads civic culture almost a 
decade later.  Even among economic development officials, there can be significant 
vagueness about the pact.  Some were uncertain of all the details.  Others didn’t know 
that both Southside and Peninsula communities had adopted it—or that all 
jurisdictions had signed.  A couple even thought that it was literally an unwritten 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’.  
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However, the impact today of the anti-raiding debate and resolutions passed a 
decade ago was still very evident in responses to a hypothetical situation 
questionnaire administered during the interviews6.  The vast majority of responses—
especially among economic development professionals—was in line with the anti-
raiding pact.  (The results charts will also be used as references in later sections of 
this chapter.)
The questionnaire began with this scenario:  You are in an urban area like 
Hampton Roads, but it is not Hampton Roads.  There is no anti-raiding agreement in 
place among cities in the urban area.  A firm located in a nearby town is said to be 
considering moving its plant.  The firm is a good one for any jurisdiction: light 
industry, well-paid jobs, no significant pollution or adverse effects of production.  
Which of the following are okay for your city’s officials to do?
Here are the specific questions and  results (because of time constraints on 
interviews, some did not complete the survey):
• 1(a)  [It is okay to] Initiate contact with the firm and point out the advantages 
of moving to your city:
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 1 1 -- "it's happening now…" 8 10
Mayors 0 1 -- "if they're not whipsawing you…" 1 2
Regional 
Officials 2 1 -- "if their host city okays it…" 0 3
TOTALS: 3 3 9 15
6
 The questionnaire was administered at the end of the interview.  This ensured that respondents were 
oriented on the subject.  All respondents were seasoned professionals or politicians with strong 
experience and opinions, so the responses should not be tainted by the previous discussion.  N = 15; 
not all interviewees had time for the questionnaire.  
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• 1(b)  **Follow on** …Should they tell the firm’s current locale about 
their contact?
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No NA* Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 2 0 0 8 10
Mayors 1 0 0 1 2
Regional 
Officials 3 0 0 0 3
TOTALS: 6 0 0 9 15
* Not Applicable: Individuals answered "no" to Question 1(a)
• 2(a)  Respond to the firm if it should inquire about relocating to your city:
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 10 0 0 10
Mayors 1 0 0 1*
Regional 
Officials 3 0 0 3
TOTALS: 14 0 0 14
* one individual did not respond
• 2(b)  **Follow-on** …Should they tell the firm’s current locale about 
the firm’s approach?
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 10 0 0 10
Mayors 1 0 0 1*
Regional 
Officials 1 2-- "if the firm agrees…" 0 3
TOTALS: 12 2 0 14
* one individual did not respond
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• 3  Do staff and market research for the firm on what conditions would be like 
in your city:
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 10 0 0 10
Mayors 2 0 0 2
Regional 
Officials 3 0 0 3
TOTALS: 15 0 0 15
A final question was apparently subject to multiple interpretations:
• 4  Make an offer on tax or fee breaks, or rezoning and the like, as incentives 
for relocation?
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 0 7-- "only if necessary to get the firm…" 3 10
Mayors 0 0 1 1*
Regional 
Officials 3 0 0 3
TOTALS: 3 7 4 14
* one individual did not answer
Counting the seven economic developers answering “under certain circumstances”
as “yes” answers because of their elaboration that they would offer such incentives if 
necessary—hence, yes, it is okay to make an offer—the matrix becomes:
Yes Under certain circumstances (please elaborate) No Total
Econ Dev 
Officials 7 0 3 10
Mayors 0 0 1 1*
Regional 
Officials 3 0 0 3
TOTALS: 10 0 4 14
* one individual did not answer
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Overall, then, officials’ values tend to reflect the anti-raiding agreement.  
Critically and interestingly, this is especially pronounced among economic 
development professionals—those officials who deal with the subject most 
frequently.  Eighty percent of the economic development professionals indicated that 
it would be wrong to initiate contact with a neighboring firm rumored to be 
considering a move (question 1a)—a higher percentage than that of mayors or 
regional officials.  All economic developers asserted that a city should tell the host 
locality of an approach by one of its businesses (question 2b) while a majority of 
regional officials did not.  Thus, despite some vagueness about pact details in verbal 
comments, officials have absorbed the spirit of the agreement.  And perhaps that is an 
even more important assessment of its enduring impact.  
A final regional institution developed during this period is worth mentioning.  
Hampton Roads, Virginia is one of only two regions to have a regional flag.  The 
Regional Identity Task Force—one of the first priority areas of the Hampton Roads 
Partnership—initiated a contest in the 1997-1998 academic year for public school 
students to design a flag for the region.  The Task Force—interestingly chaired by 
James Babcock—saw a regional flag as one of the building blocks for getting people 
to think regionally.  Cox High School (Virginia Beach) student Andrew Wall, a 16 
year old junior, submitted the winning design, a green, blue and white design 
symbolizing land and sea with sixteen stars, one for each municipality:
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Source: www.flagspot.net
The flag was first flown over Portsmouth Civic Center in a ceremony at 11 
a.m. on 2 December 1998.  It is now a common sight throughout Hampton Roads and 
the wavy blue-over-green motif has shown up on Hampton Roads Transit buses and 
the Paddlewheel Ferry.  (Knepler, 1997; Virginian-Pilot, 5/22/98 & 12/2/98; image 
from flagspot.net; Hampton Roads Transit and Ferry information from their website, 
www.hrtransit.org.)
6(A).3.3 Frictions and An Alternative View
The image of progress in regional cooperation portrayed in Section 6.3.2 
above would seem overly optimistic to some who work daily in the nitty gritty of 
Hampton Roads economic development and have seen their aspirations for more 
extensive cooperation dashed.  For example, then-doctoral candidate Dr. James 
Probsdorfer surveyed nineteen specific proposals brought before five major regional 
Hampton Roads bodies.  Only eight had been adopted.  (Probsdorfer, 2001.)  On the 
other hand, while 42% appears to be an unfavorable track record, two mitigating 
factors must be considered: First, several of the remaining 58% are still under 
consideration.  Second, a number of the unsuccessful programs required out-of-region 
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decisionmaker support.  These include attracting new sports teams and changing state 
laws which hinder regional cooperation.
Sometimes local perogative has constrained the freedom of action regional 
decisionmakers would like to enjoy.  Several who have been behind the closed doors 
of HREDA meetings confidentially cited the behind-the-scenes furor created when 
HREDA brokered the move of Doughtie’s Foods, recently purchased by SYSCO 
Foods, from Portsmouth to Suffolk.  (Shean, 1999; Kruse, 2000.)  HREDA officials 
believed that Doughtie’s would abandon its Portsmouth facility and saw the issue as 
finding a place within the region for this meat-packing operation.  Portsmouth 
representatives believed they had not been adequately consulted; that HREDA had in 
effect been party to a raid on Portsmouth.  The divisions created by this controversy 
were severe enough to reportedly generate at least one boardroom shouting match.  In 
any event, the HREDA staff was thenceforth forbidden to assist in intra-regional 
moves of local firms.
The anti-raiding agreement per se has not been without controversy since its 
regionwide adoption.  It is generally acknowledged that the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
can be effectively circumvented by constructing a municipal business magnet 
building, then hiring a private firm to recruit firms from neighboring cities or 
counties.  In private conversations, several jurisdictions are accused of doing so.  
Furthermore, at least two major possible breaches of the basic agreement have been 
reported in the press in ensuing years.  In 2002, Johnson and Wales University was 
planning to move its culinary institute out of Norfolk.  Norfolk offered incentives and 
attempted to attract Johnson and Wales to a then-vacant hotel complex.  Virginia 
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Beach officials—allegedly without prior coordination with Norfolk—tried to interest 
Johnson and Wales in establishing an enhanced restaurant and hotel management 
program along that city’s resort beach ocean frontage.  Virginia Beach officials 
maintain that their Norfolk counterparts had been notified and that the Virginia Beach 
approach came only after Johnson and Wales had signaled their consideration of a 
very generous Charlotte, N.C. incentive offer, which the school eventually accepted.  
(Virginian-Pilot, 2002; Dinsmore, 2002.)
In 2004, the tables turned: Norfolk offered Trader Publications—the co-owner 
of which also owns the Virginian-Pilot—an incentives package worth almost $14 
million to consolidate regional offices in Norfolk, vacating its present Norfolk office 
in favor of a to-be-constructed twenty story office building adjacent to land the city is 
purchasing for parking.  The consolidation would move offices housing 400 jobs 
from Virginia Beach to Norfolk. The Virginian-Pilot editorial board, historically pro-
regionalism and anti-IJC, admitted its interest in the outcome in its column supporting 
the deal.  Virginia Beach authorities gloved an insinuation of possible raiding in a 
carefully parsed comment:  “I’m happy [Trader won’t move out of the region]…but I 
have a concern with incentives being given,” said Virginia Beach economic 
development director Donald Maxwell (Minium, 2004).  However, Virginia Beach 
had also offered incentives for consolidation of Trader facilities within its environs 
(Minium, Glass & Dinsmore, 2004.)  Interestingly, both Trader and Norfolk 
spokespersons maintained that the deciding factor in the location decision was not 
incentives but an internal Trader survey indicating that its employees preferred to 
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downtown Norfolk to a Virginia Beach site. (Messina, 2004; Minium & Batts, 2004;  
Virginian-Pilot, 8/21/04 & 8/24/04.)
Finally, some leadership figures and influential businesspersons find 
regionalism to be at best unattractive or—at worst—a stalking horse for the 
domination of certain cities or areas, typically either Norfolk or the Southside in 
general.  They might point to another line in Norfolk business leader David Goode’s 
speech in Section 6.3.2 above for confirmation: that advocacy of regionalism 
ultimately “brings us to the central issue…: the health of our urban centers (Goode, 
1995).”   Early in his tenure, Virginia Beach’s Donald Maxwell found himself 
temporarily the editorial poster child for anti-regionalism for saying “The potential 
growth of Virginia Beach is tremendous.  I’d like to be part of that, but I don’t want 
to be part of the region’s growth (Virginian-Pilot, 4/30/95).”   His boss, Mayor 
Meyera Oberndorf, was suspicious of the predecessor of the HREDA:
Besides, Oberndorf adds, Virginia Beach isn’t always 
treated fairly by the agency charged with promoting regional 
economic development, a privately funded spinoff of the 
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce called Forward 
Hampton Roads.  “I wish that everything were done on an equal 
playing field, but I haven’t been convinced that Virginia Beach 
ever gets an equal shot,” she said.  “When people come to the 
region, we usually are the last ones on the list and only given 
time to show a very limited portion of our city.” (Murray, 
1994.)
The Virginia Beach position today is usually less bluntly stated—roughly, 
“We’re now the biggest economy in the region, so investment in Virginia Beach is 
good for the whole region because a rising tide lifts all boats… and the tide rises first 
in Virginia Beach.”  Still, several interviewees throughout the region feared that 
greater regionalism would—intentionally or in the natural course of events—benefit 
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primarily Norfolk as historical central city or Southside at the expense of the 
Peninsula.  Mayor Oberndorf’s comments above are illustrative of the former point of 
view.  Additionally, in 2003 several Virginia Beach city councilors agitated for 
withdrawing Virginia Beach support from HREDA and devoting the funds saved to 
the Virginia Beach business attraction effort.  Interestingly, Donald Maxwell wrote to 
the City Manager that without HREDA, “our overall program would be greatly 
diminished.”  (Virginian-Pilot editorialists found this Maxwellian sentiment 
commendable.)  While ultimately unsuccessful in their goal, this group of councilors 
did prompt an Old Dominion University review of the relative gains of constituent 
jurisdictions in HREDA (Virginian-Pilot, 2003b).  The report found that while land-
rich Chesapeake and Suffolk have gained the most from HREDA efforts (measured as 
the ratio of either new taxes or new payroll income to jurisdictional HREDA 
contributions), Virginia Beach was roughly at the average of the other four HREDA 
communities (Virginan-Pilot, 2003c; Koch, Agarwal & Yochum, 2003)..  
Interestingly, Virginia Beach city clerk records contain three constituent emails on the 
subject, all from local businesspersons and all favoring continued support of HREDA 
(Thompson, 2004)..
The latter fear—that regionalism would draw Peninsular economic vitality to 
Southside—is reflected in concerns voiced by several Peninsula business and political 
leaders.  The exemplar of their fears is the 1980s state-mandated unification of the 
three local ports in Norfolk, Portsmouth and Newport News into one, called Virginia 
International Terminals.  While the consolidation has led to increased growth for 
Hampton Roads (House Document No. 39, 2000), critics allege that the Peninsula was 
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denuded of shipping agents and other maritime-related businesses which moved to 
Southside to be closer to the center of action.  And they worry that too much regional 
cooperation could lead to another wave of consolidations in which Southside’s 
greater mass would naturally once again attract Peninsula firms as well as the 
majority of new firms entering the region, creating a vicious cycle of decline for 
political influence and economic vitality north of the James.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of those interviewed maintain that 
regionalism revived and became a potent force within Hampton Roads in the wake of 
the crises of the early 1990s.  New institutions were generated and old organizations 
revamped for greater effectiveness and inclusion of both public and private resources, 
expertise and perspectives.  Significantly, even skeptics among those interviewed did 
not want to be the one who pulled out of HREDA or scotched its proposed merger 
with PAED.  Most interviewees considered the anti-raiding agreement permeable but 
valuable and generally honored by economic development departments.   Indeed, 
perhaps part of the proof of the pudding is that blatant violations are rare, with press 
and public criticism founded not only in the specific instance but in the breach of the 
anti-raiding pact and the general principle of regionalism.  And the questionnaire 
results reported in Section 6.3.2 above showed that the values of the agreement have 
become the predominant values of officials interviewed, especially economic 
development professionals.  These values apparently include keeping firms in the 
region even if they leave one’s own jurisdiction.  Norfolk economic development 
director Roderick Woolard supported the move of AmeriComm marketing from 
Norfolk—where it had been for forty years—to Chesapeake because the alternative 
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was a site in North Carolina:  “We worked closely with AmeriComm to find a solution 
to keep them in Norfolk.  We simply did not have a suitable existing building with the 
future expansion requirement needed by the company.  We are pleased Chesapeake 
was able to keep them in Hampton Roads (Dinsmore, 2003; Virginian-Pilot, 2003d).”
The sensitivity for regionalism being co-opted to benefit one city or subregion 
is palpable among some.  However, thoughtful reflection indicates that differences in 
treatment are inevitable given that local economic development goals differ: Virginia 
Beach, for example, targets high-end firms with high pay scales—a difficult match 
for regional entities to find when most jurisdictions gladly settle for less.  Some 
Peninsular critics of regionalism actually emphasize not the subregion’s weakness in 
numbers but its strengths in industry (Northrup Grumman shipyard), innovation (the 
Jefferson Laboratory accelerator beam facility, NASA Langley) and attractions 
(Colonial Williamsburg, Yorktown and Jamestown), exuding confidence that the 
Peninsula can hold its own while dealing constructively with Southside interests.  The 
cause of regional cooperation remained a vital force in Hampton Roads as the fifteen 




6(B).1  Overview: Game Transition, Transactional Transition—Game Theory 
and Leadership in Hampton Roads
Chapter Two noted that while raiding neighboring jurisdictions’ firms was 
always a prisoners’ dilemma (Section 2.3), courting new firms which will move into 
the region even if no incentives are offered can be either a prisoners’ dilemma or an 
assurance game, depending on the level of costs relative to benefits (Section 2.4).  
Relatively higher costs push the game from the prisoners’ dilemma to assurance.  
Chapter Five empirically demonstrated the efficacy of communication and leadership 
in increasing cooperation on IJC, thus substantiating those tenets of the modern 
theory of collective action.  Leadership is often explained in terms of transactions
among leaders and followers, part of a general theory of leadership initiated by James 
MacGregor Burns (1978), of which more later.
This Part of the chapter will present an argument combining game theory with 
leadership theory.  In brief, game transition was reinforced by  leadership and 
communication in Hampton Roads during the period of the case study.  In a nutshell, 
costs associated with circa 1990 turbulence pushed the overall IJC/economic 
development game from prisoners’ dilemma to assurance.  This created a stable 
equilibrium for mutual cooperation.  Leadership elites were also motivated by the 
problems and increased costs of the era, and their reactions brought about a variety of 
responses which pushed the equilibrium from mutual defection to mutual 
cooperation—not an automatic or even easy move, as will be discussed in the next 
section.
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Part B will begin by recounting elements of game theory in Chapter Two.  It 
will then discuss relevant points from leadership theory.  This theoretical background 
sets the stage for an argument that the economic development history of Hampton 
Roads during the case study period is an example of game transition and the reaction 
of leadership elites complementing each other,  as illustrated later in this chapter. 
6(B).2 Theory:  From Prisoners’ Dilemma to Assurance-- Game Transition
To begin by anticipating a critique: It might be argued that the analysis is 
complicated by the fact that not just one but three gaming scenarios are being played 
in IJC in any urban region (Chapter Two, Theory).  These games are distinct, not 
susceptible to analysis as nested games per Tsebelis (1990) as discussed in Chapter 
Two.  However, part of the complex web of regional interactions in Hampton Roads 
produced the anti-raiding agreement, and this pact largely or entirely eliminates the 
predominance of the raiding scenario described in Chapter Two.  The remaining two
scenarios deal with firms coming to the region from the outside.  Firms which intend 
to locate in the region generate the IJC game described above, with the possibility of 
either a prisoners’ dilemma or an assurance game.  When firms might locate either in 
Hampton Roads or another region, the resultant game generates constant defection, 
given the most basic assumptions..  However, as pointed out in Section 2.5(D), if 
jurisdictions assume that at least some firms are bluffing in order to extort incentives 
packages—a very reasonable assessment according to anecdotal evidence—then the 
game can become essentially the same as if all firms intend to move into the region 
even if incentives are not given.  Thus it is not an unreasonable stretch to depict 
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Hampton Roads during the case study period as dominated by the IJC game described 
in Section 6.5.1 above.
The balance of this section will summarize by combining the narrative of 
chapter Section 2.4(A) with mathematical appendix Section 2.4(A)*:
• The Temptation to defect is: D — B 
• The Reward for cooperating is: ½ D
• The Penalty for defecting is: ½ (D — B)
• The Sucker’s payoff for cooperating 
when someone else defects is: 0
where:
• D = Direct benefits of a firm locating in one’s own jurisdiction
• B = Incentive ‘Bid’ for a firm 
… and the game matrix is:
No Bid Bid
No Bid 1/2D,  1/2D  0,  D-B 
Bid D-B,  0 1/2(D-B), 1/2(D-B)
The prisoners’ dilemma would have one Nash equilibrium: mutual defection 
in the Bid/Bid lower right-hand cell.  The assurance game retains that Nash 
equilibrium and adds another: mutual cooperation in the No Bid/No Bid upper left-
hand cell.  An inspection of the matrix confirms this IJC example and points out the 
key factor giving rise to two games with the same matrix.  First, consider the Bid/Bid
cell.    By the Rationality Assumption in Section 2.2, D > B.  Thus, in all cases, ½(D 
— B) > 0.  Getting half of even meager net benefits is better than getting nothing.  
Second, consider the No Bid/No Bid cell.  Here the comparison is between ‘D — B’
net benefits and ‘½ D’.  For the prisoners’ dilemma, the situation must be that  (D—
B) > ½D.  This is the case if:
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D — B > ½ D
½ D > B   or
B < ½ D
If the bid is small relative to direct benefits (i.e., less than half of direct benefits), the
net benefit ‘D — B’ of the temptation is greater than the reward for cooperating, not 
bidding and just sharing direct benefits ‘D’.
On the other hand, for the second, No Bid/No Bid equilibrium in the assurance 
game to hold, it must be the case that  ½ D > (D — B).  This is so if:
½ D > D — B 
B > ½ D
If the bid is large relative to benefits, the temptation payoff becomes less than half of 
what a jurisdiction would get through mutual cooperation.  Thus, through increasing 
costs the possibility of a stable No Bid/No Bid solution is opened.
An earlier generation of game theorists sometimes saw the assurance game as 
a no-brainer: Why opt for an individually and socially inferior defection equilibrium 
when a stable and superior mutual cooperation equilibrium is available? (Taylor, p 
18.)  These preliminary appraisals attributing simplicity to the assurance game proved 
unrealistic, however.  Much social intercourse begins in an atomized, sauve qui peut
environment.  Who wants to be the first to risk the sucker’s payoff in an attempt to 
inspire mutual cooperation?  As Dennis Chong illustrates, the practical translation of 
the question is: Who wants to risk imprisonment or physical harm marching for civil 
rights in the fifties and sixties?  … to risk being thrown permanently out of work in a 
company town by being the first to walk out in a wildcat strike in the nineteenth 
century? (Chong, Ch 6)  The move from mutual defection to mutual cooperation is 
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not necessarily easy.  The stable cooperative equilibrium, once established by game 
transition, must somehow be attained.  That role can be fulfilled by leadership.
6(B).3 Theory: Leadership and Transactional Transition
Too often, political studies use leadership as a default option: If no other cause 
can be found for a phenomenon, then it must be the result of successful leadership.  
Yet in point of practice, leadership is a deep mine with many rich veins of inquiry and 
thought.  James MacGregor Burns in his seminal Leadership (1978) draws the 
distinction between power and leadership (p 18): naked power uses force on behalf of 
the purposes of the power holder; leadership mobilizes resources and people 
themselves and is oriented on the needs of constituents.  
Burns is concerned with the role of leadership in historical causation.  Initially 
analyzing in terms of goals, Burns makes a crucial distinction between two types of 
leadership: transactional leadership, in which leaders and led strike “a bargain to aid 
the individual interests of persons or groups” which are seeking their individual, 
separate goals, and transforming leadership, which pursues higher, collective goals (p 
425-6).  In order to further clarify the difference, Burns looks beyond goals, adding 
the dimension of values.  Transactional leadership is concerned with means, or modal 
values—“honesty, responsibility, fairness, the honoring of commitments—without 
which transactional leadership could not work (p 426).”  Transformational leadership 
deals with end values, including liberty, justice and equality.  Only transformational 
leadership brings about historically significant, “real change” through “collectively 
meaningful causation”(p 434).
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However, rather than clarifying the argument, the addition of a second 
dimension complicates the definitions.  Fortunately, it also raises the possibility for a 
third kind of leadership which we will define below.  First, an examination of the two 










Burns has introduced two dimensions, goals and values.  Leadership appealing 
to individual goals and modal values is transactional.  Leadership invoking collective 
goals and end values is transforming, capable of historic significance.  This leaves 
two cells in the matrix undefined.  Are either conceivable forms of leadership?  In the 
case of individual goals and end values, arguably not.  End values relate to the 
collective identity.  Liberty is definitely a good for an individual in the context of 
society but it is meaningless in relation to the self alone, say, for a person stranded on 
an island.  Similarly, how is justice or equality meaningful in a context of one?  Can I 
be unequal to myself, or can I raise my equality with reference to myself?7
7
 A common comment which might provide a superficial counterexample is “You’re not being fair to 
yourself”.  However, this saying is actually invoked with reference to others: Either you are being 
unfair by judging yourself more harshly than you would others (or than others would you) or you are 
being unfair by working ten times harder than anyone else, then giving the additional harvest to 
ungrateful others, all the time denying yourself the benefits of your labors.  
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Modal values can fit well with collective goals, however.  Certainly a leader 
can call followers to forego individual rewards to satisfy collective goals because 
attainment of the collective goals gives each follower more as an individual (or as a 
group or, in the case of this study, as a jurisdiction) than would have been obtained 
individually.  The goal is thus collective, but the values are not end values.  (And of 
course note that the terminology bears more than a passing resemblance to solving a 
prisoners’ dilemma or assurance game—from the defection equilibrium to mutual 
cooperation, which is the second equilibrium in the assurance game.)  In this case 
study, leaders in Hampton Roads called upon jurisdictions and their movers and 
shakers to forego the rewards of individual pursuit of firms and marketing of 
individual cities and counties in order to reap the rewards of joint cooperation, which 
in the long run are greater than jurisdictions can achieve alone.  To follow Burns’ 
naming convention, we can call this transactional transition leadership. (While 
cumbersome, the term has the virtue of resembling verbiage used above in the game












ruled out transforming leadership
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Thus we have game transition and transactional transition leadership.  What 
is the relation between the two?  It is not a one-for-one correspondence, a direct 
mapping.  Rather, both have the potential to propel societal arrangements from one 
state to another: from a prisoners’ dilemma to an assurance game; from a hodgepodge 
of individuals (or groups) separately seeking their particular goals to a collective 
effort to attain goals which benefit all.  And, as suggested in the introductory 
paragraphs of section 6(B).1, both types of transition can reinforce each other.  The 
game transition from prisoners’ dilemma to assurance game effects the possibility of 
a stable equilibrium of mutual cooperation while transactional transition leadership 
provides the impetus and organization to get to that equilibrium.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Putnam sees a variety of civic organizations as a 
source of civic society and leadership.  This section will focus on governmental and 
regional organizations as well as on a particular subset of civic society, the business 
community.  Regime theory (Stone, 1989) amply justifies this approach.  An urban 
regime comprises “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private 
interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing 
decisions (p 6).”  Business interests are important to governance because, at a 
minimum, they make investment decisions which can either help a community or 
region prosper, or, alternatively, can funnel resources elsewhere, disrupting a 
previously anticipated regional growth path.  Business interests possess resources 
important to politicians, from jobs to campaign donations (pp 7-9).  The evidence 
developed in previous sections—e.g., the regional chambers of commerce Plan 2007
for regional development, replete with a complement of over 400 mainly business 
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community participants; Norfolk Southern Railway Chairman David Goode’s speech 
on regional cooperation; business involvement in organizations like HRP, HREDA 
and PAED as equals to representatives of local governments—certainly substantiates 
the existence of business involvement in an emerging regional governance regime.
Finally, a discussion of business involvement leads to consideration of the 
endowment of groups by wealthy individuals or entities.  Jack Walker (1991) found 
that many U.S. national-level interest groups were substantially funded by such 
patrons.  Typically these are individuals or foundations established by the wealthy or 
by business or labor institutions (pp 48-51), but government itself may also be a 
patron.  Walker credits the Kennedy Administration with financial assistance which 
proved a critical impetus to the growth of the women’s movement, for example (p 
31).  He values the funding as in the millions of dollars, including for White House 
conferences and for State Commissions on the Status of Women in all fifty states.  
We will consider whether Hampton Roads business elites function as patrons for the 
regional cooperation.
6(B).4 The Argument: Hampton Roads as an Example of Cooperation via Game 
Transition and Transactional Transition
This subsection will provide evidence to substantiate the causal pathway 
outlined at the beginning of section 6(B).1.  Rising costs lead to a game transition 
from prisoners’ dilemma to the assurance game as well as stimulating activity among 
leadership elites.  The two theories—game and leadership—at this point complement 
the effects of each other.  The assurance game provides the possibility of a stable 
cooperative equilibrium while leadership helps the overall community move from 
248
defection to mutual cooperation, which of course has an effect on the use of business 
incentives and IJC. 
The exposition of the argument has a number of steps, so it is probably best to 
update a previously presented diagram to illustrate the links, then utilize it in 





The diagram will retain the original lines of causation but will be updated to 
include:
• links in which increased costs lead to game transition, thence to the possibility 
of stable mutual cooperation and finally to regional cooperation and new IJC 
outcomes,
• a link in which increased costs stimulate a leadership reaction, 
• a link in which leadership affects communication, and
• links in which leadership and communication contribute (with game 
transition) to regional cooperation and new IJC outcomes.
Here is the initial diagram (the line from stable cooperation possible to regional 
cooperation is dashed to show that while game transition makes stable cooperation 







Costs Game Transition Stable Cooperation Possible
Regional
Cooperation
As links are substantiated by elaboration upon the case history, they will be re-
colored from red to blue.  
The superimposition of the game transition and leadership transactional 
transition on the existing fragmentation chart may be complicated visually but is more 
fully illustrative of a very rich social environment.  Several collective action 
phenomena are possible simultaneously.  As shown in Chapter Five, fragmentation 
itself can be associated with increased leadership and communication, hence with 
lower IJC.  As will be demonstrated in this part of the case study, an increase in costs 
can lead to a transition to the assurance game, making possible a mutual cooperation 
equilibrium.  If that equilibrium is realized (through leadership), then the result is 
regional cooperation and a lessening of IJC.  
Chapter Five built the argument leading from fragmentation to lower IJC via 
leadership and communication.  This causal pathway is represented by black lines in 
the diagram.  The current chapter will concentrate on links from increasing costs to 
game and transactional transitions—the colored lines in the diagram.  The concluding 
chapter will inter alia treat all these phenomena together.
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6(B).4.1 Baseline Conditions
While the diagram begins with increasing costs which motivate transitions in 
game and leadership, it is appropriate to comment on the regional environment in 
Hampton Roads prior to the study period.  Section 6(b).4.5, Increasing Regional 
Cooperation, will document and detail several metrics showing that cooperation had 
notably increased from the period just prior to the study period.  At this point, suffice 
it to note that:
• The number of regional economic development agencies formed in the 1990s 
to date exceeds those formed in the late 1970s and the 1980s.
• A previously predatory IJC environment was replaced during the 1990s by a 
regime in which an anti-raiding agreement was adopted by city and county 
governments in the region.
• Relatedly, controversial intra-regional IJC deals were minimized during the 
study period.
• New subregional economic development agencies—the Hampton Roads 
Economic Development Alliance and the Peninsula Alliance for Economic 
Development—were implemented on both sides of the James River.  These 
alliances improved upon previous arrangements by combining business 
interests with local governments, both in terms of financial support and 
membership on boards of directors.
• At the end of the study period, all indications point to the merger of the two 




As detailed in the narrative Section 6.3.1, Hampton Roads entered the case 
study period with multiple shocks in the early 1990s.  One theme of these shocks was 
the perceived diminishment of Hampton Roads economic well-being.  Banks were 
being swallowed up by out-of-state giants, the great defense apparatus which had 
cushioned the region in downturns past was being reduced and local bases might be 
closed, per capita income in the region had slipped in comparison to other, 
benchmark regions as well as the national average, and to really underscore the point, 
the nation was in recession.  Many of those interviewed enumerated these factors as 
important impetuses to regional cooperation, emphasizing the impact on elite morale 
at the time.  
Logically, when real income per capita falls, each dollar spent becomes 
dearer.  The real cost rises even more for goods which have substitutes which have 
not increased in cost (i.e., the opportunity cost has risen (Mansfield 1970, pp 156-7) ). 
Interjurisdictional competition for businesses is such a good, given that cooperation is 
essentially financially costless while incentives generally involve substantial outlays 
from the municipal fisc.  (To be strict, both involve costs such as administrative time, 
transaction and policing costs.  The argument here abstracts away from such common 
costs and concentrates on dollars.)  Thus, as is critical in the theory, the cost of 
bidding for firms—the cost of incentives—has risen.  (More metaphorically, the 
increased cost of incentives is compounded by the perception that the region is falling 
behind others which often take a more regional approach.  This point was made most 
explicitly by Brookings analyst and former Albuquerque mayor David Rusk at a 1994 
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luncheon:  “Rusk told a lunch gathering that Hampton Roads has fallen behind 
smaller regions in the Southeast because the cities here don’t work as one. ‘Now 
Charlotte has the Panthers,’ Rusk, referring to the pro football franchise, admonished 
the crowd.  ‘And you don’t!’ (Murray, 1994).)  
6(B).4.3  Game Transition
As detailed in Section 6(B).2 above, a sufficiently large cost relative to 
benefits can trigger the transition of the game from prisoners’ dilemma to assurance 
game.  Unfortunately—as noted in previous chapters—no  empirical means exists to 
reliably measure most IJC deals and costs in a specific jurisdiction, let alone all those 
which occur in an urbanized area or nationwide.  Faced with this situation, we are 
forced to look at the overall course of events, see if it seems to fit a scenario in which 
a previous fractious situation appears to have generated sufficiently widespread 
regional cooperation to warrant assuming that a stable mutual cooperation 
equilibrium has been generated, then ex post infer the existence of an assurance game 
where previously had been a prisoners’ dilemma.  The weight of the overall argument 
in these subsections will be that the pattern of previous fractiousness followed by 
rising costs followed by increased regional cooperation warrants the inference of 
game transition.  (A possible objection—that the events herald not a transition to 
assurance but rather a solved prisoners’ dilemma—will be addressed in Section 
6.4.3(f).)







Costs Game Transition Stable Cooperation Possible
Regional
Cooperation
6.4.4 Leadership Recognition and Reaction
This subsection will be divided into two segments.  The first will treat 
leadership in terms of transactional transition leadership and patron leadership—
essentially, the ‘leadership’ link in the diagram above.  The second will describe 
leadership’s shaping of the environment to enhance communication in such a way as 
to facilitate regional cooperation—the ‘communication’ link.  
6.4.4(a)  Leadership.
As reported in Section 6(A).3.1, many of the regional figures interviewed cite 
the economic problems circa 1990 as stimulating reactions on the part of business 
elites.  Follow-on interviews substantiated that many business figures in Hampton 
Roads operate throughout the region and tend to view Hampton Roads as a single 
entity rather than a collection of jurisdictions.  The narrative in Part A of the chapter 
contains several examples of the leadership link which will be employed and 
elaborated as necessary in the argument below.  These examples are: Plan 2007 and 
the Hampton Roads Partnership (HRP), HRP and HREDA-PAED joint trips, 
HREDA-PAED merger negotiations, HREDA transactional leadership, HREDA 
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founding, the anti-raiding agreement, and general interviewee descriptions of regional 
leadership and regime in Hampton Roads.  Because this segment inter alia considers 
examples of tactics and resources, we will conclude with consideration of the 
applicability of Jack Walker’s patron theory in Hampton Roads.
Plan 2007 and HRP Founding:  Plan 2007, with a genesis in 1992-3, is a 
good example of business impetus producing regional policy and organizational 
outcomes.  Participants in the initial Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce 
discussions leading to the formation of the 400+ member effort recall the threat of 
Department of Defense base closures and the falling position of Hampton Roads vis a 
vis other benchmark MSAs as very important factors leading to Plan 2007 study 
group formation.  Key figures in the group—including Chamber of Commerce chair 
Jim Babcock—tapped into a nascent statewide public-private urban development 
effort initiated by the mayors of Virginia’s largest cities.  This effort prevailed upon 
the state Chamber of Commerce to lobby the state legislature to enact the Regional 
Competitiveness Act, ensuring state government funding for efforts such as Plan 
2007.  
Local government involvement in Plan 2007 was very light, however.  
Business executives interviewed for the case study frequently commented that the 
business community—particularly at the outset of the Plan 2007 process—sees 
Hampton Roads as a single, integrated economy while politicians often see only their 
own electoral districts8.  This bothered drafters of the Plan, who included language 
8
 Reportedly, only one businessperson worried during the formulation of Plan 2007 that “we’re 
importing my next competitor.”  Shipyard executives reportedly expressed concern that wages inflated 
by economic development would diminish already shaky profits.  However, most private sector leaders 
reportedly embraced regional development on the principle of a rising tide lifting all boats.
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which supported creation of a regional body, a council which by design would 
include representatives of the jurisdictions.  Indeed, the Plan 2007 Vision Statements 
and Strategies exemplified the spirit of the twin goals of business leadership and 
governmental regional cooperation:
“PRIVATE SECTOR LEADERSHIP:  The private sector, 
representing the region’s rich history and diversity, will 
generate strong leadership which will work cooperatively to 
achieve the [Plan 2007] Vision for Hampton Roads.
“GOVERNMENT:  A partnership of local governments will help 
make the vision of achieving global competitiveness a reality.”
(Plan 2007, p 11)
In November of 1994 the Plan and Chamber of Commerce leaderships invited mayors 
and city council chairpersons (“mayors and chairs”), other local officials and the local 
naval command to a meeting in the twenty-story Norfolk Southern Railway 
headquarters in downtown Norfolk to discuss institutionalizing the cooperation and 
enthusiasm shown for Plan 2007.  Participants recommended formation of what 
would become the Hampton Roads Partnership.  The mayors and chairs embraced the 
idea and tasked their legal departments to draw a charter.  State funds granted to Plan 
2007 under the Regional Competitiveness Act endowed initial HRP programming.  
Thus did an originally almost all-business effort come to involve elected officials and 
government resources, a la regime theory.  
HRP and Joint HREDA-PAED Trips:  HRP funds were used to establish a 
number of issue task forces and regional entities, as reported in Section 6.3.2.  In 
addition, $95,000 was used to incentivize HREDA and PAED to undertake two joint 
marketing trips.  The allocation was proposed by the Port Committee, then sent  to the 
Board of Directors for approval.  As is documented in Section 6(B).4.4(b) below, the 
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Committee and the Board have heavy business and local government involvement.  
The majority of the Board and a plurality of the Committee are from the private 
sector.  Local government officials are the second largest component of the Board and 
a close third—just behind regional bodies—on the Ports Committee.  Committee 
membership encompassed several key figures in the history of Hampton Roads 
regional cooperation, including Jim Babcock, Norfolk mayor Paul Fraim, and the 
presidents of HREDA and PAED.
On the surface, the trips to Detroit and Los Angeles were to contact those who 
shipped through Hampton Roads in order to persuade some to relocate to Hampton 
Roads.  The trips were successful in identifying over seventy-five prospects, although 
none have yet moved.  However, the process showed enough promise that HREDA 
and PAED launched a third, self-funded mission to Toronto in February of 2000, 
visiting forty-two firms, one of which did change locations to Hampton Roads.  
At a deeper level, case study interviews revealed an ulterior motive germane 
to regional cooperation; a goal which turned out to be even more successful: HRP 
leaders hoped that HREDA- PAED cooperation on these trips would lead to further, 
entirely self-financed joint trips (it did generate the Toronto mission), and that the 
trips would build sufficient confidence in mutual dealings that HREDA and PAED 
boards of directors would seriously consider and eventually approve a merger.  Of 
course, merger talks ultimately materialized and produced a combined region-wide 
alliance.
HREDA-PAED Merger Negotiations:  The process of HREDA-PAED 
merger negotiations showed that regionalism advocates were sensitive to the need to 
257
meet transactional leadership demands—protection of individual territories and 
perogatives—in order to ensure political success in transactional transition.9  The on-
again, off-again process leading to the probable merger began in 2003 when two 
members of the PAED executive committee initiated a series of informal meetings 
with two members of the HREDA.  This was an independent initiative, and when the 
members reported conceptual terms of merger back to the PAED executive 
committee, several members of the committee condemned the meetings as 
unauthorized.  Various committee members were, at any rate, opposed to merger, 
fearing domination by the more populous and wealthy Southside. 
The process stalled, was revived briefly but seemingly fell apart in January 
2004 when a majority of the PAED executive committee voted against funding a law 
firm to draft a formal merger proposal.  At this point, the public sector component of 
the regional regime proved crucial.  An initiative by Newport News Mayor Joe Frank 
put the negotiations back on track.  In July 2004, Mayor Frank convened a meeting of 
the Peninsula mayors and chairs with several PAED executive committee members 
(Snider, 2005).  The meeting revived the negotiation process, and merger talks were 
again reported in the press (Batts, 2004a & 2004b).
On the 17th of November, 2004 the Peninsula Alliance board voted 
unanimously to prepare merger documents.  Sources reported that a law firm had 
been engaged by both alliances to finalize a Memorandum of Merger.  The 
expenditure on legal fees was taken as a strong omen that merger talks were very 
serious and that consolidation of the two agencies would occur.  A majority of 
9
 James McGregor Burns continues to see a role for transactional leadership in supporting change. 
Speaking of Franklin Roosevelt in a 2003 interview, Burns observed, “He made his transactions serve 
the purposes of his transforming leadership.” (Hogan & Zaleski, 2003.)
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Peninsula jurisdictions voted for the merger, including mandatory approval by the 
two largest cities, Newport News and Hampton.  Hampton Mayor Ross Kearney 
remained guardedly skeptical of the merger: “I’m going to support it, but if I don’t 
like it, I’m going to withdraw the funding (Scanlon, 2005).”  The PAED board 
approved the merger on 26 January 2005.  The HREDA board approved on 3 
February.  The merger was effective 1 March 2005.  (Batts, 2005; Snider, 2005b)
Recall that the Peninsula Alliance administered an award-winning workforce 
development program capitalizing on business contacts and local technical schools 
and community colleges (Dolan’s Virginia Business Observer, 2003).  Not only did 
merger advocates need to address the mechanics of merging two staffs, they had to 
provide a blueprint for keeping the Peninsula’s workforce development plan viable.  
They did so by concluding arrangements for the program to be spun off as an 
independent Peninsula entity, the Peninsula Council for Workforce Development
(Batts, 2005).
Merger advocates also had to address the concern that the merger would focus 
efforts on Southside while paying only minimal attention to the smaller Peninsular 
constituency.  This was accomplished by two means.  First, while the main office is in 
the current HREDA headquarters in Norfolk, a major supporting office with 
significant staff operates on the Peninsula—in Hampton, home of significant merger 
skepticism.  Secondly—and very boldly—despite more populous Southside 
contributing about 2/3 of the resources to the merged alliance, the Executive 
Committee is ½ Peninsula and ½ Southside.  This was a major concession by 
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Southside interests to consummate the merger.  In sum, transactional leadership 
supported the transition.  (Batts, 2005)
HREDA Founding:  The very founding of Southside HREDA is another 
example of business-initiated regional cooperation.  Recall from Section 6(A).3.2 that 
the predecessor effort was an entirely private arm of the Southside subregional 
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce.  The earlier operation had allowed for some 
general advertising and promotion of Southside, but a true subregional marketing 
effort would have to involve local governments to integrate private resources and 
perspectives with the development goals of constituent jurisdictions.  Business 
interests in the Chamber led a transactional transition in proposing a public-private 
partnership to replace the old private arrangement.  Local governments literally 
bought into the Chamber’s divestiture of regional marketing, paying a head tax of a 
dollar per resident in order to reap the rewards of a cooperative, coordinated 
marketing approach.  
HREDA Transactional Leadership:  The original Southside HREDA itself 
provides two other examples of paying attention to transactional leadership to ensure 
continuation of the transition from pre-HREDA arrangements to the public-private 
HREDA.  First, HREDA had to ensure that its benefits were well distributed among 
component jurisdictions.  This has not been an easy job, given differences in local 
economies (jurisdictions close to high value ports and existing industries tend to be 
largely built out, while jurisdictions with developable low-priced land are too far 
from critical facilities for some prospective businesses) as well as differences in 
municipal development goals (Virginia Beach pursues higher end firms than most).  
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The insurgency against HREDA on the Virginia Beach city council was abated  by 
commissioning an Old Dominion University study which in turn showed differential 
but significant returns on investment in HREDA for all Southside communities.  
Tables 4 and 5 of the ODU report list the ratios of additional tax revenues and of new 
payroll from HREDA efforts to each jurisdiction’s financial contribution to HREDA.  
The following graphic combines the two tables:
Benefits of HREDA to Component Jurisdictions
Ratio Of:
City or County:
New Taxes to 
HREDA 
Support:
New Payroll to 
HREDA 
Support:





Virginia Beach 5.4 31
While the two land-rich suburbs of Chesapeake and Suffolk have markedly higher 
ratios of benefit, proportions for other jurisdictions are much more similar: from 3.9 
to 8.2 in tax ratios; from 22 to 49 in payroll.
Finally, behind-the-scenes board dealings show that HREDA knows when to 
limit transitional change.   A more power-aggrandizing HREDA could carve out roles 
in growth management, sprawl and other areas by pursuing an aggressive policy of 
involvement in siting decisions as firms consolidate (or expand) and relocate to other 
jurisdictions within the region.  But this could bring about defections of dissatisfied  
jurisdictions which ‘lost’ firms through ‘HREDA interference’, crippling or dooming 
the organization.  HREDA leadership remains mindful of the Doughtie’s Foods 
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internal controversy.  Its attention to transactional needs ensures continuation of the 
transformation which produced their agency.
Anti-Raiding Agreement:  A final specific example is of course the anti-
raiding agreement.  The history of the agreement was extensively detailed earlier in 
Section 6(A).3.2; the theme of the story is again business community initiation of and 
pressing for an idea which picked up editorial and political support, finally being 
adopted by all city and county councils.  
Interview Insights on the Regional Regime:  Regime theory is borne out in 
more general observations during interviews.  When asked how pro-regionalism 
business firms and business persons promoted their agenda, most interviewees noted 
behind-the-scenes buttonholing at cocktail parties and other events hosted by 
businesspersons to which political leaders are invited.  Politicians interviewed were 
very aware that the business community controls jobs for their electorates.    Most 
credited their personal involvement ensuring individual businesses had their needs 
met for the success of their individual community economies.  And, of course, the 
incentive offers already recounted to ensure businesses remained in current host 
communities during consolidations or growth dramatically underscore the power of 
the business community because of its job creation.
Thus, as noted in Section 6(B).3, business interests possess resources 
important to politicians.  And another resource of note in the Hampton Roads case is 
expertise and reputation.  Business speakers are a staple of civic organization 
meetings in Hampton Roads.   Norfolk Southern Chairman David Goode’s 1995 
address on regionalism was not only covered by local news organizations but 
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extensively excerpted under a separate headline in the Virginian-Pilot.  (Mr. Goode’s 
public commentary on Hampton Roads since then have included his remarks before 
the World Affairs Council of Hampton Roads (Goode, 2001) and his acceptance 
remarks when awarded the 2004 Downtowner of the Year Award from the Downtown 
Norfolk Council (Pappa, 2004).)  The perception of a need for business expertise is 
also manifest in the heavy private sector involvement in boards such as the Hampton 
Roads Partnership, HREDA and PAED.  
Astute politicians can develop this into a symbiotic relationship.  One mayor  
effectively employed a business roundtable forum to vet and develop his ideas, then 
present the more controversial ones to the press, taking the initial public heat.  Some 
businesspersons interviewed saw this as a conscious, acceptable role for business 
leaders who wished to influence policy—with no political constituency to constrain 
them, they can leverage their greater flexibility to present opinions unpopular at the 
time but hopefully successful in the longer run.  
Business Elites as Patrons:  The regional cooperation bodies we have 
examined receive funding from private sector dues and from local—sometimes 
state—government.  If business is to play a patron role, the avenue left is to 
systematically fund city and county elected officials who are supportive of 
regionalism. Interestingly, a review of campaign donations in the recent rounds of 
city council elections for the largest Peninsula and Southside jurisdictions revealed 
little of the cross-jurisdictional donating which could be expected from businesses 
wishing to influence regional policy.  The city clerks of the two most populous 
jurisdictions on both the Peninsula and Southside—Newport News and Hampton, 
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Virginia Beach and Norfolk, respectively—provided photocopies of campaign 
finance report Schedules A and B, which cover all monetary and in-kind donations 
over $100.  Donors not affiliated with a corporation, labor or political group (such as 
retirees and homemakers) were excluded, although tables in an endnote show that 
percentages remain essentially constant when non-corporate-affiliated donors are 
included.  Donors were included in this chart if they were (a) a corporation or (b) 
listed as working for a corporation, labor or political group.  The latter were included 
because many employees are executives or owners and thus presumably reflect 
corporate interests.  The following two charts show the sources of corporate or 
corporate-affiliated funds for Peninsula and Southside candidates—whether funds are 
from the candidate’s own city, from another Hampton Roads city on its side of the 
James River, from a non-Hampton Roads Virginian jurisdiction, or from out of state.  
The first chart presents raw numbers of donations; the second, percentages:
HAMPTON ROADS CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES















Peninsula 656 39 12 14 21 742
Southside 2160 9 316 28 42 2555
Totals: 2816 48 328 42 63 3297
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HAMPTON ROADS CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES















Peninsula 88.41% 5.26% 1.62% 1.89% 2.83% 100%
Southside 84.54% 0.35% 12.37% 1.10% 1.64% 100%
Totals: 85.41% 1.46% 9.95% 1.27% 1.91% 100%
As can be seen, the vast majority of donations come from a candidate’s own 
city.    The second largest source is from the candidate’s own subregion (Peninsula or 
Southside) but from a different city.  Here, interestingly, Southside candidates tend to 
attract about twice as many donations from other subregional jurisdictions, 11.72% to 
the Peninsula’s 4.81%.  This may suggest a somewhat greater degree of regional 
political integration in Southside than on the Peninsula, but in any event, donations 
across boundaries are not large.  Alternative methods of computing the charts derive 
essentially the same results2.  As an interesting case in point of the general trend, 
Norfolk Southern’s David Goode—Norfolk resident, regionalism advocate and 
keynote speaker at the 1995 conference on regional economic problems (quoted in 
Section 6.3.3 above)—made five local campaign donations during this period, 
entirely to Norfolk council candidates.  
Of 248 firms which made three or more campaign donations, only eighteen 
had in turn donated to three or more candidates in more than one jurisdiction.  
Representatives of these firms were asked the criteria they used to determine which 
candidates to support.  The response was disappointingly small; however, tellingly, 
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none volunteered ‘support for regionalism’ as a reason for donations.  Typical 
responses dealt with ‘support for free markets’ or ‘supports good government’.  No 
spokesperson was willing to go beyond these general characterizations.  In sum, 
despite a great deal of activity using other means to impact policy, the regional 
business community does not employ campaign donations to influence government 
policy.  While individual business figures involved in the regional regime and 
regional movements act as political entrepreneurs to achieve state funds (as in the 
case of Plan 2007 and HRP) or to regularize per capita fees per jurisdiction (HREDA 
and PAED), they do not fit Walker’s definition of patron.  However, the Virginia 
General Assembly’s passage of the Regional Competitiveness Act did put the state 
government into the patron role in Hampton Roads—and other Virginia communities.  
State funding allowed HRP to create eight issue-oriented task forces, spin off 
organizations such as the Hampton Roads Technology Council and incentivize 
HREDA-PAED joint trips as a confidence building measure partially responsible for 
the eventual merger of the two alliances.
This section has examined the leadership link.  We saw at the outset that 
intense concern about the prognosis for the regional economy stimulated business 
activity.  These business activities produced further regional cooperation.  Thus, the 










Getting key players to communicate and interact regularly has been implicit in  
much leadership activity as invoked in the argument above (Section 6(B).4.4(b): 
Leadership) and in the narrative of Section 6(A).3.2.  Recall for example that the 
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce brought together over 400 key business and, 
to a lesser extent, public sector personalities to produce Plan 2007.  To institutionalize 
and expand that degree of regional cooperation, the business leadership proposed 
formation of the Hampton Roads Partnership as an effort to bring elected officials 
together with the business elites to produce an organization which could capitalize 
upon the advantages of both.   HREDA had a similar founding principle, enlisting 
local governments in what had been a Chamber of Commerce undertaking in order to 
produce a consensus for a truly authoritative Southside economic development 
endeavor.  Successful leadership sets the stage for key actors to communicate.  
The composition of the initial HRP Board of Directors as well as of the HRP 
Ports Committee which initiated funding for joint HREDA-PAED trips underscores 
the success of the effort to keep the public-private partnership well balanced:
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Gov't Military Other TOTAL
HRP Board 30 15 6 3 0 0 3 57
53% 26% 11% 5% 0% 0% 5% 100%
Ports Comm 22 9 4 11 5 6 1 58
38% 16% 7% 19% 9% 10% 2% 100%
HREDA and PAED trade missions included not only their own staffers but 
officials from jurisdictional economic development departments.   The repetition 
facilitates ‘policing’ or ‘monitoring’ of cooperation (E. Ostrom 1990, pp 17-21, 44, 
90):  Informal norms are that a department or departmental official who regularly 
violates the anti-raiding agreement or put his/her municipality’s interests ahead of 
advertising the region in general could not expect much support from others on a 
mission… or (in the case of an individual) even to be invited again.  Trade missions 
and board meetings are regular events, so cities, counties and individual actors are 
assured of repeated dealings.
Thus, successful leadership attempts to produce healthy patterns of 
communication and interaction among key individuals and organizations.  The extent 
of agreement on the anti-raiding pact values revealed in the interview questionnaire in 
Section 6(A).3.2 is arguably a manifestation of the success of this strategy: Economic 
development professionals were more likely to avoid competitive practices in 
questions 1(a) and 2(b) than others… and they (or their officemates)  met monthly at 
HREDA or PAED.  Thus, the validity of the causation arrow from leadership to 
communication.  And clearly, with the successes of HRP in developing new spinoff 
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organizations with public- private directors and formal liaisons (such as the Hampton 
Roads Technology Council) and in engendering sufficient trust through joint trade 
missions between HREDA and PAED to bring about their merger, causation can 
extend from communication to regional cooperation.  Finally, given the successes of 
regional cooperation—spurred both by communication and by leadership—
generating the anti-raiding agreement and a lower number of controversial business 





Costs Game Transition Stable Cooperation Possible
Regional
Cooperation
Before leaving the leadership-communication link, it is appropriate to mention 
one last observation.  While it is not the result of a deliberate move by regional 
leaders, many economic development officials interviewed noted that they had 
worked in other cities or counties within the region prior to assuming their current 
duties.  Most of these volunteered that the working relationships—in more than one 
case, enduring friendships—thus formed made serious, repeated violation of anti-
raiding and cooperative norms unthinkable.  It also made cooperation and trust in 
interdepartmental dealings more readily conceivable.
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Noted Hampton Roads figure James Eason is an exemplar.  A native of 
Hampton, Eason graduated from Hampton High School in 1960.  After majoring in 
accounting in college, he built a firm he founded into Hampton’s largest public 
accounting enterprise.  Concurrently Eason became a Hampton School Board 
member from 1978 to 1982.  In 1982 he became Hampton’s first directly elected 
mayor.  He was one of the few elected officials to participate in Plan 2007.  Eason 
resigned as mayor to become President and CEO of Hampton Roads Partnership in 
1998.  He left that post in the summer of 2004 to return to Hampton as director of 
economic development. 
6(B).4.5  Increasing Regional Cooperation—More Theory; Empirical 
    Insights
Thus we see increased cooperation.  Specificly to IJC, the anti-raiding pact is 
unanimously adopted.  Existing regional cooperative institutions are upgraded (to 
HREDA and PAED) and new ones formed, such as the Hampton Roads Partnership 
and its progeny.  
Note that this part of the argument has included not only financially costless 
IJC abatement via the anti-raiding agreement but also new regional cooperation 
organizations which are not without financial costs.  Can these be justified within the 
strict game theoretic framework in Section 6(B).2 above, or is the argument drifting 
into game-theory-as-metaphor?  The answer is that regional organizations do fit 
within the theoretical framework.  They provide the rewards of cooperation—with a 
financial cost—which can certainly be greater than the defect/defect equilibrium in 
the following way: First, recall the argument for the second equilibrium in the 
assurance game.  For the cooperate/ cooperate equilibrium to exist:
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½ D > D — B 
B > ½ D
Now consider the case in which  ½D  is obtained at cost ‘C’.  The cooperative 
equilibrium still holds if the bid increases at least commensurately by ‘B* ’.  Thus, 
½ D > D – B  (original statement)
½ D – C > D – B  and
B > ½ D + C  if
B + B* > ½ D + C  
where B* >= C
Thus the bid—now somewhat more than half of direct benefits —still more than 
offsets half the direct benefits.  This is true even though the direct benefits in the 
cooperate/ cooperate cell are now net benefits because of the financial costs of 
establishing and maintaining cooperative agencies like HREDA and HRP which have 
a business-attraction components in their agendas (in the case of HREDA, of course, 
business attraction is the sole mission).  In this manner we can legitimately include 
regional cooperation agencies in the strict theoretical discussion.  
Another aspect of regional bodies can be included in the model.  Recall, for 
example, the assertions in the press and the ODU study that HREDA returns a 
multiple of jurisdictional payments of a dollar per resident.  What effect does this 
have analytically?  Expanding on the model by adding not only costs ‘C’ but a 
synergistic return for regional organization ‘R’, we get:
½ D + R – C > D – B 
B + R – C > ½ D
add B*  >=  C
B + B* > ½ D + C – R 
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Thus, we get to the assurance game sooner if there are additional returns for regional 
cooperation, especially as such returns become larger.  
Empirically, the basic portrait above can be substantiated by examination of 
two lists of regional economic development organizations by outside sources.  
Probsdorfer (2001, pp 21-34) makes five regional bodies the focus of his study:
1. Hampton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC):  founded 1990
2. Hampton Roads Partnership (HRP):  founded 1996
3. Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance (HREDA):  founded 1997
4. Peninsula Alliance for Economic Development (PAED):  founded 1997
5. Hampton Roads Technology Council (HRTC):  founded 1997
All of Probsdorder’s five were created in during the study period.
The Virginian-Pilot (2003, 8/24/03) published a similar list:
1. Hampton Roads Partnership (HRP):  founded 1996
2. Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce (HRCC):  founded 1984
3. Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance (HREDA):  founded 1997
4. Peninsula Alliance for Economic Development (PAED):  founded 1997
5. Hampton Roads Planning District Commission (HRPDC):  founded 1990
6. Future of Hampton Roads (FHR):  founded 1982
Again, a majority— 4 of 6 organizations— were founded in the 1990s.
It might be argued that the lists camouflage earlier cooperation in the form of 
predecessor organizations of the HREDA (Forward Hampton Roads, founded as an 
arm of the Chamber of Commerce in 1984) and the PAED (Virginia Peninsula 
Economic Development Council, established 1979).  True, lists so expanded would 
add one organization each to the tally for the decades of the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
counterargument would be (a) that the 1990s would still be the dominant decade for 
new group formation, (b) that predecessor organizations had fewer resources and 
responsibilities (HREDA brought public sector funds, officials and board members; 
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PAED was streamlined for attracting business and for workforce development) and 
(c) that if lists are to be expanded to include predecessors, then perhaps other regional 
economic organizations might also be included, such as Hampton Roads Technology 
Incubator (established 1998), Hampton Roads Sports Authority (formed 1996) and 
Hampton Roads Transit (consolidated 1999).  Also, the major regionalism measure 
achieved in the 1980s—the consolidation of Hampton Roads ports—was mandated 
and administered by the Commonwealth of Virginia.    It was not a home-grown 
move.    Thus, by any measure and from any perspective, the study period is one of 
singular growth in regional bodies.
The more advanced theory dealing with the synergistic returns through 
regional organizations also finds support in the form of the Old Dominion University 
study of HREDA (Koch, Agarwal & Yochum, 2003).  As noted in Section 6(B).4.4(a) 
above,  Tables 4 and 5 of the ODU study list the ratios of additional tax revenues and 
of new payroll from HREDA efforts to each  jurisdiction’s financial contribution to 
HREDA.  These can be combined in the following table from Section 6(B).4.4(a):
Benefits of HREDA to Component Jurisdictions
Ratio Of:
City or County:
New Taxes to 
HREDA 
Support:
New Payroll to 
HREDA 
Support:





Virginia Beach 5.4 31
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Although the study did not compare these outcomes with potential returns if funds 
had instead been expended solely by local economic development departments, the 
magnitude of the ratios constitutes strong evidence of synergy in the regional 
HREDA business attraction operation.
6.4.3(f)  Possible Objections.  A possible objection to this comparative 
static portrayal of events is that is an example of the ex hoc ergo propter hoc logical 
fallacy: An upsurge in regional cooperation occurred after the shocks of the early 
1990s, therefore it occurred because of the shocks of the early 1990s.  But the 
statements of so many persons interviewed should allay this concern: Participants in 
those and subsequent events testify to the story as recounted in this section.  Thus, 
history in Hampton Roads appears to unfold in accordance with the prediction of 
game transition.  
Of course, the analysis to this point has begged a question: Was the situation a 
prisoners’ dilemma prior to 1990?  Unfortunately, the subject is not one which can be 
put in a petri dish, cultured, placed under a microscope and counted.  However, 
evidence exists that the Hampton Roads environment was much less cooperative in 
earlier years.  First, note the prevalence of IJC in the form of raiding prior to the anti-
raiding agreement.  As noted in Section 6.3.3, this included Ferguson Enterprises, 
Ernst & Young, Contemporary Cybernetics, and ValuJet.  Second, the increase in 
regional cooperation organizations during the study period suggests a less 
cooperative, more competitive earlier period.
Why is this not a solved prisoners’ dilemma as opposed to evidence of an
assurance game?  Admittedly, it could be a prisoners’ dilemma solved.  However, 
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Hampton Roads history shows a rich flowering of a number of regional cooperative 
efforts rather than simply a carefully targeted solution to one problem.  The 
prevalence of cooperation across so broad a spectrum of regional economic 
development—for just one example, consider HRP’s list of not one or two but eight
broad issue areas—certainly seems to imply the existence of a new, cooperative 
equilibrium more than a one-off prisoners’ dilemma solution.
6.5  Conclusions
Previous chapters have drawn conclusions from national data sets.  This 
method has the virtue of evaluating sweeping hypotheses based upon national 
experience.  However, the depth of  the approach is limited by the degree of 
resolution of the data.  The less detail available, the fewer the specific knowledge 
claims that can be deduced.
A case study, on the other hand, offers rich detail and intuitive texture.  Part A 
of this chapter sketched Hampton Roads history and described IJC, economic 
development and regional cooperation in Hampton Roads since 1990.  The study 
period began in the midst of shocks such as threatened defense cutbacks and a 
nationwide recession.  The decennial Census showed Hampton Roads economic 
performance falling behind comparable Southeastern urban regions.  Despite 
Hampton Roads’ fractious history and fragmented political geography, these initial 
setbacks ushered in an era of unprecedented increases in regional cooperation.  New 
regional bodies and agreements were formed, older institutions were revamped and as 
this chapter was being drafted, Southside and Peninsula economic development 
alliances were on the verge of merger.
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Part B shifted attention first to theory, then to an argument.  The text gave a 
capsule description of the possibility for game transition from prisoners’ dilemma to 
assurance if costs rose sufficiently.  It then introduced leadership theory and set forth 
the possibility of transactional transition.  The balance of the chapter substantiated 
how in Hampton Roads game transition and leadership transactional transition 
reinforced one another.  Game transition provides a mutual cooperation equilibrium.  
Leadership and communication induced by leadership can facilitate successful
collective action by moving participants in an assurance game to that stable 
cooperation equilibrium.10
Thus, in studying Hampton Roads economic development competition and 
cooperation from in the 1990s to present, we have found that indeed, per the national 
dataset, leadership and communication are powerful tools for those who seek 
regionally cooperative approaches to economic development challenges.  Combining 
the argument in this chapter with that of the previous chapter, we see that leadership 
and communication can produce regional cooperation either by solving a prisoners’ 
dilemma or by moving an assurance game to mutual cooperation.  Hence the diagram 
in which the assurance game causal pathways were superimposed in color on the 
Chapter Five prisoners’ dilemma-based chart.  Part B of this chapter has concentrated 
on game transition and leadership transactional transition.  The final chapter will 
conclude the dissertation by bringing the different causal pathways together, 
discussing implications of previous chapters for various theoretical and policy 
10
 Somewhat more speculative but nonetheless arguable is a role for anticipated returns—Note Donald 
Maxwell’s statement during the Virginia Beach City Council uprising against HREDA that the 
Virginia Beach economic development effort would be substantially diminished without the Alliance, 
a claim substantiated by the ODU study.
276




 The 1950 Census termed the MSA the “Norfolk-Portsmouth MSA”.  (Generally, the most populous 
jurisdiction is the first-named.)  Princess Anne County was a component but Virginia Beach was not 
part of the MSA environs until the 1960 Census.  By 1973, Virginia Beach had grown sufficiently to 
become part of the title: the “Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Portsmouth MSA”.  (Redefinition of MSAs 
based upon the most recent Census usually occurs about three years after the decennial.)  In 1983 
sufficient economic interaction took place across the James River for the MSA to be combined with 
the Newport News-Hampton MSA, producing the new “Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News MSA”.
Finally, beginning with the 2002 Economic Census, the ascendancy of Virginia Beach was 
acknowledged by the Bureau of the Census with the new MSA title, the “Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News MSA”.
2
 These patterns hold when non-corporate affiliated groups such as housewives and retirees are 
included.  The percentages become:
HAMPTON ROADS CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES















Peninsula 89.85% 4.81% 1.39% 1.71% 2.24% 100%
Southside 85.31% 0.30% 11.51% 1.31% 1.58% 100%
Totals: 86.38% 1.36% 9.13% 1.41% 1.73% 100%
Alternatively, the corporate affiliation could be more strictly defined as donations either directly from 
corporations or those who are evidently owners (identified by “owner” or same last name as that of the 
business firm in the applicable blocks on the Schedule A or B form).  The results are again essentially 
the same:
HAMPTON ROADS CAMPAIGN DONATION SOURCES
by PERCENTAGE; corporate-affiliated donors















Peninsula 88.35% 5.05% 1.76% 2.42% 2.42% 100%
Southside 84.26% 0.22% 12.57% 1.45% 1.50% 100%




This chapter will summarize the analytical effort in our account of 
interjurisdictional competition and urban area fragmentation, tie up several 
unresolved issues, discuss the implications of study findings for collective action 
theory and other relevant paradigms, and sketch an agenda for future research.  
Section 7.2 provides the brief summary of the work.  Section 7.3 discusses the two 
models concerning leadership and communication posited in Chapters Five and Six.  
Section 7.4 completes the discussion in the Chapter One Appendix of theories other 
than collective action by discussing implications of this study for these debates.  
Section 7.5 proposes a research agenda for future inquiry into interjurisdictional 
competition and urban area fragmentation.
7.2 Summary of the Study
Interjurisdictional competition is the use by a government of tax, spending, 
zoning and/or other regulatory provisions as incentives to induce a specific firm—or 
firms in general—to locate (or remain) in its own jurisdiction as opposed to another 
city, county, state or nation.  This study has focused on competition among cities, 
towns and counties within urban areas in the United States.  Anecdotal evidence 
related in Chapter One highlights the considerable magnitudes of incentives—
arguably over $62,000 per job in the case of Maryland’s Marriott corporate 
headquarters expansion—as well as its pervasiveness as a local (as distinct from 
interstate or international) phenomenon.  Specific instances of IJC also underscore the 
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possibility of cooperation in attracting new firms to an urban area, as is the case with 
the Metro Denver Network.
Various theoretical perspectives address the IJC phenomenon, including 
public finance and urban policy studies.  This study utilized IJC to evaluate the theory 
of collective action in political science.  A model of the collective action problem still 
often invoked four decades after its conception is Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective 
Action (1965), in which free-riding dooms most efforts at collective action unless the 
group size is relatively small or active members receive selective benefits unavailable 
to the group of potential beneficiaries at large.  IJC is frequently described in these 
terms.  The large numbers of communities which comprise so many American 
metropolitan regions make this assertion attractive.  And the substantial variation in 
numbers (from two to hundreds per urban area) makes statistical analysis tenable.  
IJC is often more specifically described as a free-rider phenomenon in terms 
of the  prisoners’ dilemma in game theory.  Because the term prisoners’ dilemma is 
sometimes employed loosely and metaphorically, Chapter Two and its appendix 
rigorously evaluate this claim.  In fact, different IJC situations give rise to different 
games.  However, at their core all have the prisoners’ dilemma problem: a strong 
incentive toward an equilibrium of mutual defection rather than cooperation.
To evaluate collective action theory using urban area IJC as a natural 
experiment, the study employed two major data sources: (a) the 1994 International 
City/County Managers Association economic development survey, and (b) 1990 
Census data, especially population and income figures for jurisdictions comprising 
urbanized areas.  The former provided data to construct additive indices assessing 
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IJC; the latter, inputs for Hirschman-Herfindahl-like indices measuring 
fragmentation.  The basic hypothesis was:
IJC = f(fragmentation)
Contrary to the received free-rider wisdom, the relationship was not positive.  
IJC did not rise with increased fragmentation, even when control variables for racial 
diversity and form of government were added.  Neither was IJC uncorrelated with 
urban area fragmentation.  In point of fact, IJC actually decreased with increases in 
fragmentation.
These results led to evaluation of alternative hypotheses based upon 
alternatives to free-rider theory.  Anticipated returns, communication and leadership 
are the major alternative explanations for the success or failure of collective action.  
A further set of regressions substantiated both communication and leadership as 
effectual within the IJC world.  In sum, Chapters Four and Five demonstrated a 
statistically significant inverse correlation between IJC and fragmentation, leadership 
and communication.  Follow-on statistical analysis led to a model in which 
fragmentation is linked with increases in leadership and communication, which in 
turn are connected inversely with IJC effort.  The assertion is not so much that 
fragmentation causes more active leadership or better communication but that 
leadership and communication arise to compensate for the absence of formal regional 
governmental mechanisms.  
In order to explore the IJC world in greater depth, we turned to a case study of 
the Hampton Roads, Virginia urban area.  The Hampton Roads regional economy 
suffered a number of shocks around 1990, including a recession, the threat of losing 
281
part of its very substantial military sector and secular decline vis a vis other 
Southeastern metropolitan areas.  The study combined game transition—a topic 
introduced in Chapter Two, Theory—with leadership theory to argue that the nature 
of the Hampton Roads game had in fact changed from prisoners’ dilemma to 
assurance, and that leadership reinforced by communication had moved the polity 
from mutual defection to the cooperative equilibrium thereby created.
7.3 Unresolved Issues (I): Models of Leadership and Communication
As noted directly above, Chapters Five and Six developed models of the 
effects of leadership and communication on IJC effort.  In Chapter Five, leadership 
and communication had the effect predicted by alternatives to the free-rider theory of 
collective action: Increased leadership and communication were associated with 
decreased IJC.  Working back through the chain of events, higher levels of leadership 
and communication were associated with greater fragmentation of urbanized areas.  
This does not mean that fragmentation causes leadership and communication but 
rather that both apparently increase to compensate for the lack of formal coordinating 





Chapter Six then overlaid a model of game transition and leadership 
transactional transition.  Harking back to an element of game theory in Chapter Two, 
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the new model traces an increase in costs (bids for firms) relative to direct benefits of 
a firm locating in one’s own jurisdiction.  A sufficient increase in costs can bring 
about game transition from prisoners’ dilemma to an assurance game, creating an 
additional equilibrium for mutual cooperation.  Simultaneously, on the leadership 
theory side, increased costs can stimulate a leadership reaction in which elites can 
prompt the development of regional cooperation mechanisms as well as 
communication which further facilitates regional cooperation, thus moving the region 
from mutual defection to stable mutual cooperation and impacting IJC.  Here is the 




Costs Game Transition Stable Cooperation Possible
Regional
Cooperation






Costs Game Transition Stable Cooperation Possible
Regional
Cooperation
The Chapter Six argument focused solely on the game transition/leadership 
transactional transition model—the colored links—via the contention that the game in 
Hampton Roads  had changed by observing newfound cooperation across a spectrum 
of regional activities and concerns.  This leads to further issues.  First, can the two 
models (in Chapter Five and Chapter Six) of leadership and communication both be 
at work at the same time in the same urban region?  The answer would seem to be 
affirmative in three of four possible combinations.  To begin with the Chapter Five 
mechanism, as noted in the chart below, while the alternative theories of leadership 
and communication were developed for the prisoners’ dilemma paradigm, there is no 
reason they cannot work equally well for its cousin, the assurance game.  Both 
leadership and communication work to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma mutual 
defection equilibrium.  If a second, cooperative equilibrium appears, so much the 
better.
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MODELS SUPPORTING REGIONAL COOPERATION
Chapter 5 
Mechanism






Assurance yes yes, as costs rise vis a 
vis direct benefits
The game transition/leadership transactional transition model works in a 
somewhat more complicated manner.  If the game is originally a prisoners’ dilemma 
and bid costs rise sufficiently, then the situation becomes an assurance game.  This 
was the case argued in Chapter Six for Hampton Roads.  Thus, the game/leadership 
transactional transition model can be at work in the assurance game.  However, if the 
polity is already in the assurance game mode and costs fall sufficiently relative to 
direct benefits, the game transition could presumably work in reverse.  Given the 
reversion to the underlying prisoners’ dilemma incentives to defection, the decrease 
in the cost of bidding would remove the link stimulating elites to seek regional 
cooperation, leaving only the Chapter Five mechanism. 
Of course, there could be a Keynesian downward stickiness to regional 
cooperation efforts.  Once established, institutions—both organizations and 
practices—tend to have a resilience which ensures a high degree of longevity.  The 
extent to which regional cooperation would vanish is an empirical issue for follow-on 
study.  If there is no stickiness downward, then another possibility needs to be 
theoretically modeled and empirically investigated: Do the relative-costs- based 
pressures of the prisoners’ dilemma on one side and the assurance game on the other 
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constitute a rough band of equilibrium behavior, a social state defying definitive 
description as either prisoners’ dilemma or assurance game but rather eternally 
flitting back and forth between the two?  And might such a social state help break 
vicious cycles?
Empirical measurement itself is the second issue to follow from the two 
models.  Is there a way to generate adequate metrics to statistically measure direct 
benefits and bid costs in order to get better resolution on a test of game transition?  In 
the Hampton Roads case study, the argument was more intuitive and based upon 
breadth of cooperation being more likely to reflect the assurance game than a series of 
solved prisoners’ dilemmas.  This is a valid first cut at testing the theory in the 
metropolitan context; however, as an agenda item for future research, a numerical test 
of some sort would constitute a more rigorous evaluation.  In the IJC realm, a future 
test might involve two ICMA economic development surveys (they are conducted at 
roughly seven year intervals) to generate additive indices and Census data on 
urbanized area per capita income.  Falling per capita income could be taken as a sign 
of increased bid costs for business incentives in a manner similar to the argument 
attributing rising costs to Hampton Roads in Chapter Six.  The statistical test would 
then ascertain if rising costs (falling income per capita) are associated with greater 
cooperative behavior in additive indices.
Even this test has its shortcomings, however.  Chief among them is that, 
unlike the case study, the statistical test cannot get a handle on breadth of cooperative 
behavior to infer an assurance game.  Perhaps a cleaner test of game transition would 
take place not in government and politics studies but rather in the economics of cartel 
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behavior.  The analysis could first identify markets in which cartels formed or, having 
been in existence, lost members or dissolved.  In this scenario, costs are not bids but 
costs of production and are probably constant across all firms.  However, direct 
benefits vary, changing the gap between direct benefits and costs.  When this gap is 
small enough (as predicted by the theory in Chapter Two), the game should change 
from prisoners’ dilemma to assurance and we should see an increase in cartel stability 
as cooperation becomes an equilibrium position.  When the gap widens sufficiently, 
we should observe defection as firms in the market try to undercut cartel prices as the 
cooperative equilibrium disappears and the game changes from assurance to 
prisoners’ dilemma.  Note that the cartel context should also generate much more 
precise estimates of ‘T’ (‘temptation’), ‘R’ (‘reward’), ‘P’ (‘penalty’) and ‘S’ 
(‘sucker’s payoff’), thus allowing a more certain diagnosis of what game is being 
played.
7.4 Unresolved Issues (II): Debates in Other Literatures
While the focus of this study has been the collective action problem, the 
Appendix to Chapter One sketched other theories germane to the phenomenon of 
interjurisdictional competition.  Two major debates were covered, one on the nature 
of IJC, the other on the outcomes of fragmented versus unified regional government.
The debate within the public finance community of economics centers on 
whether IJC is beneficial in steering firms to jurisdictions in which they are most 
productive or whether the competition over incentives is destructive, progressively 
impoverishing jurisdictions as mobile firms move successively from community to 
community in search of the best deals.  In the first argument, local governments 
287
compete by offering incentives which ensure a firm’s overall taxes are no greater than 
the marginal cost for the jurisdiction to produce the public goods consumed by the 
firm.  Thus, all business taxes are benefit taxes—a normatively desirable goal within 
welfare economics.  In the second argument, jurisdictions bid for firms in order to 
lower the tax bills of ordinary residents.  This works for a while but eventually gets 
out of hand.  Firms find that they can bargain for lower and lower taxes by moving 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Jurisdictions are reduced to effectively cutting 
corporate tax payments to almost nothing and shifting the burden onto the residents 
IJC was intended to help.
The results of this study tend to support the IJC-as-benefit-taxation school by 
refuting destructive competition claims about the inexorable nature of jurisdictions 
undercutting each other.  Greater fragmentation is associated not with further 
defection but instead with greater cooperation and less IJC.  The downward spiral is 
broken.  This is especially reinforced by game transition: If costs rise too greatly 
relative to direct benefits, the change to assurance game should make regional 
cooperation a more attainable outcome.
The second debate pits polycentricity against monocentricity.  Is a 
metropolitan region with many local governments more responsive to its citizenry, or 
does it become a series of feuding petty fiefdoms, grossly inefficient and incapable of 
cooperative action on issues of regional concern?  
Unlike the two different approaches IJC, this debate covers a number of 
phenomena—IJC, sprawl, public goods provision, equity in health care, education 
and other services.  From the perspective of IJC, this study tends to support the 
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polycentrists.  Fragmented regions tend to develop more leadership and better 
communication, leading them to exhibit not more but less IJC.  The ‘wasteful IJC 
spending’ predicted by monocentrists is not in evidence in these statistical outcomes.
7.5 A Research Agenda
Just as this study has employed different research techniques, future research 
on interjurisdictional competition and urban area fragmentation should similarly 
employ a variety of research techniques and theoretical perspectives.  Most 
obviously, given the administration of the ICMA Economic Development Survey 
approximately every seven years for more than two decades, the national data 
component can be rerun using multiple years.  This would allow analysis not only of 
cross-sectional but panel data.  Compiling such data is hardly a trivial endeavor.  The 
project would involve some critical decisions—such as how to define comparable 
additive indices given changes in survey questions over the years—and laborious 
generation of fragmentation indices from Census data.  However, the enhanced 
analytical capacity from such a dataset would be very rewarding.  The multi-year 
component would facilitate another perspective on the effects of changing degrees of 
fragmentation within urban regions over time as well as statistical estimation of game 
transition as outlined in Section 7.3 above.  However, empirical evaluation of game 
transition should also include testing more data-rich venues, such as cartel behavior, 
as also mentioned in Section 7.3.
Another major research method used in this report is the case study.  The 
Hampton Roads case study was a very interesting and productive exercise which 
generated not only a firm intuitive handle on the subject but also new insights, such as 
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the game transition/leadership transactional transition model for regional cooperation.  
In that the folk theorem has it that the plural of case study is ‘data’, other case studies 
can assess the conditions which lead to cooperation or defection on IJC and in 
regional economic development.  The comparative case study method (Lijphart, 
1975; King et al, 1994) requires a theoretical paradigm to orient the research in the 
various urban areas studied; thus, positing a model of urban regional cooperation 
would be a necessary intermediate goal of further case study research.  However, the 
paradigm is intended as guidance to allow researchers to compare specific case 
studies across specific variables.  It is not a straitjacket; indeed, some very interesting 
research using the comparative case study method has ultimately recommended 
substantial modifications to the original paradigm (c.f.: Leland & Thurmaier for such 
scholarship in cases of city-county consolidation referenda).  After specification of an 
initial model of IJC cooperation, a group of scholars could collaborate on a 
compendium of case studies.
Relatedly, the Hampton Roads case study also uncovered an organization 
which may in itself be of interest for comparative case studies.  The history and 
development of the subregional (ultimately, regional) economic development 
alliances like HREDA and PAED turned out to be a rich and enlightening tale of 
cooperation in the midst of an environment which is competitive in multiple 
dimensions—both in the marketplace and among governmental jurisdictions.  
Hampton Roads is particularly interesting because of the Southside-Peninsula 
differences.  While the James River provided a physical (and, for many generations, 
economic) barrier, other urban areas may have similar distinctions among subregions 
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based upon historical development (say, two conurbations which grow and become 
one).  The merger of sub-regional alliances in these cases may also contribute to the 
study of various perspectives in political science.
Finally, the reservations about interjurisdictional competition expressed by 
opponents of the practice (Section 1.1, Chapter One) should be engaged by theory 
and research.  For example, does IJC frequently transfer tax dollars to politically 
well-connected supporters of politicians who influence or determine business 
incentive allocations?  This ultimately leads to a full consideration of the ethics of 
IJC.  One ethical concern is the welfare economics principle of equity: similar entities 
in similar circumstances should be treated in the same way (Due & Friedlaender).  Is 
IJC equitable?  The question is not easy: From the first public finance school noted 
above, IJC promotes equity by ensuring that all taxes are benefit taxes.  Yet on the 
other hand IJC means that newcomers to the region are treated differently from 
established entrepreneurs.  A related conundrum involves Kantian versus utilitarian 
analysis.  The Kantian analysis would call for all businesses to be treated in the way 
the owners would prefer to be treated themselves, and presumably the average 
entrepreneur would rather not see his or her taxes used to subsidize the relocation of 
potential competitors, so IJC is not an ethical practice.  Yet as noted in the case study, 
many businesspersons support the use of incentives to attract new businesses, 
anticipating a more robust economy which will help all businesses, theirs included—
in effect, the ethics of the self-refilling cookie jar (Schmidtz) which likens a growing 
economy to a cookie jar in which every time you take a cookie, two appear in its 
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place, making taking a cookie a morally good act instead of extracting a resource to 
the exclusion of others.
While the ethics of self-refilling cookie jars may have a playful tone, the goal 
of ethical analysis of interjurisdictional competition is hardly detached erudition.  As 
with so much in science, the ability to predict IJC in specific instances or particular 
urban regions remains limited.  Our descriptive analysis can give voters and 
policymakers guidance but—especially in the absence of complete and detailed 
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